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STUDENT PROJECT: THE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL
ACT OF 1980
T HIS ISSUE OF THE AKRON LAW REVIEW is devoted to legal questions re-
lating to the savings and loan industry. This particular project consists
of an in-depth examination of the very important piece of legislation named
in the title above. Although many of the provisions contained therein directly
impact upon savings and loans, the authors have not limited themselves
to that aspect, but have also addressed issues relating to all types of de-
pository institutions. A general discussion of interest regulation is given
first. This is followed by a title by title, section by section analysis of the
major provisions of this far-reaching act.
The coordinating editor of this project was David R. Parker. The
student authors of this work are:
MELISSA A. BYERS
CHRIS 0. PAPARODIS
LAWRENCE J. ROMAN
LINDA R. Tucci
INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF INTEREST REGULATION
A. Historical Perspective
In the course of its history, Regulation Q1 has served as a housing
program, a banking industry stability program, and an indirect tax revenue
measure. Regulation Q, in its basic form, establishes ceilings on the interest
rates which various classes of depository institutions may pay to their
depositors. The ceiling differential is used to compensate for variations in
the regulatory restrictions pertaining to investments which can be made and
services which can be offered. In the past decade, depositors have received
less than the fair rental value of their money as market values for the
use of the money rose with expectations of continued inflation.' Builders
and buyers in the housing market benefited from a source of low interest
financing subsidized in part by depositors. The mandated phaseout of Regu-
lation Q under the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
I See Interest on Deposits, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1980) (Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R.
§ 329 (1980) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); and 12 C.F.R. § 526 (1980) (Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board) for maximum rates payable to their respective members.
The popular name for such interest regulations has been Regulation Q. Some form has
been in effect since January 1, 1936.
2 Regulation Q and Related Measures: Hearings on H.R. 4986 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980
House Reg. Q Hearings].
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Control Act of 19803 (hereinafter referred to as the 1980 Act) was the
result of pressure from the small saver for an equitable return as well as
pressure from an industry concerned about the outflow of deposits (dis-
intermediation) from regulated depository institutions to alternative invest-
ments.
The foundations of Regulation Q date back to the Banking Act of
1933' which authorized the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to set ceilings on interest which member banks could pay on time
deposits. Interest could not be paid on demand deposits.' Interest rate ceilings
for non-member banks were set by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC).' In the relative economic stability of the 1933 to 1966
time period, there was little pressure on the established ceilings. Market
rates paid on savings deposits represented the rental value of money less
the services provided to the saver. Thrift institutions and credit unions
competed with banks for the depositors' savings. By enabling statutes and
tax incentives, the thrift institutions concentrated in the home mortgage
market and credit unions provided their members with consumer loans for
automobiles and other non-residential purposes.
The delicate competitive balance among the regulated depository in-
stitutions was maintained by the Interagency Coordinating Committee
(ICC). This informal group was comprised of the heads of the FDIC,
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), FHLBB, National Credit Union Adminis-
tration (NCUA), the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of
the Currency.! The ICC met regularly to discuss issues relating to the ad-
ministration of Regulation Q, but did not take votes.' Now, under Title II
of the 1980 Act, the Depository Institution Deregulation Committee (DIDC)
is comprised of the same representatives as the ICC had been. The Comp-
troller of the Currency is a member but has no vote. A majority vote is re-
quired for any action taken.'
During the 1970's, the average consumer price index annual increase
was 7.42% 1 and depository institutions faced disintermediation as savers
3 Pub. L No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Act].
'See generally 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1976); see also 12 U.S.C. 371b (1976).
5 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976).
o 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1828(g) (1976).
T 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 869-71 (testimony of Messrs. Sprague,
Heimann, and Partee). Changes in the ceilings were determined by the FDIC, FHLBB, and
the Federal Reserve.
8 ld. at 871.
9 12 U.S.C.A. § 3502(b) (1980).
"0 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 910 (statement of the National Retired
Teachers Association and the American Association of Retired Persons). Their chart
compares the growing inflation of the 1970's with the relatively unresponsive passbook
ceilings to emphasize the net negative interest to savers. See also MoNmLY LAD. REv., U.S.
DEPT. or LAB. BuREAu oF LAD. STATISTICS, Nov. 1980.
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sought alternative markets such as government securities and Money Mar-
ket Mutual Funds (MMMF's). The ICC reacted by giving institutions the
authority to offer long term certificates of deposit (CD's) at market rates.
The most successful of these CD's has been the six-month money market
certificate introduced in June, 1978 which pays up to 2 % above the
twenty-six-week Treasury Bill rate.1"
The market rate CD's enabled depository institutions to slow the
flow of deposits from their vaults but the CD's had various duration and
minimum deposit requirements. Small savers and those having liquidity
requirements continued to receive only nominal returns on their deposits.
Those savers unwilling or unable to buy CD's were also kept out of the
alternative markets to some extent by similar restrictions. Treasury Bills
and other government securities were attractive where security was the
prime objective but liquidity was limited, purchase was inconvenient, and
minimums were high. MMMFs offered market interest rates and, in some
cases, check-like withdrawals but were uninsured and the rate of return was
not fixed in advance." A third alternative which many savers found ap-
pealing was to spend money as it was earned, stocking up on necessities or
purchasing retail goods before anticipated price increases. Because of the
impact massive withdrawals by many small savers from the depository
institutions would have, Congress and various presidential commissions
gave careful study over the last decade to the desirability of continuing
deposit interest rate ceilings.
B. Presidential Initiatives on Deregulation
In 1970 President Nixon appointed a Commission on Financial Struc-
ture and Regulation. The Commission, headed by Reed 0. Hunt, was
comprised of leaders in banking, government and industry. Their findings,
commonly referred to as the Hunt Commission Report," contained the
following interest ceiling recommendations: a) abolishment of interest ceil-
ings for accounts of $100,000 or more;" b) stand-by authority to the
Federal Reserve Board to stipulate ceilings on smaller accounts when serious
disintermediation is threatened;" c) discretionary power in the Board to
reduce the $100,000 cutoff amount for the stand-by power;"6 d) stand-by
power of the Board to establish interest rate ceilings including the power
to establish differentials of limited duration between institutions providing
11 Since their inception, the rates payable to purchasers of money market certificates have
been generally in the 8 to 16% range. On January 1, 1981 the rate was 13.661%.
12 See generally Money Market Mutual Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aflairs, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980).
13 THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION
(1971) (Reed 0. Hunt, Chairman).
1I ld. at 23.
25 ld.
'16 Id.
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third party payment services and those institutions not providing such
services;1 ' e) five year limit on the authority to establish and maintain
differentials; 8 f) a ten year limit on the power of the Board to establish in-
terest rate ceilings; 9 and, g) retention of the prohibition against the payment
of interest on demand deposits."0 In addition, the Commission warned
against piecemeal legislative action and stressed the interdependence of
their recommendations.2 ' Other recommendations of the Commission dealt
with: a) regulation of the functions of depository institutions; 2 b) charter-
ing and branching;"3 c) deposit reserve requirements;' d) taxation of
financial institutions; 5 e) deposit insurance; 8 f) housing and mortgage
markets;" g) regulation and supervision of financial institutions;" and
h) other related matters.
In 1973 President Nixon, after considering the Hunt Commission
recommendations, made the following proposals to Congress: a) in-
terest ceilings on time and savings deposits should be removed over
a 5 year period; b) federally chartered thrift institutions and banks
should be allowed to offer expanded deposit services for consumers; c)
investment and lending alternatives for federally chartered thrift institutions
and banks should be expanded; d) federal charters for stock savings and
loan institutions and mutual savings banks should be permitted; e) credit
unions should be provided with greater access to funds; f) Federal Housing
Administration and Veterans Administration interest ceilings should be re-
moved; and g) the tax structure of banks and thrift institutions be modified."
President Carter also recognized the need for reform of existing regu-
lations. In 1978 he established the Inter-Agency Task Force on Deposit
Interest Rate Controls and Housing Credit. The Task Force included repre-
sentation from the Treasury Department, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council
of Economic Advisors, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President
for Consumer Affairs, the President's Domestic Policy Staff, the Federal
1171d. at 23-24.
18 Id. at 24.
19/d.
20oId. at 27.
21 Id. at 8-9.
22ld. at 31.
23 Id. at 59.
24 Id. at 65.
25 1d. at 71.
26 ld. at 73.
27 ld. at 77.
28 Id. at 87.
29 President's Message to Congress on Restructuring Financial Institutions, 1973 PUB. PAPERS
682 (Aug. 3, 1973), reprinted in DEPT. OF TREASURY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN
THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1973).
[Vol. 14:3
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/4
STUDENT PROJECT
Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the FHLBB, and
the NCUA.30 The task force concluded that:
[T]he current deposit interest rate control system is not functioning
as it was intended. First, it does not prevent disintermediation and the
consequent curtailment of funds for housing finance. Second, it is un-
fair to small savers, who are deprived of the market rates of return
available on a wide array of specialized or unregulated financial assets.
Third, the current system of rate controls leads to inefficiencies in the
financial marketplace.81
In his request for financial reform legislation" President Carter made
recommendations to Congress based on the Task Force findings. He recom-
mended comprehensive financial reform regulation including provisions for
an orderly transition to market-level interest rates to the average depositor
and measures to protect the long-term viability of savings institutions. He
specifically asked Congress to grant federally-chartered savings institutions
authority to offer variable rate mortgages (VRM's) and to invest up to
ten percent of their assets in consumer loans. In addition, Congress was
asked to grant Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) account authority
to federally-insured institutions."s
Congressional action on the deregulation proposals has been selective
and cautious, but not to the point of being unresponsive. The changes
incorporated into the 1980 Act resulted from a careful balancing of con-fficting interests among the depository institutions and their customers. The
following section will explore some of the arguments made by some of
the special interest groups at legislative hearings.
C. Arguments For and Against Deposit Interest Ceilings
Any form of government regulation will benefit one segment of society
at the expense of another. In transportation regulation, the additional ex-pense of serving rural communities is underwritten by urban customers. Pub-lic utilities are regulated to provide uniform service and to prevent monopo-
listic excesses. Two standards can be used to measure the degree to which
some will benefit and some will lose under the regulations. The first is
the situation which would exist in the total absence of regulations and
mechanisms for regulation. The second is the status quo which existedjust prior to changes in the regulatory balance. The second standard is
particularly important where existing regulations have been in effect long
enough for entities to act in reliance on the continued existence of the
regulations.
so DEPT. OF TREASURY, DEPosrr INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND HOUSING CREDrr: TIE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q (1979).
311d. at x.
32 President's Message to Congress Proposing Financial Reform Legislation, 1979 PuB.
PAPERS 928 (May 22, 1979).
83 Id. at 930.
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The arguments presented during hearings on the removal of interest
ceilings can be classified by the standard which was advocated. Those ad-
vocating a fair return or market-level interest on their deposits were making
their arguments on the basis of the first standard.3" Those arguing on behalf
of the housing industry or prospective homebuyers or on behalf of depository
institutions having long-term low interest mortgages in their portfolios were
advancing the second standard. 5 In the many years of regulated interest
rates, investment decisions were made in the expectation of continued
subsidy of the mortgage industry by the government and small savers.
Some of the arguments advanced in favor of continued deposit interest
rate ceilings were based on social policy objectives or economic stability
considerations. The AFL-CIO advanced a convincing argument that small
savers would not really benefit from increased interest paid on their de-
posits. 6 In its hypothetical situation, a family with $1500 in a savings
account spent $15,000 during the year. It projected that the gain from in-
creased interest on the savings would be more than offset by increased
prices in consumer goods as producers and sellers passed on increased
costs which they had to pay for borrowing. Some interesting counter-
arguments can be made.
First, if the $1500 saver is losing money, where is it going? In the
example, the producers and sellers, by passing on their increased borrowing
costs, may experience less demand for their products at the increased
prices. Therefore at best, they break even. The non-saver will have to pay
increased prices with no corresponding benefit. The large saver, or those
willing to tie up their small savings for two and one-half years, will not
benefit unless certificate of deposit ceilings are also lifted. The slowing
or reversal of disintermediation is an advantage for the banks but it is
offset by the higher interest which would be paid to the small saver.
Therefore, if anyone is gaining at the expense of the $1500 saver, it is
other small savers with a higher ratio of savings to consumption. The saver
in the AFL-CIO example had a savings to consumption ratio of one to
ten. An example of a saver with a higher ratio (one to two) is one with
$5000 in savings and $10,000 in annual expenses.
Second, the cost of consumer goods is not directly related to the in-
terest paid to small savers. In 1980 the prime lending rate varied from
twenty-percent in April to eleven percent in July and went back up over
twenty percent in December. At the same time interest paid to small savers
remained at nominal levels. The interest rate on loans is tied to the demand
34This group included the Grey Panthers, the Campaign for Economic Democracy, and
the California Council for Older Americans. 1980 House Reg. Q. "Hearings, supra note 2 it
685-86 (statement of Robert Gnaizda of Public Advocates, Inc.).
36 This group included -the AFL-CIO (Id. at -665) and the National Association of Home-.
builders (Id. at 544).
36 Id. at 678-79 (statement of H. Schechter, Director, Dept. of Urban Affairs, AFL-CI0).
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for a limited number of dollars which depository institutions have to lend.
Banks and other depository institutions would surely pass on increased
interest costs but if market levels of interest were to be paid on small saver's
accounts, then savers might deposit more of their spendable income, thereby
increasing the dollars available to lend. The increased attractiveness of savings
accounts would reduce the demand on consumer goods. That reduced demand
would translate to reduced demand for business loans and reduced consumer
prices (assuming that a free supply and demand market existed). It must be
remembered that people will eventually spend some or all of their savings
when they have more than they need for security or when buying an expensive
item such as a car or house. Thus it is impossible to predict what effect in-
creased passbook interest will have on consumer prices.
Third, the $1500 passbook saver should not expect the same interest
as a $1500 certificate of deposit owner. There is a point at which a de-
pository institution is expending more in servicing an account than it is
making on the use of the deposits. Ideally, the interest paid on deposits
should represent the value to the institution of the use of the money minus
the cost of servicing the customer.
Some of the other arguments for a continuation of Regulation Q-type
interest controls can be summarized as follows: a) banks will fail if they
have to be competitive;" b) the housing industry will suffer from resulting
higher lending rates; 8 c) older people who are losing money on their
passbook accounts have purchased homes under low regulated interest con-
ditions and thereby benefited from Regulation Q; d) the rich should not
get richer;"0 e) home ownership is the "American dream."'"
All of these arguments advance regulation as a means to achieve social
objectives through an indirect tax on the small saver. During the hearings,
Representative Frank Annunzio said of Regulation Q:
It has been the singularly most successful housing program ever
designed in this country. It has not cost the taxpayers a single penny,
and there has not been a single scandal attached to it.'
1
Millions of small savers are taxpayers also and it has cost them plenty.
Chairman St. Germain said that "the time has arrived where we have to
say it is time for the borrower to pay the price of the money that they seek
to borrow in order to pay a fair return to . . . the small account holders."' 2
371d. at 670-71.
38 Id. at 548-57 (statement of the National Association of Homebuilders).
3 9d. at 718, 726. Compare the testimony of Mr. Gnaizda on behalf of the Grey Panthers
with the testimony of Mr. Schechter of the AFL-CIO on the referenced pages.
40 Id. at 142 "[tlhe American dream .... is to own their own home with a white picket
fence around it and rose bushes." .
41 Id.- at 12.
42 Id. at 255.
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Perhaps Representative Doug Barnard summed up the mood of Congress
when he said:
I think the chairman and most of this subcommittee agree that the
sooner that we get out of being the goddess of justice, as far as the com-
petition is concerned, the better off we will be, because we're never
going to weigh those scales correctly. There is one proverb about this
business: You can't make all the people happy all the time."3
The 1980 Act was the culmination of years of studying, experimenting
with, and refining the delicate balance of competition among the depository
institutions. It reflects a blend of the recommendations of recent Presidents,
the Hunt Commission, the Task Force, regulators, depository institutions,
and special interest groups. Primarily, it provides a framework for regula-
tion based on present social policy objectives with mechanisms included
for continuous adjustment and fine tuning as the economic effects of the
Act become manifest.
The following sections will explore the provisions of the 1980 Act
in detail.
TITLE I: MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980
A. Introduction
The decline in the Federal Reserve Membership has prompted the
concern of the Federal Reserve and Congress." This decline has been going
on since World War II, but has accelerated in recent years (since 1970). The
drop of membership has intensified in the three years (1978-1980) that
Congress has debated the solution to membership attrition." A further
decline was expected in 1980 even though many institutions had deferred
43 Id. at 256.
-From 1970 to 1978, 430 member banks withdrew from the system, while only 103 non-
member banks have joined. As of the end of 1977 member banks held less than seventy-three
percent of total commercial demand deposits, down eight percentage points since 1970.
Thus, over one-fourth of commercial banks deposits and over three-fifths of all banks are
outside the scope of Federal Reserve control. Monetary Control and the Membership
Problem: Hearingi on H.R. 13476, H.R. 13477, H.R. 12706, and H.R. 14072, before the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, 90-1 (1978)(Statement of G. William Miller, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) [Hereinafter cited as Monetary Control Hearing of 1978].
45 From 1978 to the beginning of 1980, the proportion of all bank deposits held by member
banks dropped three percent to a gross level of seventy percent. Federal Reserve Require-
ments: Hearings on S.353 and Proposed Amendments S.85, and H.R.7, before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980) (statement
of Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.) [Here-
inafter cited as Federal Reserve Requirement Hearing of 1980].
[Vol. 14:3
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from withdrawing until Congress passed legislation."" Not only is the total
number of banks within the system changing, the composition is also in
flux. Most of the banks withdrawing from membership had been small
(total deposits under $50 million) but a developing trend has been for
larger banks to leave the system." Now larger institutions have decided the
cost of membership in the Federal Reserve is too high a price because
nonmembers may hold their required reserves in the form of interest bearing
assets (as determined by state statute), and the development of NOW
accounts (interest bearing checking accounts) at thrift institutions has
sharpened the competition among depository institutions. Thus the decline
in membership has been attributed to three factors:
(1) The excessive cost of membership. Only member banks must
retain all of the Federal reserve requirements in nonearning re-
serves.
48
(2) The inequity of cost burden by member banks. Nonmembers and
thrift institutions which compete in the same markets for loans
and demand deposits are either exempt from reserve requirements
or can maintain interest bearing reserves.19
(3) The increase in competition. 0 The commercial bank's past do-
main of offering demand deposits has been eroded by the entry
of nonbank thrift institutions."'
A staff study of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs predicted a number of dire consequences due to the decline
in membership. 2 First, it has been proposed that the Federal Reserve's
monetary control would be weakened because fewer banks within the
Reserve means fewer banks can be influenced by changes in reserve re-
quirements.5 3 As more transaction accounts are held at nonmember in-
stitutions, the relationship between the money supply and reserve levels
controlled by the Federal Reserve becomes less precise as a tool to im-
plement policy and predict the result of monetary control. Secondly, the
nation risks an increase in bank failures because nonmember banks during
a period of tight monetary control may not have access to liquidated as-
4" A 1979 survey by the Federal Reserve Board, concluded that 320 member banks were
considering withdrawal from the Federal Reserve system and another 350 member banks
were actively withdrawing. These 670 banks represented a possible decline of ten percent of
the Federal Reserve membership and over seventy-one billion dollars in potential lost
reserves. Id. at 9.
47Id.
48 Monetary Control Hearing of 1978, supra note 44, at 91-92.
49 Id. at 92-93.
50 Id. at 93.
51 In New England, which has had NOW accounts before 1980, the Federal Reserve's
share of member banks dropped from seventy-three percent to sixty-two percent during the
period 1974 to 1977. Id., at 91.
5Id. at 524, 539-44.
53 d. at 539.
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sets in order to meet their daily obligations." The Federal Reserve only
loans money to member banks through the discount window in order to
cushion the impact of a transition from open to tight monetary policy. In
comparison to nonmember correspondent banks the amount of credit the
Federal Reserve may extend is not tied to profit but is determined by its
monetary policy goals.5 5 Therefore, in a liquidity crunch, nonmember banks
may not have access to an adequate amount of loans correspondent banks
consider their profit levels and the potential credit risks before extending
any loan. Thirdly, the treasury loses a substantial amount of revenues be-
cause the Federal Reserve has fewer reserves to invest in interest earning
government securities and therefore less interest income is transferred to
the treasury each year. Fourthly, the decline in membership adversely
affects the prestige, strength, and autonomy of the Federal Reserve as
an independent governmental institution.57 With a decline in constituents,
the Federal Reserve will have less political clout to carry-out unpopular
but necessary monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve's emphasis on the importance of membership is
not shared by all. Nonmember banks,58 the U.S. League of Savings Associ-
ation, 5 the National Savings and Loan League 0 members of Congress,"'
and reputable economists62 do not correlate a decline in membership with
lack of monetary control. This divergent group cites that the lack of control
is due to inaccurate and outdated information as well as the nonuniform
reserve rate for member banks.6" Some have proposed that reserves are
not necessary at all to control monetary policy because many European
nations require minimal, if any, levels of reserves, " and because the Fed-
eral Reserve, historically, has used reserve requirements much less than
open market operations as the chief tool of monetary control."5 Even while
conceding that reserve requirements are helpful, opponents contend that
the Federal Reserve has adequate power to stop the exodus of banks from
5Id.
55 BOARD OF GovERNORS, THE FEDERAL REsERvE SYSTEM, 36 (6th ed. 1974); see also; Mone-
tary Control Hearing of 1978, supra note 44, at 541.
56 Monetary Control Hearing of 1978, supra note 44, at 541.
57 Id. at 543-4.
58 Monetary Control: Hearings on H.R.7, before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, 96th Con., 1st Sess. 372, 431, 485, 500, 751 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Monetary Control Hearing of 1979].
59 Id. at 689, 691-694.
60 Id. at 703, 704.
81 Id. at 485, 487.
62 Id. at 375, 517, 735, 762.
63 Id. at 380-2, 490-1, 646.
64 125 CONG. REc. H6320-1 (daily ed. July 20, 1979) (remarks by Rep. Wylie).
65 Monetary Control Hearing of 1979, supra note 58, at 500; 508 (statement by Perkins on
behalf of the American Bankers Association).
[Vol. 14:3
10
Akron Law eview, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/4
STUDENT PROJEcr
the system."' The Federal Reserve could lower reserve requirements, lower
the discount rate, change their monetary policy of high interest rates,
and/or request Congress to pass legislation allowing the Federal Reserve
to pay interest on the present non-interest-bearing reserves. Nor do op-
ponents believe the stability of the banking community is jeopardized.
These opponents emphasize that Federal Reserve membership is a pre-
requisite for banks to be involved in the correspondent business. Therefore,
these member correspondent banks are able to use the discount window
to handle the credit needs of its nonmember clientele.67 If nonmember banks
need access to the discount window then they should be given direct access
without also requiring they post reserves with the Federal Reserve System."8
The assertion that the decline in Federal Reserve membership is a
problem rests on two presumed effects: lack of monetary control and in-
stability in the banking community because fewer banks are bearing the
burden of monetary control. The question is, did Congress merely accept
these truisms and proceed to decide how to stem the decline rather than
first look into whether the decline actually was a problem? Even assuming
the existence of a problem, was universal reserve requirements on all
transaction accounts at depository institutions the most viable solution?
Finally, should the Federal Reserve System be given more power in order
to affect monetary policy? This comment addresses the above basic questions
inherent in any analysis of Title I, the Monetary Control Act of 1980.
B. The History and Function of the Federal Reserve System
A discussion of the structure and history of the Federal Reserve system
is needed in order to understand the changes suggested by Title I of the
Depository Deregulation Monetary Control Act of 1980.
1. History of the Banking System
The American Banking system has become known as a dual banking
system, because its main feature is a concurrent federal and state chartering
of commercial banks. The federal banks are under the supervision of the
Comptroller of the Currency (United States Treasury) and the state-chart-
ered banks are under the regulation of state agencies. Indeed, the American
system is unique among the world's systems. Every other major developed
nation has a highly concentrated structure" but membership in the Ameri-
can National Banking System is voluntary.70 Banks are induced to join the
66 125 CoNo. REc. H6322 (daily ed. July 20, 1979) (remarks by Rep. Paul).
67 Federal Reserve Membership: Hearings on Amendment No. 398 to S.85, S.353, and H.R.
7 before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
102, 105 (1979) (statements of John E. Malarkey, State Bank Commissioner of Delaware-
Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
e8 Monetary Control Hearing of 1978, supra note 44, at 543.
69 125 CONG. REC. H6320 (daily ed. July 20, 1979) (remarks by Rep. Wylie).
701d. at H6321.
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system by being offered services and benefits rather than a compulsory
approach."
The dual banking system did not always run smoothly. From the
Revolution until the Civil War, the American economy was plagued by
bank failures and tight credit.
This situation persisted for two reasons. First, banks were under
limited regulation."2 Many banks maintained adequate reserves and were
able to redeem notes for coin, but others issued notes without concern for
problems of liquidity in a rush for profits."3 Secondly, there was no way
to extend the money supply in response to concentrated seasonal demands
of a rural economy because there was no central bank from which corres-
pondent banks could borrow."'
Even though the American people were suspicious of concentrating
power in a central banking system, by 1861 the banking situation had be-
come intolerable."' There were constant demands on Congress to stabilize
the economy. As the economy expanded from a rural society to an industrial
nation, large swings in liquidity were experienced. The National Banking
Act of 1864,16 was enacted to prevent the overissuance of notes which had
caused the liquidity problems of not enough cash to redeem bank notes.
(Note, at this time checks were not widely used and notes were redeemable
71 The benefits of the Federal System include:
(1) Access to the discount window. As a public bank, the Federal Reserve is not
operated for a profit. Profit objectives have no effect on the amount of credit that
can be extended. Credit levels are a function of liquidity needs and monetary
policy objectives;
(2) Use of the Federal Reserve facilities to collect and clear checks as well as transfer
funds among correspondent banks;
(3) Ability to obtain currency and coin services;
(4) Ability to obtain security safekeeping services;
(5) Intangible benefits and prestige.
However, certain disadvantages must be recognized. The prospective member has the follow-
ing responsibilities:
(1) To retain required levels of reserves which are noninterest bearing reserves (com-
monly called "sterile" reserves). (Note, the Monetary Control Act of 1980 extends
reserve requirements to nonmember banks and thrift institutions. This will decrease
the above negative impact);
(2) To submit to federal examinations;
(3) To abide by federal rules and regulations on banking;
(4) To supply information pertaining to banking transactions. (Note, the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 extends reporting requirements to nonmembers and thrift
institutions. Again this may decrease the negative impact.);
(5) To purchase stock in the Federal Reserve. Id. at H6320; see also, BOARD OF Gov-
ERNORS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (6th ed., 1974), 20; 36.
72 DussENBERRY, MONEY AND CREDIT: IMPACT AND CONTROL, 23 (1964).
73 Id.
T 4 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 512.
75 DUSSENBERRY, supra note 72, at 23.
76 The National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
38).
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in gold coins)." Thus, national banks were required to hold reserves in
vault cash or as deposit accounts with a national bank in one of seventeen
"redemption" cities. 8 For reserve purposes, the Act classified national banks
by geography. Each geographical classification (central reserve city banks,
reserve city banks, and country banks) had different levels of required
reserves as well as different apportionments of reserves between vault cash
and deposit at the redemption cities."
A major flaw of the National Banking system was its inability to meet
the seasonal demands for credit.' The system provided no way to vary
the supply of credit to meet fluctuating demands. Large concentrated
amounts of currency were withdrawn in the spring during the planting sea-
son and in the fall when crops were purchased."s Banks often were solvent
but unable to convert their assets into cash. This instability of the banking
system was further caused by the pyramiding of reserves between the geo-
graphical classifications.82 Pyramiding occurred because reserve balances
of country banks were held in banks at reserve cities and these banks held
their reserves in central city banks.8 When country banks needed currency
they could draw on these deposits because comptrollers allowed banks to
let their reserves fall well below legal minimums without legal recourse.8"
However, if at the same time city banks needed currency, the banking
system's reserves may have been depleted by the country banks. Inevitably,
some banks would fail and this only increased the financial panic. From
1878 to 1907, bank failures, plummeting stock prices and the failure of
business plagued the economy. 5 Such economic instability hampered the
potential industrial growth of the nation.
After the financial panics of the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
a National Monetary Commission was established., The recommendations
of this commission became the basis for reform legislation and the creation
of the Federal Reserve System.
2. The Federal Reserve System and the Changing Role of Reserves
The United States set up a central bank in 1914, after the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. 81 Decentralization of Banking power
77 Dussenberry, supra note 72, at 23.
Is Phillips and Robertson, Are Uniform Reserve Requirements Really Necessary?, 91 BANK-
iNG LJ. 403, 407-9 (1974).
1 9 Id. at 408.
80 Dussenberry, supra note 72, at 25.
81 id.
82 Phillips and Robertson, supra note 78, at 408.83 Id. at 409.
4 Dussenberry, supra note 72, at 25.
85 Id.
se Id. at 26.
87 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). For wictjon, see Historical
Note at 12 U.S.C. § 225 (1976).
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was maintained because the "central" bank became not one institution but
twelve.88 A twelve-bank system would be able to react to the special needs
of each part of the country, but without forsaking control. Control would
be retained because the major policies of the Federal Reserve Banks are
not controlled by member banks. Policy decisions are made by officers
appointed by the Board of Governors located in Washington.89 Besides
managing the twelve federal reserve banks, the Board of Governors oversee
monetary policy."
The new legislation retained the dual banking system. National banks
were required to become Federal Reserve members but state banks had
the choice to become members or to retain their state charters.9 ' Under
this new banking system, member banks had to deposit reserves at the
Federal Reserve banks. By an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act
in 1917,2 required reserves were to consist solely of deposits with the
federal reserve banks.13 This amendment also changed the function of
reserves from that of preserving liquidity to a tool of monetary policy."4
Therefore, required reserves held by the Federal Reserve banks could no
longer be used to meet the daily liquidity requirements of the member banks.
While the Federal Reserve Act and the subsequent amendments changed
the role of reserve requirements, the Act retained the National Banking Act's
reserve structure95 and the old classification of central reserve, reserve city,
and country banks." This complicated the setting of reserve requirements.
Not only were reserve requirements based upon a certain percentage of
a bank's demand deposits but the banks in each classification had a different
reserve rate schedule.9" To further complicate the problem, in 1935 the
Board of Governors acquired the authority to vary required reserve ratios. 8
Taking the problem one step further, by 1960 banks were again allowed
to count a part of vault cash as reserves.9" A new wrinkle was added to
the already complicated reserve system, the "lagged reserve requirements
88Id. at § 2 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1976)).
89 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1976).
90 Id.
91 Dussenberry, supra note 72, at 26.
92 Act of June 21, 1917, ch. 32, 40 Stat. 232 (1917) (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.
Title 12).
93 12 U.S.C. § 642 (1976).
"'Phillips and Robertson, supra note 78, at 412.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Reserve city banks had a thirteen percent reserve requirement; the reserve city banks
had a ten percent ratio, and the country banks had a seven percent ratio. See Act
of June 21, 1917, ch. 32, § 10, 40 Stat. 239 (1917) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 462 (1976)).
98 Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935). For codification, see Historic Note
at 12 U.S.C. § 228 (1976). This act eliminated the need for an "emergency" before such
action could be taken. (see 12 U.S.C. § 426).
99 Phillips and Robertson, supra note 78, at 414.
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computations," under which each member bank adjusted its levels of re-
serves once a week to meet its reserve rate. 100 At any time during the in-
terim the bank could be below or above its reserve level. A few years after
lagged reserve requirements were implemented, the reserve structure of mem-
ber banks were changed from a geographical classification to a classification
by bank size.' This reserve structure continued until the enactment of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19802
which will be subsequently discussed.
Thus, the role of reserves changed from a function of preserving liquidity
under the National Banking System to a function of monetary control under
the Federal Reserve System. This metamorphosis of reserves was enhanced
by two aspects of the Federal Reserve system. First, reserves were no
longer needed to serve a liquidity function because Federal Reserve banks
acquired insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company.'
Secondly, to meet liquidity needs at times other than during insolvency,
the Federal Reserve created' the discount window. The discount window
is a term used to describe the process wherein the federal reserve makes loans
by crediting a bank's reserve deposit account." 5 Based upon the above,
the Federal Reserve System insured the liquidity of its member banks, rather
than the reserve requirements of each bank.
3. How the Federal Reserve Controls Monetary Policy.
The Federal Reserve uses three instruments to carry-out its monetary
policy objectives:""9 the discount rate,' open-market operations,"' and
reserve requirements. "'
The discount rate is the rate of interest charged by a Federal Reserve
bank on loans made to other banks. In return for the loan, the commercial
bank may give as collateral IOU's drawn against themselves or the promis-
sory notes of businesses and individuals which they hold as security against
loans granted to the public. The discount rate is set by each Federal Re-
serve Bank's board of directors, subject to the approval of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System."0
200 Id. at 417.
101 Id. at 416.
102 1980 Act, supra note 3.
'0D3See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et. seq.
104 BOARD OF GovENoRs, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 72 (6th ed. 1974) see also,
Dussenberry, supra note 72, at 27.
105 Id.
°10 MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES, 315-16.
'-T 12 U.S.C. § 357 (1976).
1- 12 U.S.C. § 358 (1976).
109 12 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
110 Id.
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Borrowing money from the Federal Reserve affects the reserve posi-
tion of a bank. If a bank borrows money from the Federal Reserve, the
regional Federal Reserve Bank then credits the member bank's reserve
account by the amount of the loan. Since a bank can loan only that amount
of money in excess of its reserve requirements, a credit to its reserve account
means it has more reserves which can support more loans. Therefore, when
a commercial bank borrows from the federal reserve system, it can ex-
tend more credit to the public. Conversely, when a bank repays its loan,
it has less money to loan to the public.
Banks, like all creditors, are more encouraged to borrow when the
interest rate at the discount window (the discount rate) is low rather
than high. Hence, a decrease in the discount rate encourages banks to pass
the savings to the public in the form of lower interest rates. Conversely,
an increase in the discount rate discourages banks from borrowing. Those
banks which must borrow raise their interest rates in order to offset their
increased costs.
From the Federal Reserve's viewpoint, the discount rate is a tool of
monetary policy. 1 ' Varying the discount rate discourages or encourages
the public to increase the money supply by borrowing from commercial
banks. Thus by raising or lowering the discount rate the Federal Reserve
system can meet its monetary goals.
It must be noted, the discount rate is a weak monetary tool. Banks
infrequently borrow from the Federal Reserve because they have to pay
interest on their loans.11' More importantly, banks view the need to borrow
from the Federal Reserve as a black-mark against the bank's reputation.""
The Federal Reserve has encouraged this viewpoint because access to the
discount window has been restricted."' Basically, the Federal Reserve uses
the discount window only to rescue a bank faced with a sudden cash shortage
which can not be solved by any other means without jeopardizing the long-
range solvency of the bank. 1 ' Since credit has been extended only as a
last resort, the use of the discount window has negative connotations.
The second tool of the Federal Reserve to control monetary policy is
the manipulation of the reserve ratio. An example from an economic text
book will concisely explain how reserve ratios influence the money supply:
Suppose a commercial bank's balance sheet is such that reserves are
$5,000 and demand deposits $20,000. If the legal reserve ratios
stands at 20 percent, the bank's required reserves are $4,000. Since
112 id.
112Fuspuw, ECONObaCS, 302 (1972).
113 Id.
114 id. at 303.
126 McCorNuLL., supra note 106, at 316; FusFELD, supra note 112, at 303.
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the actual reserves are $5,000, it is apparent that the excess reserves
of this bank are $1,000. On the basis of this $1,000 of excess re-
serves we have seen that a single bank can lend $1,000, but the bank-
ing system as a whole could create a maximum of $5,000 in new
bank money by lending.1 '
As the above example explains, the banking system can expand or
contract the money supply by changing the reserve ratio. This method of
controlling the money supply is similar to the discount ratio as previously
discussed. If a decrease in the money supply is the goal, a higher reserve
ratio increases the amount of reserves a bank must keep." ' Since a com-
mercial bank can only lend an amount equal to its excess reserves, any
excess reserves are transformed into required reserves in order to meet
the new reserve ratio.1 8 Depending on how much the reserve ratio is in-
creased, a bank may be able to meet the new requirement by not extending
new credit and by cutting costs. However, the bank's present level of re-
serves may not be enough to support its outstanding demand deposits.
In that event, the bank would have to contract its money supply by calling
in short term loans and by not renewing old loans." 9
It must be noted that changes in reserve requirements have a great
effect on the reserve positions of the member banks. For example, "when
reserve requirements were raised by only one-half of one percent in Decem-
ber, 1967 (and even then on only demand deposits of over $5 million)
the total increase in required reserves was about $550 million."" This
impact of changes in reserve requirements would not be evenly felt through-
out the banking or financial community. First, small businesses which are
usually short of working capital may be harmed more than large businesses
with excess profit margins. Secondly, small banks may not have the ability
to juggle their resources in order to meet increased reserve requirements.
For whatever reasons, the Federal Reserve has sparingly used reserve re-
quirements as a tool of monetary policy.'" Therefore, its potential as an
effective monetary tool is largely theoretical.
The Board of Governors primarily controls the money supply through
open-market operations; 22 that is, the buying and selling of government
securities. For example, when the Federal Reserve buys securities it pays
for them by crediting the reserve account of the purchaser, the commercial
bank. This transaction increases member bank reserves which subsequently
"'S MCCONNELL, supra note 106, at 311.
"IT Id. at 312.
-18 Id. at 300.
'29Id. at 311.
in FUsFELD, supra note 112, at 300.
ula McCoNNELL, supra note 106, at 312.
2" Id.
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increases the lending ability of the commercial banking system. Conversely,
a sale of government securities reduces a bank's reserve account and its
ability to extend credit.
The open market operations method is relied upon more than any
other tool for basically three reasons. First, the effect of the open market
operation on reserve balances is under the control of the Federal Reserve
whereas the effect of the discount window depends on member banks
borrowing at the discount window.1"' Second, changing market demands
can be more effectively met by buying or selling securities rather than by
lowering or raising reserve ratios.' Third, the Federal Reserve Banks have
large holdings of government bonds the sale of which could reduce com-
mercial bank reserves to zero."2 5 Regardless of the tool chosen, the discount
rate, the reserve ratios, or open market operations, effective monetary policy
depends upon the ability of the Federal Reserve to decrease or expand the
money supply.
C. Background of the Monetary Control Act of 1980.
1. Legislative History of Title I
The background of this legislation can be traced to 1950. The con-
cept of treating all banks equally whether a member or nonmember of
the Federal Reserve System was initiated by Senator Douglas in a report
of a Congressional Committee in 1950.120 It was "repeated in a 1952
report of a Congressional Committee, endorsed by the Commission on
Money and Credit in 1961, reaffirmed by the President's Committee on
Financial Institutions in 1963, and restated again in the 1971 report of the
President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation."'27 However,
it was not until 1977 that Congress seriously tried to overhaul the nation's
banking system.
In 1977, the Senate Banking Committee reported out a bill which
would have authorized the Federal Reserve Board to equalize competition
between nonmembers and members by paying interest on reserve require-
ments of member banks.128 However, this bill did not even come to a vote
on the Senate floor.2 9
Again, in 1978, legislation was introduced in the House which was
'-w Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 508.
I" Id.
=5 McCoNNELL, supra note 106, at 319.
-'eSee HR. REP. No. 96-263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1979),
121 Id.
128 S. 2055, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. REP. No. 95-407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
see 33 Cong. Q. Almanac 152-153 (1977).
-AId. at 152.
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designed to halt the exodus of members from the Federal Reserve System.'"
After the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of the House
of Representatives held hearings on these bills, a clean bill, H.R. 14072,
was reported to the House.' H.R. 14072 was the forerunner of the present
Monetary Control Act because it required all major federally insured banks
to maintain reserves; a mandatory rather than a voluntary approach. Op-
ponents of the bill, especially smaller and medium-sized banks, contended
that such an action would destroy the dual banking system.1 3 2
Despite pressure from the Federal Reserve Board to enact the bill,
the House did not take further action after it became apparent the Senate
would not have time to act until the next session in 1979. s
The unfinished business of the 95th Congress, the problem of de-
clining Federal Reserve membership, was thrust upon the 96th Congress.
In January, Henry Reuss introduced a bill, H.R. 7, which was referred to
his House Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs Committee. 13' The original
H.R. 7 would have required all banks to hold reserves equal to 9.5 percent
of all demand deposits in excess of fifty million dollars and authorized a
reserve ratio variation between 8 and 10 percent."' The approach to H.R. 7,
to stop the erosion of membership from the system, was similar to H.R.
14072 of 1978. Both bills endorsed mandatory reserve requirements for
nonmember banks and thrift institutions which had traditionally been ex-
empt from holding reserves with the Federal Reserve banks.
The opponents of the bill preferred a Republican substitute offered
by Rep. Stanton (R-Ohio) which favored voluntary reserve requirements
rather than mandatory ones." ' A voluntary system would use the induce-
ments of lower reserve requirements, interest on reserve requirements, and
freer access to the discount window. Only when reserves sank below 66
percent would Stanton's substitute bill call for mandatory universal reserve
requirements."' 3
Chairman Reuss was a proponent of universal reserve requirements,
130 A number of bills to deal with the problem were introduced in the House, namely
H.R. 13476, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 13477, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R.
12076, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); See Monetary Control Hearings of 1978, supra note
44, at 2, 11, and 13 respectively.
131 H.R. 14072 incorporated parts of previous bills but it streamlined and combined the
various proposals. H.R. 14072, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Monetary Control Hearings of
1978, supra note 44, at 509; see also 34 Cong. Q. Almanac 271 (1978).1 32 See Monetary Control Hearings of 1978, supra note 44, at 693, 700 (Statement of Lewis
R. Holding).
13834 Cong. Q. Almanac 271 (1978).
184 H.R.7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979) Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58,
at 2.
188 Id. at 10.
181 See H.R. REP. 96-263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1?Id. at 37.
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and thus was ideologically opposed to this type of proposal, so it was a
surprise when the House passed H.R. 7 on July 20, 1979 as amended by
Representative Stanton." 8 Chairman Reuss supported the compromise in
order to send a bill to the Senate which had the overwhelming support
of the House. The House in September also passed H.R. 4986, the Consumer
Checking Account Equity Act of 1979 and likewise sent this to the Senate.'39
In the interim, the Senate had begun work on its own Federal Reserve
membership legislation. The Senate Banking Chairman Proxmire, D-Wis.,
supported universal reserve requirements while Senator Tower, R-Texas,
endorsed a voluntary system.' Both Senators were appointed to the Senate
Conference Committee.
The Tower Bill (S. 353), a voluntary system, endorsed interest pay-
ment on reserve requirements and reduced reserve requirements."" In com-
parison, Proxmire's Bill (S. 85) required universal reserve requirements on
all banks. Unlike the House version, no exemption level was endorsed, but
there was a three percent reserve requirement on the first five million of de-
mand deposits and twelve percent on the remainder above that amount. "
However, the Senate did not incorporate any membership proposal
in its version of H.R. 4986. Senator Morgan (D-N.C.), succeeded in strip-
ping the bill of a provision which would make universal reserves mandatory
for all banks that offered NOW accounts.' 3 Both Houses of Congress met
in conference to reconcile the two versions of H.R. 4986.
The conference reached an impasse on December 5, because the con-
flicting proposals were the pet projects of the respective chairmen. The
House provision on the membership problem, as touted by Chairman Reuss,
was absent in the Senate version, while the Senate provision which phased
out interest rate limits was absent in the House version. The conferees, un-
able to reach agreement on these key issues, deferred further action on H.R.
4986 until 1980.'"
When the House and Senate Banking Conferees resumed work, they
faced a time constraint. A decision had to be reached by March 31, 1980
because stopgap legislation, which protected interest bearing checking ac-
188 Federal Reserve Membership. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 72. The bill as passed not only incorporated the
Stanton cutoff, 67.5% (Id. at 87) but also set the exemption level at thirty-five million (Id.
at 78).
139 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 4.
140 S. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) Federal Reserve Requirements Hearings of 1980,
supra note 45, at 167 (introduced by Sen. Proxmire) and S. 353, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980), Id. at 149 (introduced by Sen. Tower).
141 Id. at 153.
142 Id. at 171.
'"3 35 Cong. Q. Almanac 323 (1979).
14 Id. at 324.
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counts from a court ordered ban, expired on that date.' 5 To further com-
plicate the situation, both the House and the Senate conferees were bargain-
ing without clear directions from their committees. Neither Committee
could reach a consensus on the issues in conflict - the membership problem
and the phaseout of "Regulation Q". Due to the intensified pressure of
the ominously close stopgap legislation deadline, a hastily put together
version of H.R. 4986 was signed into law on March 31, 1980.1
2. Provisions of Title I
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 has greatly changed the system
of reserve requirements and reporting requirements of depository institutions
in the following areas:
a. Reporting requirements.
Section 102 of the Act"' authorizes the Federal Reserve to collect,
through regulatory and supervisory agencies, current liability and asset re-
ports from depository institutions (banks, savings banks, savings and loans,
and credit unions). The Federal Reserve has full discretion to determine
the type and frequency of the reporting requirement. These reports are
deemed necessary in order to monitor and control the money supply. Prior
to section 102, only member banks were required to provide relevant data.
b. Reserve Requirements
This part of the Act" 8 subjects all financial institutions to reserve re-
quirements on transaction accounts (accounts which are third-party pay-
ments such as demand deposits, NOW accounts, telephone transfers, and
share drafts)14 ' and non-personal time deposits (transferable time deposits
or deposits not held by an individual). ' Thus, a mandatory reserve system
replaced the voluntary system. The uniformly imposed reserve requirement
structure is:
(1) a reserve ratio of three percent on the first twenty-five million
dollars of transaction account deposits. 1 '
(2) an increased reserve ratio of twelve percent for transaction ac-
counts in excess of twenty-five million dollars. 5 '
(3) a possible variation in the reserve ratios between eight and four-
teen percent for that portion of transaction accounts in excess
of twenty-five million dollars.5
145 See 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1.
24 1980 Act, supra note 3.
14 Id., § 102 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2)).
2"8 Id., § 103.
149 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)).
1250d. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(c)).
'InId. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A)(C)).
'32 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
258 1d.
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(4) a reserve ratio of three percent or a variable within a zero to
nine percentage range on nonpersonal time deposits."'
Beginning in 1981, the Board of Governors shall index the twenty-five
million dollar breakpoint on transaction accounts by issuing a regulation
which would increase or decrease the breakpoint by eight percent of the
percentage increase or decrease in transactions accounts of all depository
institutions." Thus, by indexing the twenty-five million dollar breakpoint
the banks which presently have a three percent reserve ratio will not be
forced into the twelve percent reserve ratio by inflation. Therefore a bank
must grow faster relative to the higher reserve ratio banks before it will
exceed the breakpoint.
c. Waiver of Ratio Limits in Extraordinary Circumstances
This Act empowers the Board of Governors to impose reserve re-
quirements outside the limitations prescribed in section 103 for a period
of 180 days. 56 Such action can not occur unless five members of the
Board determine that there is an extraordinary circumstance which re-
quires waiving the set limits on reserve ratios. The Federal Reserve's power
to vary reserve ratios may be extended for 180 day periods upon the action
of five Board members."5 7 Also, the above action is within the full discretion
of the Board and is not reviewable by Congress.
d. Supplemental Reserves
Additional reserve requirements on depository institutions may be
imposed up to a limit of four percentum of their transaction accounts. 55
This additional power referred to as "supplemental reserves" has certain
restraints. First, the supplemental reserve may not be enacted unless it is
essential for the conduct of monetary policy.' Secondly, such a requirement
can not be imposed to reduce the cost burdens of reserve ratios or to in-
crease the balances needed for check-clearing purposes.' Thirdly, sup-
plemental reserves can not be imposed if reserve ratios are below the initial
reserve ratio rates.' Fourthly, the Board of Governors must send a report
to Congress which states the basis for exercising such authority.162 Supple-
mental reserves, if imposed, are interest bearing at a rate not to exceed
the average rate earned by the Federal Reserve's security portfolio during the
5 4 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2) (B)).
155 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(C)).
'15 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(3)).
157 Id.
I"aId. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (4) (A)).
159Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(4)(A)(i)).
1bald. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(4)(A)(ii)(iii)).
'I' Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (4)(A) (iv)).
'1152 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C, § 461 (b) (4) (B) ).
[Vol. 14:3
22
Akron Law eview, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/4
STUDENT PROJECT
previous year.'63 Furthermore, supplemental reserves terminate at the close
of the first ninety-day period during which the average amount of basic
reserves is less than the amount that would be required if the initial ratios
on basic reserves were in effect. 64
One of the most important provisions of the Act is section 103(7)
which helps to offset the costs of universal reserve requirements." 5 Now,
any depository institution in which transaction accounts or nonpersonal
time deposits are held is entitled to the same discount and borrowing privil-
eges as member banks. Prior to the enactment of this section, only member
banks could procure the services of the Federal Reserve including the use
of the discount window.
Another provision which helps to offset the cost of imposed reserve
requirements is the change in the form of reserves."' Under the present
Act, reserve requirements are met by maintaining vault cash or reserves
at the federal reserve banks. These required reserves may be passed to the
Federal Reserve banks through a correspondent bank, a federal home loan
bank, or a central liquidity facility. Also the reserve requirement burden
is lessened because the balances maintained to satisfy liquidity requirements
may be used to satisfy other liquidity requirements imposed by state or
federal law. 7
e. Pricing of Services and Effective Date
Besides imposing mandatory reserve requirements, this Act breaks
the tradition of the Federal Reserve providing free services.6 8 Although,
all depository institutions have access to the Federal Reserve's services, these
institutions will have to pay for any services procurred. The Board of
Governors by the sixth month after the bill's enactment is to publish a fee
schedule. The schedule of fees shall cover the following services:
(1) currency and coin services
(2) check clearing and collection services
(3) wire transfer services
(4) automatic clearinghouse services
(5) settlement services
(6) security safekeeping services
(7) Federal Reserve float
(8) any new services offered in the future"6 '
6ald. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(4)(C)).
164 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(4)(E)).
165ld. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(7)).
'
66 Id., § 104 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(c)(2)).
?Id., § 104(a) (to be codified at 12-U.S.C. § 248(a)).
6 Id., § 107 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248a(b)).
169 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248a(b)).
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This title of the Act shall take effect on the first day of the sixth month
after its enactment. ' "
3. Effects of Title I
The above provisions have numerous effects upon the banking system.
One effect is to give the Federal Reserve 15.9 billion dollars in reserves
without the supplemental, and a high of 27.1 billion with the supplemental.''
In comparison, the level of reserves before the Act was 31 billion. The
second effect is to equalize the burden on member banks by reducing their
reserve requirements and spreading the burden among the competing in-
stitutions. The third effect is that 4,165 nonmember banks, 1,360 savings
and loans, and 70 mutual banks which previously were untouched by
Federal regulation will have to post reserves at Federal Reserve banks.' 2
Besides imposing uniform reserve requirements on all depository in-
stitutions, the legislative intent is to stabilize the financial system.' 3 The
Act relies on a number of devices in order to enhance financial stability.
A potentially major device to ensure the system's liquidity is increased
access to the discount window. Under this Act, all depository institutions,
not just member banks, may borrow from the Federal Reserve. Addition-
ally, the Federal Reserve's ability to predict and impose monetary policy
is to be enhanced by two devices. One, the reserve ratio requirements for
various types of depository institutions have been simplified in comparison
to the prior classification scheme. Second, mandatory reports from all
depository institutions will provide better access to information about the
current money supply and future trends. Furthermore, the Act purports
to make the Federal Reserve more efficient and economical because there
is a charge for services procured by the depository institutions.' Prior
to the Act, services were rendered to only member banks and without charge
in order to offset the cost of posting reserves with the Federal Reserve
banks' The adverse impact on member banks from having to pay for ser-
vices is decreased because their reserve requirements have been lowered.' 5
Whether or not the Act will live up to its legislative intent will be discussed
in a subsequent section.
D. Analysis of the Federal Reserve Membership Problem and the
Ramifications of Title I as the Solution
1. Is There a Federal Reserve Membership Problem?
The chairman of the Federal Reserve Board contends that the nation's
170 Id., § 108. Therefore, the effective date was October 1, 1980.
171 125 CONG. REc. H2043 (daily ed. March 20, 1980).
L72 Id. at H2044.
IT8 126 CoNG. REc. H2274 (daily ed. March 27, 1980).
174 Id.
15 Id.
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banking system will be weakened if membership in the Federal Reserve
continues to decline.I ' A decline in membership means the Federal Reserve
has less deposits subject to its reserve rquirements and therefore less con-
trol over the money supply.
However, this premise is based upon the theory that reserve require-
ments are a necessary tool to control monetary policy.'77 Chairman Miller
explains this necessity by asserting that as a larger portion of banks become
subject to the diverse state reserve requirements, and as more transaction
accounts are held by thrift institutions, the linkage between reserves and
the money supply becomes less precise.176
Another proponent of uniform reserve requirements is the President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York." ' In 1974, Mr. Waage presented
the following argument in support of uniform reserve requirements:
Effective management of the supply of money and credit requires
that the assets held as reserve by the banking system come under the con-
trol of the Federal Reserve. The reserve requirements of the states, re-
gardless of what their role may be in protecting liquidity, do not meet
this test. This defect is a serious one."
His article proceeds to explain why the "defect" is serious. It was
claimed that member banks must support nonmember correspondent bank
balances with reserves which are small in comparison to the nonmember's
total deposits.' The author gives an example to explain why it is in-
equitable to make only member banks bear the costs of monetary policy.
In essence, member banks must hold one dollar in reserves to support
seven dollars of demand deposits. In comparison, that same dollar in reserves
at the member bank can support seven dollars of demand deposits for a non-
member bank, which in turn can use this same reserve to back-up fifty
dollars of demand deposits"' As a result, the quantity of all commercial
bank deposits that can be supported by a given amount of reserves is altered
by the movement of demand deposits between member and nonmember
banks. The direct result of the movement of demand deposits between in-
stitutions with varying reserve ratios is to make the link between bank re-
serves and the money supply unpredictable. 8 Such an inability to predict
the money supply causes the Federal Reserve to have less control over the
economy.
176 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 70, 71. (Statement of G. William
Miller).
"7 65 FED. RES. BULL. 113 (1979) (Statements to Congress by G. William Miller).
178 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 72.
179 Waage, The Need for Uniform Reserve Requirements, 91 BANK L.J. 499 (1974).
ISO Id. at 506.
181 Id.
283 Id. at 507.
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However, it should be pointed out the Federal Reserve has never
done a scholarly work which conclusively proves that the monetary con-
trol is weakened by the erosion of membership."' One might wonder why
one of the largest employers of economists had not presented scholarly
work to support their assertions during the debate of the Monetary Con-
trol Act. In turn, the premise that reserve requirements affect monetary
policy has been contradicted by scholarly research.'
Opponents of uniform reserve requirements purport that the Federal
Reserve could control monetary aggregates without relying on reserves
as a monetary tool. 8 ' Rather, the Federal Reserve could rely on two other
tools, the discount window and open market operations in order to con-
trol the economy. These traditional tools will be improved because of the
requirement, that all depository institutions report all assets and liabilities.
This argument is bolstered by the fact that the Federal Reserve has tra-
ditionally relied upon open market operations rather than reserve require-
ments as a monetary tool. 8 ' The advantages of this tool are its predictable
effect upon the money supply and its flexible implementation. To increase
or decrease the money supply the Federal Reserve buys or sells securities
on the open market rather than cumbersomely change reserve ratios of
depository institutions.
A noted economist states another reason why reserve requirements
are not a necessary tool of monetary policy. 8 Even if reserve requirements
were reduced to zero, cash reserve would be maintained by banks regardless
of any mandatory reserve level. 8" A study of state banks in Illinois, which
does not have reserve requirements, shows that these banks maintained about
five percent of their demand deposits in reserves."' All banks must retain
a certain level of reserves in order to meet their check clearing needs and
to pay for services procured from correspondent banks. 191 This cash re-
serve base could be controlled by the Federal Reserve as long as it had
adequate information concerning the levels of demand deposits at each
bank. The Federal Reserve could then control this preexistent reserve base
through the purchase and sale of government securities in the open market.
Also, a zero reserve requirement would benefit those banks whose
184 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58 at 689, 692-3 (Statement of the U.S.
League of Savings Associations). See however, id. at 762, 768-9 (Statement of Professor
Whitesell) wherein it is stated that there has been one such study.
185 Id. at 693, citing to Carson, fn. 146, infra, and others.
is' Id. at 500, 515-6 (statement on behalf of the American Bankers Assoc.).
187 Id. at 508.
1I8 Carson, Should Reserve Requirements be Abolished? in MONEY AND FINANcE, 233 (2d
ed. 1972).
19d. at 236.
190 Id. at 236 n.7.
19' Id. at 236.
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present reserve levels have exceeded the balance they desire to hold.'
These freed reserves could be used to make loans or investments at the
market interest rate. Such a zero reserve requirement, although benefiting the
individual bank, would not negatively affect monetary policy. The Federal
Reserve's open market operations might be used more frequently in order
to prevent wide swings in the ratio of cash to deposits initially caused by
a zero reserve requirement. Also, better reporting on cash reserve bases
would minimize any remaining problems.' Actually, a zero reserve re-
quirement would benefit the consumer. When reserves are freed, this in-
creases the cash balances of banks which in turn can be used to meet the
credit demands of consumers. Also, the consumer benefits because banking
resources would be more efficiently allocated due to increased competition.
Under a zero reserve requirement, the Federal Reserve would have to com-
pete with correspondent banks for cash deposits because banks would be
free to keep their balances at whichever financial institution paid the highest
return. Thus, not only are reserve requirements a superfluous tool of mone-
tary policy, but the economy would be improved if reserve requirements
were reduced to zero.
The United States League of Savings Associations (the League)
also disagrees with the use of uniform reserve requirements as a solution
to the membership problem.'" One of the main concerns of the League
has been the lack of verification by the Federal Reserve that a decrease
in membership directly affects monetary control."5 The League acknowl-
edges it has suffered from inflation caused by excessive growth in the money
supply.' Nevertheless, the League contends that a movement from a volun-
tary system to a mandatory one is not the solution, especially since there
is a lack of research to support the Federal Reserve's proposals.'
In fact, the League asserts that the use of uniform reserve requirements
as a monetary tool would be useless. The Federal Reserve has relied pri-
marily on targeting interest rates by varying the federal fund rate daily or
weekly in order to control monetary policy. This causes short-run fluctu-
ations as a trade off for long-run stability."9 8 Even if uniform reserves would
blunt short-run fluctuations as the Federal Reserve claims, they are still
valueless. As long as the Federal Reserve uses a monetary tool (controlling
interest rates) which causes short-run fluctuations, implementing uniform
reserves would be counterproductive. Futhermore, as the League points
'
9 2 ld. at 238.
293 Id. at 236.
'19Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 689 (statement of the U.S. League
of Savings Associations).
295Id. at 692.
198 Id. at 691.
1971d. at 692.
298 Id.
Winter, 1981]
27
et al.: The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
AKRON LAW REVIEW
out, the real problem is long-run excesses in the money supply rather than
daily fluctuations."'
The League also opposed uniform reserve requirements because chang-
ing the reserve requirements has been an inefficient tool. 00 Therefore, the
League contends that open market operations is a superior tool with which
to control monetary policy. In fact, the Federal Reserve has traditionally
relied on this tool rather than varying reserves rates."' One of the main
reasons open market operations has dominated as a monetary tool is that
even when reserve ratios are varied, open market operations must be
used to offset the initial effects on banking institutions'3 A sudden in-
crease in reserve ratios may result in a bank not having enough liquid assets
to support an increase in reserves as well as to maintain its present level
of financial activity.
A number of economists contend that there is not a membership prob-
lem as it has been defined; that is, as a lack of control over demand deposits
which weakens the linkage between member bank reserves and the money sup-
ply. In fact, economist Greenbaum asserts that the use of uniform reserve re-
quirement as a tool of monetary policy is the Federal Reserve's real prob-
lem."03 Uniform reserves are not an efficient monetary tool because vari-
ations in the reserve ratio add an additional variable in the money supply
which is difficult to predict.
Greenbaum explains that, in theory, when Federal Reserve members
leave the system, the effectiveness of the reserve requirement declines and
variations in the money supply increase.' " However, other factors must
be included in the 'real world' implementation of reserve requirements.
Whenever reserve requirements are increased, financial institutions are in-
duced to create substitutes for demand deposits, ones which do not have
reserve requirements or have very low levels.' Economist Greenbaum's
argument was supported by examples of innovations created to avoid re-
serve requirements: NOW accounts, money market mutual funds, credit
union share drafts, and repurchase agreements. By Greenbaum's analysis,
as each of the above substitutes for demand deposits are required to bear
reserves, innovative banking institutions will create new variations.
Besides the problem of substituting demand deposits for innovations
which bear no little or reserve requirements, Greenbaum and a colleague,
199 Id.
200 id.
2o Id. at 693.
20 2 Id. at 694.
203 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 735. (statement of Prof. Stuart I.
Greenbaum).
m Id. at 736.
205 1;. at 737,
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Professor Kanatas recommend that all legal reserve requirements be elimi-
nated. 00 In order to tighten the money supply, reserve requirements are
increased. However, an increase in reserve requirements also increases the
variability of the money supply, thus defeating effective monetary control.
Therefore, Kanatas and Greenbaum assert that reserve requirements nega-
tively affect monetary policy. A solution which they contend would moot
the membership erosion problem would be to pay an interest rate on de-
posits voluntarily held at the Federal Reserve."0 '
To this commentator, the Federal Reserve's contention that reserve
requirements are a necessary tool which must be protected by making re-
serves mandatory for all depository institutions is tenuous. In view of the
fact Federal Reserve economists have published few, if any, scholarly stud-
ies in support of mandatory reserves, one can not help but question the
necessity of the Monetary Control Act. If reserves are so valuable a tool
that the voluntary system had to be forsaken for a mandatory system, one
would expect some documentation. Adding to the confusion, reserve re-
quirements have been touted as a necessary tool even though the Federal
Reserve has traditionally relied on open market operations. Proponents
of uniform reserve requirements attribute the lack of utilization of reserves
to a fear of exacerbating federal reserve membership erosion. However,
the Federal Reserve has relied primarily on open-market operations even
before a "membership problem" had been asserted. If mandatory uniform
reserve requirements are an absolute necessity how did the American bank-
ing system survive up until now? Before deciding how to solve a problem, it
would seem more prudent to determine if there is a problem. Therefore,
the question is, did Congress adequately analyze membership erosion in
the Federal Reserve or did it start from the premise that the erosion was
a problem?
2. Is Monetary Control Facilitated by Uniform Reserve Requirements?
The proponents of the Monetary Control Act contend that the shift
of members to nonmember banks and the lack of control over thrift in-
stitutions has created problems in implementing monetary policy. The de-
creased control over reserves has been touted as the problem and uniform
reserves for all depository institutions has become the chosen solution.
In comparison, there have been a number of studies which refute the
notion that monetary control is facilitated by increasing the Federal Re-
serve's control over reserve requirements. Rather, these empirical studies
demonstrate that the source of instability in the money supply has been
caused by the graduated reserve requirement structure of member banks
and not by the variation in reserve requirements between member banks
and other banking institutions. According to these studies, the money supply
208 Id.
207 Id. at 742,
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could have been stabilized by streamlining the complex reserve structure
of member banks. Thus, the Monetary Control Act did not need to extend
reserve requirements to all depository institutions, but should have con-
fined itself to streamlining the reserve structure of member banks.
The above conclusions are supported by Professors Robertson's and
Phillips' 1974 article," 8 Robertson and Phillips explain the factors
which affect the ratio between the base money (net liabilities of the
Federal Reserve) and the money supply (demand deposits plus currency).
In order to accurately predict monetary policy, the Federal Reserve must
compute how many dollars taken out of or placed in the money supply
will generate a given level of economic activity. This multiple effect is re-
ferred to as the "multiplier". Predictability becomes difficult because the
multiplier is made up of four ratios which have their own factors and para-
meters. A short description of each ratio is needed in order to be able to
understand Phillips and Robertson's analysis:
(1) The R-ratio. It is computed by dividing total reserves by total de-
posits. Prior to Title I, the Federal Reserve had to estimate the
deposits held by nonmembers and thrift institutions. °9
(2) The K-ratio. This is the ratio of currency in the hands of the public
to the total demand deposits. This ratio varies greatly because
the public chooses to hold different levels of cash depending on
seasonal or business cycles. 1
(3) The T-ratio. Time deposits to demand deposits of all commercial
banks. Under the Monetary Control Act, demand deposit reserve
requirements differ from nonpersonal time deposits. The Federal
Reserve must estimate the public's desire to hold time deposits in
order to determine the effect on the money supply.
2 1
1
(4) The G-ratio. This is the United States governmental deposits in
commercial banks to private demand deposits. Reserves are re-
quired on both deposits. A fluctuation in the amount of Govern-
ment deposits held in the banking system affects the amount of
private deposits held by the banking system. 2
The above ratios must be analyzed together to accurately predict and
implement monetary policy. According to the Robertson and Phillips article,
the R ratio is the least volatile of the other three ratios. Therefore, variations
in the money supply are not caused by the movement of demand deposits
between member and nonmember banks, as asserted by the Federal Re-
serve, but by a number of other variables affecting the money supply which
are too numerous to accurately pinpoint the solution to uniform reserve
208 Phillips and Robertson, supra note 78.
209 Id. at 424.
210 Id. at 424-5.
211 Id. at 425.
2 1 2 Id. at 425-426.
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requirements. In contrast, these authors advocate relying on more predicable
monetary tools such as open-market operations and requiring timely reports
concerning banking institutions' assets and liabilities.2 1 1
Another empirical study also demonstrates that non-member banks
have not been a source of error or instability in monetary policy. One of
the most thorough studies concerning this issue was published by Professor
Starleaf in the 1975 Journal of Finance.2 " He contends that the variability
in the deposit multiplier for all banks is less than the variability in the de-
posit multiplier for member banks. From this deduction, Starleaf inferred:
[A]ll of the tests indicate that the non-member banks have been a
moderate source of stability for Federal Reserve control of the money
stock . . . without non-member banks Federal Reserve control would
have been slightly more unstable than it was in fact." 5
It must be noted Starleaf acknowledged that given the lack of precise data
on nonmember bank activities his analysis may not be correct. However, the
facts of his empirical analysis show that bringing non-member banks into
a system of graduated reserve requirements would not reduce but would
actually increase the instability or error in predicting monetary policy.
A rejoinder was published by Kopecky, an economist of the Federal
Reserve System, in the 1978 Journal of Finance."' Kopecky challenges
Starleaf's assertion that the Federal Reserve monetary policy would not
be helped but would be negatively affected by uniform reserve requirements.
In his rejoinder, Kopecky pursued a theoretical argument that the deposit
multiplier for all commercial banks became more stable under universal
reserve requirements. Without uniform reserves, the money supply becomes
unpredictable because a proportion of deposits is in flux between member
and nonmember banks and the total proportion of demand deposits subject
to reserve requirements is decreasing.""
In rebuttal, the American Bankers Association (ABA) submitted a
memorandum to the House during hearings on the monetray control issue
in 1979."1 The ABA memorandum supported Starleaf's position and pro-
posed unifying reserve ratio rates only within the member bank system.
The author of the ABA memorandum attacks Kopecky's probability model
because of a number of flaws."1 Even once the flaws are corrected, the
218 1d. at 430-2.
214 Starleaf, Nonmember Banks and Monetary Control, 30 JoURNAL OF FINANCE 955 (Sept.
1975).
2 51d. at 973-4.
216 Kopecky, Nonmember banks and Empirical Measures of the Variability of Reserves and
Money: A Theoretical Appraisal, 33 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 311 (March 1978).21 7 1d. at 314-317.
218 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 610 (memorandum from Charles
Haywood representing the American Bankers Association).
2L9 The ABA memorandum found three major flaws:
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Kopecky model actually demonstrates a premise contrary to the one it
seems to state. It actually premises that reserve ratios which vary among
member banks, rather than between members and other institutions, have
caused the error in predicting monetary policy. In conclusion, the ABA
memorandum rejects mandatory reserve requirements and suggests that
the solution to potential unpredictability is a better reporting system.220
It must be noted that this is the position of a 1979 article co-authored
by economists of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 2 '
These economists state that the introduction in 1972 of graduated reserve
requirements for member banks increased the variability of the reserve
ratio on demand deposits.'22 Their empirical study shows that eighty-four
percent of the additional variability in the reserve ratio since 1972 was
due to the graduated reserve structure of member banks.2 ' Furthermore,
this variance could be corrected by frequent and accurate reports on bank-
ing activity. Once reserve level fluctuations become predictable, open-mar-
ket operations can be used to offset any undesired contractions or expansions
in the money supply.' "
As the above article exhibits, even economists within the Federal Re-
serve system are not in agreement on the necessity for uniform reserves.
Assuming the studies against uniform reserve requirements are accurate,
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 did not have to force nonmember banks
and thrift institutions into holding noninterest-bearing reserves. A fairer and
more viable solution would have been to abolish gradual reserve requirements
within the membership system and to confine the Monetary Control Act to its
reporting requirements.2 5 Again, this commentator questions whether there
are adequate scholarly studies to warrant changing the banking system from
voluntary to mandatory reserve requirements. If Congress can not obtain one
of its main objects, greater monetary control, then Title I will have been a
costly but useless adventure for those institutions previously exempt from
federal reserve requirements.
This commentator questions the legislative intent in passing the Mone-
(1). The approach of the Kopecky model overstates the magnitude of the random
variation in deposit flows between member and nonmember banks.
(2). The Kopecky model does not include the probability of "on-us" checks being de-
posited in member banks versus their being deposited in nonmember banks or
thrift institutions.
(3). The Kopecky model misstated the deposit multiplier for nonmember banks.
Id. at 612-7.
220 Id. at 617.
2 21 Farley and Simpson, Graduated Reserve Requirements and Monetary Control, 34 JoURNAL
OF FINANcE 999 (Sept. 1979).
22 Id. at 1001.
223 ld. at 1003.
2U Id. at 1004-5.
925 180 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 102.
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tary Control Act, which is purportedly to aid the Federal Reserve in im-
plementing monetary policy. A review of the major proposed legislation
prior to this Act, H.R. 722 and H.R. 14072,227 shows that Congress had en-
dorsed the idea of decreasing the total percentage of banks and demand de-
posits under the Federal Reserve's control."8 Under the proposed bill,
H.R. 14072, as of December 1978, ninety percent of the Commercial banks
would not be subject to any reverse requirement. Of the remaining ten per-
cent subject to reserve requirements, one-half of this ten percent could use
their vault cash holdings to meet the reserve requirements."9 In essence,
ninety-five percent of all banks would have been free from holding reserves
with the Federal Reserve because of a fifty million dollar exemption.2
Similarly, under the proposed version of H.R. 7 as reported in the House
Report 96-263," l a smaller percentage of transaction accounts would have
been covered than the amount under the Federal Reserve's control at that
time. This proposed bill would have cut the amount of reserves under the
Federal Reserve's control from thirty-four billion to seventeen billion or
stated alternatively, a reduction from seventy-two percent to sixty-six percent
of all demand deposits controlled."22 Therefore, this proposed bill would
have left a large portion of financial institutions outside the Federal Re-
serve's control.
Both of the proposed bills were important ancestors of the final legis-
lation-Title I. Yet, each would have produced the strange result of de-
creasing the amount of demand deposits and the financial institutions within
the control of the Federal Reserve. If monetary control would not be
increased by these proposals, what was the intent of their proponents, who
were the same proponents of Title I? One answer might be that the Federal
Reserve really viewed the erosion in its membership as a threat to its political
clout. With less "constituents" to plead its case, the Federal Reserve may
have feared losing its prestige and independence. By coercing all financial
institutions to retain mandatory levels of reserves and to file reports, the
Federal Reserve could thereby expand its control.
Another possible answer is that the Federal Reserve feared the erosion
of memberships because this erosion chipped away at its revenues. The
revenues of the Federal Reserve are increased by increasing the level of
reserves under its control. More reserves mean more money which can
22 0H.R.7, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
227 H.R.14072, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
228 125 CoNG. REc. H6322 (daily ed. July 20, 1979) (remarks by Rep. Hinson and Henry
S. Reuss); Letter of Transmittal, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House
of Representatives, m (Dec. 30, 1978).
2 2
9Id.
220 Id.
2S1H.R. REP. No. 96-263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
292 Id. at 4.
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be invested in interest accruing government securities. The potential loss
of control of another powerful agency comes into play because the Treasury
Department eventually receives most of the Federal Reserve's profits. 33 How-
ever, sound monetary policy may not coincide with the Treasury Department's
and the Federal Reserve's goal of increasing revenues. It must be pointed
out the Federal Reserve's main purpose is to implement sound monetary
policy, not to generate revenue.
The background of Title I is as disconcerting as the procedure used
to enact it. Senator Armstrong, on the floor of the Senate, attacked certain
of its provisions as not having been considered by the House or the Senate
prior to the conference. " Citing Title I, the Monetary Control Act of 1980
as a case in point, the senator stated: "Contrary to the express will of
the Senate Banking Committee, [it was] made behind closed doors in a
conference committee by a handful of people operating against a deadline
. . . in a high pressure environment."23 5
Senator Morgan, during the same day, forcefully objected to the pro-
cedure of passing an act without a Senate debate on the act in final form."
The Senator had struck the provisions concerning reserve requirements
from the proposed act prior to the conference. Such provisions would have,
in the Senator's view, destroyed the dual banking system.3 7 To the con-
sternation of Senator Morgan the provisions were readded to the proposed
Act and passed by the Senate. Therefore, Senator Morgan charged the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
with: "Appoint[ing] a conference committee that very carefully eliminates
anyone who posed views contrary to that."" 8
Congress invites criticism when such a revolutionary act is enacted
without Senate debate or hearings on the act in its final form. The possible
ramifications as well as the legislative intent are difficult to ascertain. One
is left with the haunting suspicion that Congress would have adopted any
leadership-backed version of Title I in order to meet the deadline caused
by the expiration of the stop-gap legislation.
The argument for Title I is that member banks have been competitively
unequal with nonmember banks and thrift institutions because only member
banks have supported the cost of monetary control.3 Prior to the enact-
ment of Title I, only member banks have been required to hold noninterest-
2 3 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 527.
234 126 CONO. REc. S.3236 (daily ed. March 29, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Armstrong).
25 Id.
231 ld. at S.3241 (remarks by Sen. Morgan).
maT d.
2s Id.
289 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 76-77 (statement of Chairman
Miller).
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bearing ("sterile") reserves with the Federal Reserve. Now, the Act re-
quires all financial institutions to hold this type of reserve in the name of
equality.240
Opponents of universal reserve requirements contend the above argu-
ments are misleading. Not all member banks are at a competitive disadvant-
age. While member banks hold more noninterest-bearing reserves than other
institutions, this cost has been offset by using these balances to pay for
correspondent banking services.2 ' Therefore, only those banks without
large correspondent businesses may have felt the cost of the Federal Reserve
was too high. The problems of these banks could be alleviated more equit-
ably by inducing them to remain in the system rather than by forcing all
institutions to hold reserves. One proposed inducement was to lower re-
serve requirements for member banks by one-fourth.' 2
Also, it is argued that Title I exchanges one type of inequality for
another. A claimed inequality between member banks and other financial
institutions has been exchanged for an inequality between small and large
financial institutions. Financial institutions subject to reserve requirements
have a lower reserve ratio if their deposits are under twenty-five million
dollars.""3 Of course, small banks have been traditionally protected from con-
centrations of economic power. However, this act is legislation which pur-
ports to equalize costs, not to protect a certain segment. In fact, there is
testimony that small banks are better able to compete on an equal basis
and can generate more profits than large banks.'" Nor are the authorities
in agreement on whether or not it is small banks which bear the cost burden
of Federal Reserve membership." '4 The Federal Reserve contends small
banks disproportionately bear the cost of reserve requirements because they
use less services.2" In comparison, the American Banker's Association
states that net membership burden increases as the size of the financial in-
stitution increases." Therefore, larger financial institutions may actually
be forced to bear a disproportionate amount of the burden by the enact-
ment of Title I.
Title I may also increase rather than decrease inequities between
financial institutions because of geographical disparities. A major flaw in
treating all financial institutions alike regarding uniform reserve require-
ments is that each state has special needs and problems that would not be
240 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 103.
241 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 372, 377 (statement of E.D.
Dunn, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
242 Id. at 378.
248 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 103.
2
" Monetary Control Hearing 1979, supra note 58, at 547.
245ld. at 522.
2;4 Id., at chart iI, 88.
247 Id.
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considered. As enacted, Title I, in the name of equality, may cause some
state banks' profits to decline disproportionately which in turn causes a
disproportionate rise in rates within the affected state. Those states which
had minimal, or no reserve requirements prior to the Act will be the most
affected. For example, Representative Akaka, from Hawaii contends that his
state will be inequitably burdened by mandatory reserve requirements."
8
In Hawaii, a great demand for credit has been caused by rapid growth and
development. However, credit is in short supply because a large percent of
the investors in Hawaii are overseas investors who drain the earnings to
their foreign countries. "9 Thus, when reserve requirements are increased,
Hawaiian banks have less money to loan, which stifles economic growth.
Similarly, Rhode Island's economy is negatively affected by uniform
reserve requirements.""° Mr. Barnes, President of the Old Stone Bank, states
that Rhode Island has a unique problem because its state banking laws per-
mit every mutual savings bank to operate as a commercial bank which
offers commercial loans, demand deposits, and the services of a thrift in-
stitution. 5' These hybrid banking institutions are not required to hold re-
serves on a majority of their deposits because under Title I savings de-
posits which are not subject to automatic transfer252 and nonpersonal time
deposits are exempt.
253
In comparison, the Old Stone Bank does not have the reserve re-
quirement exemptions applicable to the hybrid banks. As a consequence,
President Barnes contends that the Old Stone Bank would have to re-
structure its business from transaction accounts (which require reserves)
in order to be more competitive with the hybrid commercial-thrift institu-
tions.22" Thus, one of the Rhode Island's largest residential mortgage lenders,
the Old Stone Bank, would be induced to raise its interest rates and make
less consumer loans; both actions which would negatively affect Rhode
Island residents.
According to H. Lee Boatwright, the consumers of Maryland would
also be inequitably burdened by reserve requirements determined by the
Federal Reserve.25 His bank predominantly serves bedroom communities
for Washington, D.C., which are more retail oriented than other indus-
trialized areas. Maryland banks in this area devote more of their loans to
consumers, such as home mortgages, than do banks of similar size else-
2'8Id. at 444 (statement of Rep. Akaka, from Hawaii).
249 Id.
250 Monetary Control Hearing of 1978, supra note 44, at 562 (statement of Theodore Barnes,
Pres. of Old Stone Bank, R.I.).
251 Id. at 563.
252 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 103.
283 Id.
' Monetary Control Hearings 1978, supra note 44, at 563-4.
255 Id. at 587 (statement of H. Lee Boatwright, Pres. of Suburban Trust Co., Md.).
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where.25 This concentration on consumer loans has the added cost factors
of consumer default and low yields as to accrual of interest. Additional
cost of required reserves would induce these banks to shift from consumer
loans to higher yield loans.
This is not the only consumer oriented banking system which wouldbe inequitably burdened by uniform reserves. The Manufacturer's Bank
of Los Angeles, California contends that uniform reserve requirements would
deter them from loaning to small businesses because California banks would
not be willing to assume the added cost of reserves as well as the risks
characteristic of small business loans." '
Another inequality related to the geographical distinctions between
financial institutions is the inequality between rural banks and those located
near Federal Reserve banks.258 Basically, a bank which is not located near
a Federal Reserve bank or branch and does not have a large volume of
checks cannot meet the Federal Reserve deadlines for receipt of checks to
be cleared. 59 Thus, rural banks use Federal Reserve services less than those
located near Federal Reserve Banks. These distant banks must hold addi-
tional reserves with correspondent banks which provide them with check
clearing services. Uniform reserve requirements would heighten the com-
petitive disadvantage of rural banks because now they have to hold double
the reserve levels of other banks. Again, these costly inequities would be
passed on to small businesses and consumers who may seek loans.
Title I has other provisions which may cause inequities. The National
Savings and Loan League have expressed their concern over the increased
cost of double examinations and reporting requirements."0 The potential
duplication may arise from the overlapping jurisdiction of two federal agen-
cies, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve
Board."' Although the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has traditionally
regulated thrift institutions, now that the Federal Reserve has the power
to impose reserve requirements, reporting requirements, and examinations,
there may be a conflict. In effect, thrift institutions are at a competitive
disadvantage with state banks which have the option of changing to or
adopting a national charter in order to escape double costs. Savings and
loans do not have the option of leaving the Federal Home Loan Bank
2H Id. at 588.257 Id. at 598 (statement of Leonard Weil, Pres. of Manufacturers Bank, Los Angeles,
Calif.).258 Id. at 693, 695-6 (statement of Lewis Holding, Pres. of First-Citizens Bank and Trust
Co., North Carolina).
259 Id. at 695-8.
26 0 Monetary Control Hearing of 1979, supra note 58, at 703 (statement of Jonathan Lindley
on behalf of the National Savings and Loan League).
261 Id. at 705.
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Board for the Federal Reserve System should this move prove more profit-
able. 2 62
Another major concern of thrift institutions is that uniform reserve
requirements will affect their economic health, and in turn the housing
market.263 As Senator Morgan states, "Then where will we go to get our
home loans? . . . Savings and loans finance about 60 percent of the
home loans in this country. I predict in the next two years that will drop
to 40 percent or less."2 6' The liquidity of savings and loans may be im-
paired because their reserves no longer bear interest under the new Act.
Previously, the thrift institutions had held reserves in highly marketable
short-term money market securities. 65 The inequality between thrift in-
stitutions and commercial banks is further emphasized because commercial
banks offer a wider range of services and are located in convenient locations
for banking clientele."'
3. The goal of equality may be outweighed by the harmful effects on the
banking system
The delicate balance between Federal and State banking powers may
be destroyed because Title I has shifted more power to the Federal Reserve.
As a result, state banks may convert to a national charter. In essence, Title
I may have caused a migration from state charters to national charters in
an overzealous attempt to stem federal reserve membership erosion.
One reason for state banks to convert to a national charter would
be to avoid the added costs of double reporting requirements and examina-
tions. Such double requirements are costly because employees' efforts are
diverted from banking business to fulfilling the requirements.
Another incentive for adopting or defecting to a national charter
would be to escape higher reserve requirements. The Monetary Control
Act of 1980 does provide that reserve requirements may be used to satisfy
liquidity requirements imposed by state or federal law.
2
"
7 However, if the
state reserve requirements are higher than the levels imposed by the Fed-
eral Reserve, the state banks would be induced to cut costs by joining the
Federal Reserve system. This scenario is supported by the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors' Report which found that several states do have
higher reserve levels than the levels proposed in H.R.7 which are similar
to the present Federal Reserve levels.66
262 However, see Title VIII of the 1980 Act which may provide a solution to this problem.
6 Monetary Control Hearing of 1979, supra note 58, at 689, 695-9 (statement of the U.S.
League of Savings Assn.).
26 126 CoNG. RuE. S.3242 (daily ed. March 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Morgan).
265 Monetary Control Hearings of 1979, supra note 58, at 696.
266 Id. at 698.
267 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 104.
269 H.R. REP. No. 96-263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38. (Supplemental views of Rep; Stanton). 38
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The bottom line is that the dual banking system may be in jeopardy
by the enactment of the Monetary Control Act of 1980. If this is the result
of the Act, the goal of equalizing the burden of monetary policy becomes
inconsequential compared to the establishment of a centralized banking sys-
tem. Americans have traditionally been suspicious of concentrated power
which does not afford the checks and balances necessary to maintain equality.
The Federal Reserve has virtually become the "fourth" arm of the gov-
ernment because Congress has delegated broad powers over the monetary
system to the Federal Reserve." 9 Most of the time, policy decisions are
made without even reporting why the Board of Governors reached their
decisions. 70 Even a President's power over the Federal Reserve is sharply
limited because each member of the Board of Governors is elected for a
fourteen year term which may not coincide with a President's term of
office. Therefore, the President may or may not be able to choose members
of the Board of Governors which will follow his administration's policies.
271
This semi-independent status of the Federal Reserve has created contro-
versy. Many feel the Federal Reserve should be made more responsible to
Congress and the President because monetary policy is an integral part of
the national economic policy. If more banks become Federal Reserve banks,
the administration may be unable to establish or coordinate an overall
economic policy should a more powerful Federal Reserve decide to take
an opposite action.
4. Was Title I the best solution to the erosion of membership in the Fed-
eral Reserve?
The major alternative proposal to Title I was a voluntary approach
wherein banks would be induced to join the Federal Reserve system by the
lure of interest paid on required reserves. By paying interest on reserves,
banks would not withdraw from the system or choose a state rather than a
federal charter.
Representative Stanton proposed such a bill, "The Freedom of Choice
Compromise" in the Ninty-Sixth Congress. 2 ' Stanton advocated a voluntary
system because such a system has been in existence since 1931. As long
as the system works, why implement a drastically different structure which
has never been tried before in the United States? As previously stated, there
have been few, if any, scholarly studies in support of mandatory reserves.
Even assuming that such studies exist, these studies would be untried in
reality.
The Stanton proposal incorporated the premise that the banking
269 See generally, Patman, What's Wrong with the Federal Reserve and What to Do about it,
61 A.B.A.J. 179 (Feb., 1975).
27 0 ld. at 180.
272 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
272 H.R. REP. No. 96-263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1979).
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structure should be changed as little as possible in any effort to stem the
flow of members from the Federal Reserve.2 73 Under the Stanton bill, re-
serve requirements would not be initially applied to any but Federal Re-
serve members. 7 ' The new twist was that reserve levels would be lowered
below the levels endorsed by the Federal Reserve and interest would be paid
on those reserves.275 In the event the membership continued to erode, and
demand deposits under Federal control dropped below sixty-six percent,
reserve requirements would be mandatory for all financial institutions."'
The effect of the Stanton Bill would have been to increase the number
of banks and reserve requirements under Federal Reserve control without
extending such control over nonmembers and thrift institutions in the ab-
sence of an emergency. " In the final analysis, the Stanton bill would have
strengthened the voluntary system and worked to reduce a member bank's
motives for leaving the Federal Reserve system.
E. Conclusion
This commentator supports the Stanton bill rather than the enacted
version of Title I. This proposal would have been the best answer to the
"problem" of the membership decline in the Federal Reserve System. Unlike
the enacted version which required all financial institutions to hold reserves
with the Federal Reserve Banks, the Stanton proposal relies on a voluntary
approach which only becomes mandatory if reserves fall below a set level.
The benefit of such a combined approach is twofold. One, it is a prudent
solution which changes incrementally rather than radically a banking sys-
tem which has been viable for sixty-eight years. Second, the Federal Reserve
System could have been adequately protected by the automatic emergency
reserve measures without burdening financial institutions with the cost of
reserves during a stable economy.
The adoption of a radical and untried banking system which enlarges
the powers of the autonomous Federal Reserve is even more incongruous
because Title I may be a solution to a nonexistent problem. As previously
stated not all banking experts agree that the decline in Federal Reserve
membership would have been disasterous to efficient monetary policy.
Nor did the experts agree that the Federal Reserve should rely more
on varying reserve ratios in order to implement monetary policy. In
comparing the cost burden of mandatory reserves to the necessity of re-
serves as a monetary tool, less obtrusive monetary tools such as the dis-
count rate and open-market operations would have been a wiser choice.
273 Id.
27 4 Id. at 38.
275 Id. at 39.
276 Id. at 40.
27 7 Id. at 39.
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Therefore, this commentator believes Congress overreacted to an in-
accurately perceived problem, one which, if it existed, could have been
solved without encroaching upon the freedom of choice which had been
the bulwark of the American banking system prior to Title I.
TITLE II: DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1980
A. Background of Title I
Title II of The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 198078 will have far reaching effects on the public. It will
mean greater earnings on savings for everyone with a savings account with-
out sacrificing the safety of federally insured deposits or the liquidity of a
passbook. This part of the Act has caused much furor since it was enacted.
In order to understand the controversy presently surrounding this section
some background to Title II must be explained.
On May 22, 1979, President Carter sent a message to Congress
concerning the rate ceiling on deposit interest rates.2"' The President felt that
these ceilings discriminated against the small saver who was not able to
purchase market rate securities due to insufficient funds.8 This is the saver
who must have his funds made available to draw from on short notice and
so must sacrifice the market rate instruments, which tie up savings for a
period of time, in order to have this liquidity. The President's message also
stated a concern that the small savers were pulling out of those savings plans
subject to these ceilings offered by banks and thrift institutions and were
going into the financial marketplace with its new investment alternatives,
such as the Money Market Mutual Funds. These investment alternatives
offered the small saver the going market rate as opposed to the 5.5%
or 5.25% that the regulated institutions offered as well as the liquidity
that the small saver needed for his funds."s The drawback to these funds
was that they were not insured by the federal government and so may
not have been perceived as safe by the small saver who wanted more
for his money but certainly could not afford to lose any of his life sav-
ings trying to get it. Lastly, the President felt that savers would prefer
a higher yield on their savings as opposed to non-price competition
that financial institutions were using to attract depositors, such as merchan-
dising gifts. 8 '
278 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title II.
279 Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on S.1347 Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (Part I) 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S.1347 Hearings].
2s Id.
281 Id. at 6.
282 Id.
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In his message, the President offered several proposals to help
both the small saver and the financial institutions that must pay the higher
earnings on the savings. The proposal that is important to this section of
the article is the one in which the President asked Congress:
to provide that through an orderly transition period all deposit interest
rates be permitted to rise to market rate levels. This will be subject to
emergency action on the part of the responsible regulators if the safety
and soundness of financial institutions is threatened or the implemen-
tation of monetary policy so requires. 83
This recommendation came about after review of the report of the Presi-
dent's Inter-Agency Task Force on Regulation Q."8'
Legislation was introduced in the Senate on June 14, 1979 which was
intended to carry out the proposals of the President's message.285 The bill,
which was introduced by Senator Cranston and Senator Proxmire, would
have phased out Regulation Q over the course of ten years.' This was to
be accomplished by raising the ceiling one quarter of one percent every six
months starting in 1982 and continuing through 1989."7 Starting in 1990
there was to be no ceiling, but stand-by authority to reimpose rate ceilings
after 1990 under emergency circumstances would have existed. u8 Authority
would also have existed to postpone the raising of the ceiling for up to
one year. 9 On September 24, 1979 the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs considered S. 1347 and after approval of some amend-
ments reported it as a substitute for H.R. 4986,"' ° the House bill that was
to give many of the powers to financial institutions found in S. 1347 but
which did not have a Regulation Q phase-out provision. After the bill was
reported out of committee it passed the Senate on November 1, 1979. °1
The two Houses were unable to reach an agreement on the differences
in the bills on December 5, 1979 and agreed to reconvene on March 4,
1980.111 In the meantime, other phase-out plans had been introduced and
discussed in the House hearings on the Regulation Q phase-out.
283 Id.
2 84 Tim REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q, DE-
POSIT INTEREST CEILINGS AND HOusING CREDIT.
285 S. 1347 Hearings, supra note 279, at 8.
28 Id. at 4.
2 87 Id. at 19.
28 Id. at 21.
2 89 Id. at 20.
290 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEWS 834, 835.
291 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODB CONG. & An.
NEWS 834, 835.
92 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman St.
Germain).
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The provisions of these plans were as follows: H.R. 6198 would have
gone into effect on July 1, 1980 and continued until July 1, 1985. Ceilings
were to be lifted starting with the longest term certificates. This bill con-
tained no provision for postponement during the phaseout. Authority to
reimpose controls after July 1, 1985 was to be held only by the Federal
Reserve Board for the period of one year in an extreme economic emergen-
cy. 9 3 H.R. 6216 had no deadline but contained a provision that beginning
in 1985 regulators would bring passbook rates to market level as soon as
possible."
Finally, Congressman St. Germain made a proposal at the beginning
of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee Hearings on the phase-out of
Regulation Q in H.R. 4986."5 Mr. St. Germain's proposal was to phase
out Regulation Q over five years, requiring a one half of one percent in-
crease in the first year and other increases at the discretion of the regulators.
This proposal contained no emergency reimposition powers for the regu-
lators. On March 4, 1980, the conferees agreed on a compromise bill which
was passed by the House on March 27, 1980 and by the Senate on March
28, 1980.21 This compromise bill had nothing in common with the various
proposals mentioned above. However, the overall goal of deregulation seems
to have been well served.
B. Review of Title 11
Upon enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, the manner in which rate ceilings are determined
changed and so did the philosophy behind rate ceiling regulation. First, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee was formed (hereinafter
Deregulation Committee)Y' The Deregulation Committee is made up of
the following members: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the
National Credit Union Administration Board, the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Chair-
man of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, all of whom are the voting
members of the Deregulation Committee. 9 The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency is also a member of the Deregulation Committee but is a nonvoting
member." ' The authority transferred to the Deregulation Committee had
previously been with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Fed-
293 Id. at 36-37 (statement of Jay Janis, Chairman FHLBB).
294 Id. at 37.
295 Id. at 2.
296 [1980] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 834.
-97 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title 1, § 203 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502).
298 Id.
299 Id.
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eral Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Chairman of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board."'0 The Deregulation Committee determines a change in
interest rate ceilings by a majority of its voting members. 0 ' Under the rate
setting system that had existed, the regulators consulted with each other on
increases and no vote was taken, but because of the legally mandated differ-
ential given to thrift institutions, no increase could be instituted without the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board increasing the ceiling for thrift institu-
tions."0 ' This individual authority to set rates is now eliminated and rates
are increased by a majority vote of the Deregulation Committee, no matter
what an individual regulator may decide."3
In order to ensure that deregulation would proceed in an orderly
fashion, Congress gave the Deregulation Committee targets for the phase-
out of Regulation Q.101 These targets are not, however, fixed standards.0
Rather, they are guidelines to be followed. During the first eighteen months
after enactment, an increase of one quarter of one percent on permissible
passbook rates was set.'" Other rates during this period may be increased,
but this is not mandated.30 7 Starting with the third year of this phase-out
and continuing through the sixth year, a one half of one percent increase
is targeted on all classes of accounts for each year.03 The Deregulation Com-
mittee may either exceed these targets if economic conditions warrant this
type of action or may refrain from increases on the permissible rate if con-
ditions in the economy warrant.30 9 The Deregulation Committee also has
the discretion to selectively increase or decrease permissible rates on any
class of deposits or, should economic conditions mandate, lower the per-
missible rates on any or all accounts. 1 This authority may be exercised
at any time during the six year period."' The Deregulation Committee is
not restricted to this formula of phase-out.313 The Deregulation Committee
may combine the phase-out formula and its targets with newly created
types of deposits that are not subject to any ceiling or have ceilings that are
00 Id.
801 Id.
0 Pub. L. No. 94-200, Title I, § 102, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975). (noted after 12 U.S.C. § 461
(1976)).
303 H.R. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 73, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& A. NEWS 901.
3o4 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title 11, § 205 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §' 3504(a)).
103 d. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3504(b)).
306 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3504(a)).
307 Id.
208 Id.
303 H.R. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 72-73, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 900.
9'old. at 73; [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 901.
311 Id.
112 14. at 72; [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AI. NEWS 900.
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linked to the market-rate."' 3 The new class of accounts need not have a
differential between thrift institutions and commercial banks. 1'
The latitude extended to the Deregulation Committee on ways to
phase out Regulation Q was not also extended to the procedures the De-
regulation Committee must follow in administering the phase-out. The
Deregulation Committee must meet at least quarterly in public sessions. 15
The business of the Deregulation Committee is to be conducted in con-
formity with the Sunshine Act and the Freedom of Information Act.1 ' The
Deregulation Committee may not eliminate the differential on classes of
accounts subject to Public Law 94-200 but may increase rates on these
accounts provided the differential is maintained."" The lack of observance
of procedures and restrictions were later challenged by the U.S. League
of Savings and Loans when the rates were changed by the Deregulation
Committee on Money Market Certificates and Small Saver Certificates. 18
The Deregulation Committee and its Regulation Q authority expires
six years after enactment of the legislation. " The reason for the six year
extension is to permit the thrift institutions enough time to incorporate the
new powers given them in the remainder of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.20 The new powers were
given to the thrift institutions in order to create competitive equity among
commercial bank and thrift institutions and to make up for the loss of the
differential. 2 ' After the expiration of Regulation Q the depository institu-
tions will be able to compete directly with nondepository institutions for
savings, thus creating an opportunity for the small saver to receive market
rates in insured institutions.
C. Subsequent Regulatory Action
The Deregulation Committee, although a new and innovative idea,
is certainly not controversial and with all these guidelines and procedures
should not have been the cause of great concern. Unfortunately, this has not
been the case. On May 20, 1980 the Deregulation Committee met in a closed
313 Id. at 73; [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 901.
3241d.
313 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title I, § 203 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502(b)).
818 "All meetings of the Deregulation Committee shall be conducted in conformity with the
provisions of section 5526 of Title 5" Id. See also legislative history at [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 900.
B1T Pub. L. No. 94-200, Title I, § 102(a), 89 Stat. 1124 (1975); see also [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 901.
R18 Complaint of Plaintiff at 7-10, United States League of Savings Association v. Depository
Institution Deregulation Committee, No. 80-1486 (D.C.D.C., filed June, 1980).
3191980 Act, supra note 3, Title II, § 202(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3501(b)).
320 H.R. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 72 (1980). reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 896, 900.
1921 Id.
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session to consider the differential on the Money Market Certificate."
This caused a great deal of commotion in the financial industry, with the
American Bankers Association asking for removal of the differential and
the United States League of Savings Associations asking for the retention
of the differential at all levels of Money Market Certificates."' The meeting
produced no decision on the differential. A second meeting on May 23, 1980,
also in closed session, produced no decision, but the Deregulation Com-
mittee announced an open meeting on May 28, 1980.124 The meeting of
May 28, 1980 produced Rule No. 0008. '25 This rule is very technical and
deserves some explanation. It deals with the differentials on certificates
sold by the depository institutions. These differentials allow the thrifts
to pay a higher percentage of return on savings of all types which ultimately
helps the thrifts compete for funds. For example, in the area of Money
Market Certificates, the rate is pegged to the six month Treasury bill average
weekly auction rate. If the average auction for a Treasury bill is below 7.25
percent, the ceiling for both the commercial banks and the thrift institutions
is 7.75 percent with no differential for the thrift institutions. If the Treasury
bill average is 7.25 - 7.50 percent the ceiling for the commercial banks
is 7.75 percent and the thrift ceiling is the Treasury bill rate plus .50
percent, giving the thrifts a differential ranging from .25 - 0 percent. When
the Treasury bill average is 7.50 - 8.50 percent the commercial bank ceiling
is the Treasury bill rate plus .25 percent and the thrift ceiling is the Treasury
bill rate plus .50 percent, according the thrifts a differential of .25 percent.
When the Treasury bill rate is 8.50 -8.75 percent, the commercial bank ceiling
is the Treasury bill rate plus .25 percent and the thrift ceiling is 9.00 per-
cent, giving the thrifts a differential of 0 - .25 percent. At 8.75 percent
and above on the Treasury bill average, the ceiling for commercial banks
and thrifts is the Treasury bill rate plus .25 percent with no differential. 26
The commercial bank may also renew Money Market Certificates to existing
customers at the same rate that the thrifts offer them."2 ' This new ceiling
schedule replaced the old ceilings in which the commercial banks rates
were the same as the Treasury bill auction average.2 ' The thrift ceiling under
the old ceiling system was given a .25 percent differential when the Treasury
bill average was 8.74 percent or lower. 29 The thrifts could pay 9.00 percent
when the Treasury bill average was between 8.75 and 9.00 percent. 33 0
322 Washington Notes, May 16, 1980 at 1.
823 Id.
324 Id., May 23, 1980 at p. 6.
325 45 Fed. Reg. 37,803 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1204.104-1204.106). Rule
0008 is a docket number on the Deregulation Committee's activities.
326 Id. This information is taken from a table set out irt the Federal Register.
227 Id. This was only true 6 months after promulgation.
32243 Fed. Reg. 21,435 (1978) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(f)).
82944 Fed. Reg. 15,477 (1979).
830 Id.
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When the Treasury bill average was 9.01 and above, the thrifts paid the
same as the Treasury bill average and there was no differential.
The Deregulation Committee did not stop with the new rate ceilings
on Money Market Certificates; rates were also increased on Small Saver
Certificates. Although these increases are not as complicated, they are also
a point of contention and so should be explained. The Small Saver Certificate
is based on the Treasury Composite Rate on thirty month Treasury securi-
ties, 3 ' The Small Saver Certificate rate is determined bi-weekly.3 2 When the
Treasury Composite Rate is 9.50 percent or below, the commercial bank
ceiling is 9.25 percent and the thrift ceiling is 9.50 percent, the differential
being .25 percent. 3 ' When the Treasury Composite Rate is 10 percent, the
commercial bank ceiling is 9.75 percent and the thrift rate is 10 percent
with a .25 percent differential. " When the Treasury Composite Rate is
11 percent, the commercial bank ceiling is 10.75 percent and the thrift
ceiling is 11 percent, giving a differential of .25 percent3 5 When the Treasury
Composite Rate is 12 percent and above, the commercial bank ceiling is
11.75 percent and the thrift ceiling is 12 percent, also giving a .25 percent
differential. Previously, the changes in the ceiling of the Small Saver Cer-
tificate rates were determined by the Treasury Composite Rate minus three-
quarters of one percent for commercial banks. The thrift rate was the Treas-
ury Composite Rate minus one-half of one percent, so a differential of .25
percent was built into the rates."'
D. Challenge by the United States League of Savings Associations
To say the least, the thrifts were not pleased by the turn of events.
The loss of the differential, except for limited circumstances on money
market certificates and the one half of one percent increase on small saver
certificates, would cost the thrifts money. The United States League of
Savings Associations, which is a national trade association with a member-
ship of approximately 4,500 savings and loan associations, was so dis-
pleased that, as a result, it filed suit.3 37 In the action, the Deregulation Com-
mittee and its members are named both individually and in their capacity
as members . 33  There is one exception to this: defendant Jay Janis is not
named individually but solely in his capacity as a member of the Deregu-
331 44 Fed. Reg. 75,621 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(g)), (Fed. Reserve); 44 Fed.
Reg. 75,378 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.7(b)(10)) (FDIC); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,625(1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(4)) (FHLBB).
33245 Fed. Reg. 37,804 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1204.106(a)).
333 Id.3341d.
335 Id.
3-m44 Fed. Reg. 75,625 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(4) (ii)).
3 United States League of Savings Associations v. Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee, No. 80-1486, (D.C.D.C. filed June, 1980).
338 Id., Complaint of Plaintiff at 2-3.
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lation Committee."' This is unusual, for Mr. Janis is a voting member of
the Deregulation Committee and voted for Rule 0008. Defendant John G.
Heimann is named individually and he is a non-voting member of the De-
regulation Committee." ' The difference may be that Jay Janis is Chairman
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board which regulates the members of
the United States League of Savings Associations and John Heimann is
Comptroller of the Currency, which has no regulating powers over the
members of the Association. After going to the trouble of naming these
members of the Deregulation Committee individually the League asked for
no damages against them, but only a declaratory judgment and preliminary and
permanent injunctions against the Deregulation Committee.' These facts
may not imply intentional harassment, but they raise a specter of doubt
as to the motive for naming five of the members individually.
The complaint listed eleven counts which will now be discussed along
with the reply of the Deregulation Committee. In the first count of the
complaint the United States League of Savings Associations (hereinafter
the U.S. League) claims that the Deregulation Committee is not permitted
under Title II of Public Law 96-221 to eliminate or reduce in part or in
whole the differential on existing classes of deposits and accounts." 2 Even
if the Deregulation Committee does have the authority to do this, it vio-
lated section 206 of Public Law 96-221 by not waiting until after the an-
nual individual reporting by members of the Deregulation Committee to
Congress had been made regarding the effect that removal of the differ-
ential would have on the housing industry and the thrifts. Thus, according
to the League, the Deregulation Committee violated section 206 by acting
within two months and not waiting until after the first annual reports. '
The U. S. League fails to recognize some very important facts in their
bringing of this count. First, the fact that there is a legally mandated differ-
ential is of no consequence because the mandate applies only to classes of
accounts in existence on December 10, 1975.' The classes of accounts
involved in the complaint were created after that date and, as such, are not
under the mandate." 5 If Congress had wanted to change the mandate to
89Id. at 3.
840 Id
841 Id.
842 Complaint of Plaintiff at 11-13.
343Id. at 12-13.
844 Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 102(a), 89 Stat. 1124, (noted after 12 U.S.C. § 461). This
section made differentials in existence on December 10, 1975 unchangeable without con-
gressional action.
35 Market Certificates were first authorized at 43 Fed. Reg. 21,435 (1978) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 217.7(f)), (Fed. Reserve), 43 Fed. Reg. 21,436 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.6
(b)(5)), (FDIC); 43 Fed. Reg. 21,438 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.5(a)) (FHLBB); while
small saver certificates were first authorized at 44 Fed. Reg. 75,621 (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.7(g)) (1979) (Fed. Reserve); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,378 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.7(b)
(10)) (1979) (FDIC); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,625 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(4))
(FHLBB).
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include accounts created after 1975 it could have enacted legislation to do
SO.
Section 209 of the Act provides that regulations of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter F.D.I.C.), the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (hereinafter Bank Board) and the Federal Reserve Board
remain in effect until repealed, amended or superseded by the Deregulation
Committee.' "4 The F.D.I.C. and Federal Reserve Board have taken action
in the past on IRA and Keogh accounts created after the mandated differ-
ential to eliminate or reduce the differential."', With the transfer of their
authority in section 203 to the Deregulation Committee tempered by the
provisions of section 209,3" an examination of prior regulations is essential.
Formerly, thrifts could pay the Treasury bill rate plus one quarter
of one percent on money market certificates."4 9 Subsequently, however, the
F.D.I.C. and the Bank Board established the Treasury bill rate as the
ceiling when this rate reached nine percent. This was done to relieve pressure
on the thrifts because the sharply rising interest rates were depressing
earnings.3" This action stripped the differential when the Treasury bill rate
reached nine percent. 51 A similar logic was used in the promulgation of the
new rates. The Deregulation Committee feared that the commercial banks
would lose funds from the Money Market Certificates if the regulation re-
mained in its present form, thus hurting the commercial banks' ability to
make business loans. 2 Similarly, commercial banks were permitted by
the Federal Reserve Board and the F.D.I.C. to pay the maximum rates
payable by thrifts on accounts under $100,000 on I.R.A. and Keogh de-
posits. 53 As a result, the actions of the Deregulation Committee are not
unique but are analogous to actions by the prior regulating authorities.
The second count of the U.S. League's complaint asserts that the De-
regulation Committee violated Congressional intent by acting on the in-
tent by acting on the interest rate before the thrifts had an opportunity
to implement new powers given them in the Act.3" The U.S. League also
asserts that the minimum ceilings violate the Congressional intent not to
allow ceiling rates to go above market rates. This second assertion will be
handled in count five which also deals with this problem.
3" 1980 Act supra note 3, at § 209, (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 3508).
34742 Fed. Reg. 20,284 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(e)) (Fed. Reserve); 42 Fed.
Reg. 21,272 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.6(b)(4) and § 329.7(b)(6)) (FDIC).
848 1980 Act supra note 3, § 209 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C § 3508).
34943 Fed. Reg. 21,438 (1978) (then codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.5(a)).
350 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(8)(iii) (1980).
351 Id.
352 Memorandum of Defendant at 8.
3" 42 Fed. Reg. 20,284 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(e)) (Fed. Reserve); 42 Fed.
Reg. 21,272 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.6(b)(4) and § 329.7(b)(6)) (FDIC).
854 Complaint of Plaintiff at 13-16, see H.R. REP. No. 96-842 at 72, reprinted in [1980] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 900.
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The Deregulation Committee, it must be remembered, did not phase
out all differentials; only the differential on the Money Market Certificate
has been altered. The only other action taken by the Deregulation Com-
mittee was the increase in rates on Small Saver Certificates. 5 ' The prior
regulatory agencies, however, were under no limitation on when they could
act, so the transfer of this authority to the Deregulation Committee should
mean that the Deregulation Committee could also act at any time."3 6 Even
if this is not accepted, the language of section 204 directs the De-
regulation Committee to phase out the limitation to market rates "as soon
as feasible" and "as rapidly as economic conditions warrant.""35 This lan-
guage, taken in conjunction with the fact that section 205 sets targets that
may or may not be implemented at the Deregulation Committee's discretion
to act within the first eighteen months on the permissible rates paid on
these types of accounts, gives the Deregulation Committee the authority
to act in such a manner. 58 Under the U.S. League's assertion, the Deregu-
lation Committee could only act after the annual reports of its Members.
This interpretation is contrary to the language of section 205."' Further-
more, the Deregulation Committee could only act after these powers were
fully in effect. This position is also contrary to the discretion granted to the De-
regulation Committee in the Act.8 0 Although phase-out of Regulation Q
is linked with the new powers granted thrifts, the Deregulation Committee
has not phased out Regulation Q entirely, nor can they without Congression-
al action on certain classes of accounts.'
In the third count of the complaint the U.S. League asserts that the
Deregulation Committee failed to give "due regard for the safety and sound-
ness of depository institutions" ' as mandated in the Act."' They further
assert that the Congressional intent was violated in that the "competitive
equity among [different classes of] depository institutions" was not en-
sured. ' "
These assertions ignore the fact that the Deregulation Committee
exists to protect depository institutions, which includes commercial banks
as well as thrifts. 65 It was determined by the Deregulation Committee that
355 45 Fed. Reg. 37,803 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1204.104-106) (1980).
95 1980 Act, supra note 3, § 209 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3508).
3571d., § 204, (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a)).
858 Id., § 205 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3504(b)).
359Id.
60 Id.
3e5 This is due to the strictures of Pub. L. No. 94-200, Title I, § 102, 89 Stat. 1124 (noted
after 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1975)).
862 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title II, § 204(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(b)).
363 Complaint of Plaintiff at 16-17.
364 H.R. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 73 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 901.
365 Id.
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reduction in the differential would decrease the likelihood of outflow of
deposits from commercial banks to thrifts. 6 This outflow, it was feared,
would impair the commercial banks' ability to make business loans." ' The
Deregulation Committee also looked at the effects this action would have
on thrifts. It was determined that the flow to thrifts, although resulting
in an absolute increase, would not rise as sharply as it would without the
reduction."' Assuming that these allegations can be substantiated, it is
difficult to see how the League can successfully assert that the Act, and
Congressional intent behind it, was violated by the Deregulation Committee.
The fourth count claims that some members of the Deregulation Com-
mittee are prejudiced or biased against the differential and/or Savings and
Loans. The U.S. League asserts that this prejudice or bias caused the De-
regulation Committee to act without due regard for the "safety and sound-
ness" of savings and loans. "
This assertion fails to recognize the study conducted by the Deregula-
tion Committee's staff in order to determine the effect of the reduction
on savings and loans." '° Furthemore, the Chairman of the Bank Board
voted for the action taken. Some of these same people determined the ceilings
prior to the existence of the Deregulation Committee. No such claims were
made when actions to reduce the differential were taken in 1977.371
Count five asserts that the minimum ceiling promulgated by the Do-
regulation Committee causes the Money Market Certificates to exceed the
prevailing market rates for deposit in certain circumstances.72 This violates
section 204(b) which prohibits the increase of limits on maximum rates
above market rates during the phase-out. 373
The Government's response is, in effect, "no harm, no foul." They
state that since the minimum ceilings (7.75% )"' were applicable at the
time of filing, no harm has yet been done. The Deregulation Committee's
position is that "market rate" is not defined by the Act and that Treasury
Securities are often less than market rates. 7 The rationale behind the
minimum ceiling is to allow rates comparable to those of Money Market
Mutual Funds." 6 This high ceiling would also give the depository institu-
368 Memorandum of Defendant at 8.
367 Id.
SOS Id. at 25.
369 Complaint of Plaintiff at 17-18.
370 Memorandum of Defendant at 8.
37142 Fed. Reg. 20,284 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(e); 42 Fed. Reg. 21,272
(1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.6(b)(4) and § 329.7(b)(6)).
373 Complaint of Plaintiff at 18-20.
373 1980 Act supra note 3, at Title II, § 204(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(b)).
87 45 Fed. Reg. 37,803 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1204.104).
873 Memorandum of Defendant at 20.
3 76 Id. at 24.
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tions an opportunity to operate in an unregulated situation like that which
will exist after phase-out with the security of a minimum ceiling. 77
Although well intentioned, this ignores the fact that the Deregulation
Committee itself has used the Treasury Securities to set the rates on these
certificates so that almost by incorporation it has been used as the market
rate. If the Treasury Securities are not the market rate, however, then
why are the Certificates allowed to reach market level part of the time
but unable to do so at other times? A better system might be to peg the
rates of the Certificates to a more accurate gauge of the market rate. Lastly,
the Deregulation Committee has set up a situation where the Treasury
Securities rate may cause the minimum ceiling to go into effect at a time
when the market rate would be less than the ceiling. This is a situation
that the Act was intending to prevent during the phase-out.
378
The sixth court asserts that the removal of the differential on I.R.A.
and Keogh accounts was a violation of section 102(a) of Public Law 94-
200.1" The Deregulation Committee has not acted on either of these ac-
counts. The agencies that did act on them are not named as parties in
this suit.38 0 Therefore, this count fails to state a claim on which relief can
be granted. It seems as though any such claim should have been brought
at the time of the offending action.
Furthermore, the U.S. League has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies available through the Deregulations Committee. The possibility
of the Deregulation Committee reinstating these differentials has been cir-
cumvented by the failure of the U.S. League to seek relief from the De-
regulation Committee. Considering the discretion given the Deregulation
Committee this would be within their authority.3"' This failure violates a
long-settled principle that in order to seek relief through the courts, ad-
ministrative remedies must first have been exhausted. 82
The seventh count is a catch-all constitutional claim that Title II not
only denies savings and loans equal protection under the law but also
due process of law and is, therefore, unconstitutional per se due to the com-
position of the Deregulation Committee. 83 Count eight is related in that
it is maintained that there is a violation of the fifth amendment.3 84
377 Id. at 11.
378 1980 Act supra note 3, at Title II, § 204(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(b)).
7 Complaint of Plaintiff at 20-33.
B80 The agencies involved were the FDIC and the Federal Reserve. This was accomplished
in 1977 at 42 Fed. Reg. 20,284 (1977) (Fed. Reserve) and 42 Fed. Reg. 21,272 (1977)
(FDIC).
81 1980 Act supra note 3, at Title II, § 204 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503).
88 Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 at 50-51 (1938); Weinberger v.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645 at 652 (1973); Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft
Co., 415 U.S. 1 at 24 (1974). "
3 Complaint of Plaintiff at 21-22. 384 Id. at 22-24. 52
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In addition, the U.S. League asserts that due to its composition, the
Deregulation Committee has a built-in bias.8 5 With this bias there is a
conflict of interest, for the Deregulation Committee is without specific and
binding standards to follow in Title 11.38 The eighth count's gravamen is
that the actions were committed without submission of the annual reports
to Congress required under section 206. By taking this action it is asserted
that the Deregulation Committee violated the fifth amendment. 8 " The
U.S. League bases both complaints on the fact that it has only one thrift
representative on the Deregulation Committee and that that representative
is the only member concerned with home financing.
These assertions fail to recognize that administrative rulemakers as in-
dividuals are presumed to have conscience and intellectual discipline, capable
of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circum-
stances.388 This must be refuted before a court will find that bias existed. 8 '
The composition of the Deregulation Committee includes the National
Credit Union Administration which regulates thrifts."' The F.D.I.C. as
well regulates mutual savings banks which are thrifts. In the area of home
financing the savings and loans are not alone. Small commercial banks
are also mortgage lenders. The composition of the Deregulation Com-
mittee may, consistent with the requirement of due process, contain mem-
bers already familiar with the facts of particular cases."' The composition
of an administrative tribunal does not violate equal protection merely
because it can be shown to be unsympathetic to a particular minority posi-
tion.9 Furthermore, the makeup of the Committee was set by Congress,
which has a legitimate interest in the regulation of financial institutions.
In count nine the U.S. League asserts that the Deregulation Com-
mittee failed to follow the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter
A.P.A.). ' The asserted violations of the A.P.A. were: adopting the regu-
lations without giving public notice and comment time and not delaying
the effective date of the regulations for at least 30 days.9"
385 Id. at 23.
3" 1980 Act supra note 3, at Title II, § 205(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3504(b)
(1980)).
387 Complaint of Plaintiff at 23.
388 313 U.S. 409 at 421 (1941).
389 333 U.S. 683 at 701 (1948), cited in Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Horton-
ville Education Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482 at 493 (1976).
M'o 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) defines the term Federal Credit Union as "a cooperative association
organized . . . for the purpose of promoting its members."
391 426 U.S. 482 at 493: "Mere familiarity with the facts of a case... does not disqualify
a decision maker."
392 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I at 18 (1979).
398 Complaint of Plaintiff at 24-26. The text of the A.P.A. is found at 5 U.S.C. § 551
et. seq. (1976).
391 These provisions are found at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c) (1976).
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The requirement of advance notice and public comment time can be
waived 95 when the agency, for good cause, finds that notice and public
procedure are impractical, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest.39
During April and May of 1980 the interest rates were falling. The
Deregulation Committee staff's study showed that depositors were pulling
out of the depository institutions and going to non-depository institutions.
The staff study also showed that the reinstitution of the differential for
commercial banks would do even more harm to them, for anyone wanting
to stay in the depository institutions would go to the thrifts. This would be
especially hard on the small commercial banks that have relied heavily on
the Money Market Certificates. These small commercial banks are primarily
in the business of making agricultural and small business loans to persons
or entities which have few alternative loan sources. 97 The thrifts would
also be hurt by the declining interest rates because depositors would with-
draw from thrifts as well as commercial banks which, in turn, would cause
home financing to be restricted."9 '
The Deregulation Committee acted in the same fashion as did its
predecessors in promulgating changes in interest rates. When these agencies
originally adopted maximum rates on Money Market Certificates they
did not use notice and comment procedures. 99 This is also the case in the
adoption of Small Saver Certificates." ° When the rates on Money Market
Certificates were modified, the same procedure was followed. "°1 As a result,
this procedure has been used often without being questioned.
The Deregulation Committee did not delay the effective date of the
new ceilings for 30 days for two reasons. The first was that an economic
emergency was likely to take place in the depository institutions, especially
the small commercial banks. The Deregulation Committee feared that the
30 day delay would cause harmful disruptions in the financial community."2
The second reason was the fear that speculation on these Certificates would
take place. Depositors might hold back on purchases of Certificates until
the new rates were in effect. This would cause a drain on funds in depository
institutions and restrict their loan making ability." '
The tenth count repeats the ninth count, wherein the League cites
895 The requirement of publishing new regulations 30 days before the effective date can be
waived under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976).
a9Id. at (b)(3)(B).
397 Memorandum of Defendant at 28.
398 ld. at 27.
39943 Fed. Reg. 21,435 (1978).
40044 Fed. Reg. 75,621 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,378 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,625 (1979).
40144 Fed. Reg. 16,360 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 15,476 (1979).
402 Memorandum of Defendant at 29.
403 Id.
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statutory language which reads: "The reviewing court shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, authority or otherwise not in accordance with law."' " This
was asserted for reasons set forth in counts one, two and five.
This count is thus based on the acceptance of assertions made in
counts one, two and five. Under this analysis, only count five has shown
any violation of the Act or the intent of Congress. 05 Nowhere in the De-
regulation Committee's promulgation are there arbitrary or capricious acts,
abuse of discretion or statutory excesses. The Deregulation Committee was
given great discretion in setting rates as well as when to set them. Their
staff studied the problems necessitating the need for these actions. There
were three meetings held before the Committee went forward. The rationale
behind their promulgation is within the limitations of the intent of Congress
in passing the statute.4 06 The only failure of the Deregulation Committee
is in the promulgation of minimum ceilings which may cause ceiling rates
to go above the market rates, but even this was done with due deliberation
and for sound reasons, not arbitrarily or capriciously.
Count eleven asserts that the Deregulation Committee was arbitrary,
capricious, abused its discretion and did not act in accordance with the
law in promulgating the new ceilings because of the bias or prejudice of
certain members against the differential and/or savings and loans (count
four).
There is no showing that those Committee members who are named
acted with intent to harm the savings and loans. Moreover, if these regula-
tors are biased toward the depository institutions under their respective
agencies, no showing has been made that the promulgations were not with
the safety and soundness of the depository institutions in mind. Absent this
showing, these actions are within the mandate of Congress.
The major failure of the Deregulation Committee in these promulga-
tions is to set the minimum ceiling on the Certificates which go against
the intent of the Act by creating a situation where rate ceilings may exceed
market rates. The other actions of the Deregulation Committee are within
the intent of the Act and in accordance with the A.P.A.
E. Conclusion
The Deregulation Committee appears, from the action taken so far,
to be aggressively carrying out the authority given it in Title H of P.L. 96-221.
If the Deregulation Committee is not thwarted in its attempts to carry out
deregulation by this case, deregulation should and will come to financial
4 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
403 See text accompanying notes 372-378, infra.
4° See 1980 Act supra note 3, at Title II, § 205, 12 U.S.C. § 3504 (1980).
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institutions before the end of the six years unless the market conditions
change so radically as to make this course unwise and/or politically un-
popular.
The cost of regulation to the consumer is the theme of the day and
the business community has complained about regulations every chance it
gets. Now a government agency is attempting to take the regulations off the
collective back of financial institutions and cut the cost to consumers and
a part of the financial institution industry (the thrifts) scream murder.
However, the future is likely to hold more deregulation in this area, with
true competition setting in. The thrifts had better be prepared because the
evidence of the desire for quick action can be seen by the change in Cer-
tificate Regulations taken by the Deregulation Committee. If the case is
decided in favor of the Deregulation Committee, as it should be, then it should
be an interesting and competitive next couple of years.
TITLE III: THE CONSUMER CHECKING ACCOUNT EQUITY ACT OF 1980
Introduction
Title Ill of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 19804" is more commonly known as the Consumer Checking Ac-
count Equity Act of 1980.1° Its basis for noteworthiness to the consumer
centers on its authorization of the Negotiable Order or Withdrawal or NOW
account and the credit union corollary share draft program. These accounts
allow thrift institutions, banks, and credit unions to offer consumers the "func-
tional equivalent of interest bearing checking accounts." 9 Although, at first
glance, this type of interest authorization may seem to be a simple develop-
ment that would work to the benefit of any consumer, there are many
intracacies in this title that are worthy of discussion. This section of this
comment will discuss the background and development of the Act, its im-
pact upon the consumer, its impact on banking institutions and credit
unions, its relationship to negotiable instruments law in Article III of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and its future as a basis for litigation.
A. Background and Development
The banking system in operation today is a result of the United States
Supreme Court holding in McCulloch v. Maryland."1 ' That Court upheld the
authority of Congress to charter banks under the "necessary and proper" clause
of Article I of the United States Constitution. This is in addition to "the histo-
407 1980 Act, supra note 3.
408 Id. at § 302.
409 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) reprinted in (1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 834, 835.
410 4 Wheat (U.S.) 316 (1819).
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rical regulation of banks by states, reserved to them as a police power under
the Constitution." '' Therefore, there are financial institutions chartered by
both Congress and the states.
District Court Judge Bownes discussed extensively the three types
of federally chartered financial institutions. The first of these is national
associations or national banks, which are primarily commercial banks."1 '
Commercial banks traditionally could accept both time4 13 and demand 1"
deposits, and, in addition, they offered certificates of deposit.4 1 5 Second,
there are federal savings and loan associations 1" which were formed by
Congress. "[I]n order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which
people may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of
homes."' Prior to the advent of the NOW account, funds in these savings
and loan association accounts could not be withdrawn through the use of a
check or negotiable order. Finally, in 1934, the Federal Credit Union Act
authorized the creation of the third type of federally chartered institution,
federal credit unions. 1' The principal difference between the credit union
and other federally authorized financial institutions is the democratic con-
trol and management mandated in the credit union. Credit unions may only
accept deposits and make loans to their members. Prior to the Consumer
Checking Account Equity Act,"1 9 they could not offer any type of checking
account. The impact of the 1980 Act on each of these institutions will be
discussed in detail in this section.
NOW accounts made their first appearance in the state of Massachu-
setts 2' and their validity was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
411 La Caisse Populaire Ste- Marie (St. Mary's Bank) v. States, 425 F. Supp. 513 (D. N.H.,
1976) at 515. See also the authorities cited by District Judge Bownes at 425 F. Supp. 515.
412 These banks have the option of becoming members of the Federal Reserve. As stated by
Judge Bownes: "All national Banks are subject to the rules of the Comptroller of the
Currency, an official of the Treasury Department, and all must have their deposits insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See generally 12 U.S.C., chs. 1, 2, 3, &
16 . . . . National banks are permitted to form branches pursuant to state law. 12 U.S.C.
§ 36. . . . Traditionally, national banks . . . have favored short- term loans, although
are permitted and do maintain a smaller percentage of their assets in consumer loans,
real estate loans, and others."
St. Mary's Bank, 425 F. Supp. at 516.
413 Time deposits are those that cannot be legally required to be paid until a certain day or
time or for a certain period after the deposit is made. An example is a savings account.
12 C.F.R. § 217.1(6) (1980).
414 Demand deposits, for example a checking account, are payable on demand. 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.1(a) (1980).
41 Certificates of deposit are long term, high yield deposits. 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(c) (1980).
416In 1933 the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et. seq.) established the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Under this Act, that Board was given the authority to
charter and supervise these savings and loan associations. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
417 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-1(a)(1) (1980).
419 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1770 (1976).
411 1980 Act, supra note 3, Title III.
420 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 168, § 26 (West, 1981).
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Court in 1972.21 That Court held that a savings bank "is entitled to permit
its depositors to make withdrawals by means of a withdrawal order in
negotiable form. '4 22
Although that Court cleared the way for savings banks to offer NOW
accounts, commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and cooper-
ative banks were prohibited from offering similar accounts. This created
a great deal of controversy, especially as NOW accounts spread into the
state of New Hampshire as well as Massachusetts. 23
Finally, in 1973, the Congress took a position on the operation of
these NOW accounts. At that time Congress allowed depository institutions
in Massachusetts and New Hampshire only to offer accounts, withdrawals
from which could be made by the use of a negotiable instrument, and receive
interest. 2 ' The Act also imposed sanctions upon any institution outside
these two states that offered such accounts. '25 This served to clear the con-
troversy in allowing all Massachusetts and New Hampshire banks, but no
others, to offer NOW accounts. In enacting section 2, Congress apparently
decided "to permit continuance of NOW accounts on a limited experimental
basis."'
But NOW accounts continued to spread. In 1976, authorization for NOW
accounts was extended to the remaining New England states of Connecticut,
Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 2 As noted by Irvine H. Sprague,
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC):
421 Consumer Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416
(1972).
422 Id. at 719, 282 N.E.Zd 417-18.
423 Kaplan, Federal Legislative and Regulatory Treatment of NOW Accounts, 91 BANKINO
L.J. 439 (May, 1974).
424 Pub. L. No. 93-100, 87 Stat. 342 (Aug. 3, 1973). Section 2(a) of this Act reads as
follows:
"No depository institution shall allow the owner of a deposit or account on which
interest or dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instru-
ments for the purpose of making transfers to third parties, except that such withdrawals
may be made in the States of Massachusetts and New Hampshire."
Section 2(b) defined depository institution as:
"(1) any insured bank as defined in section 3 in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
"(2) any State bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
"(3) any mutual savings banks as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act;
"(4) any savings bank as defined in section 3 ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
"(5) any insured institution as defined in section 401 of the National Housing Act;
"(6) any building and loan association or savings and loan association organized and
operated according to the laws of the State in which it is chartered or organized; and
for purposes of this paragraph, the term 'State' means any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands."
425 "Any depository institution which violates this section shall be fined $1,000 for each
violation." Id. at § 2(c).
420 Kaplan, supra note 423, at 442.
427 Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 10 Stat. 197 (Feb. 27, 1976).
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"In many respects, the initial phase of the NOW account availability
resembled the current rather than the first-year NOW account expe-
rience in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. For example, commer-
cial banks immediately emerged as the dominant NOW account force
in the four states, accounting for 82 percent of total balances in NOWs.
Moreover, by June 1978, 52 percent of the commercials and 55 per-
cent of the thrifts in the four states offered NOW accounts, which is
like the current situation in Massachusetts and New Hampshire rather
than the initial experience.""
Soon after, in November of 1978, New York banks were given au-
thority to offer Automatic Transfer Services which resembles the NOW
account in many ways." ' The Congress then proceeded to authorize NOW
accounts in New York in that same month.""
The impetus for the extension of NOW accounts nationwide, how-
ever, developed in Washington, D.C. in 1978. At that time two cases arose
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that served
to speed up a decision on whether or not NOW accounts had a viable
future in the United States. The first of these was United States League of
Savings Associations v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."31
This was an action brought by the United States League of Savings Associ-
ations (hereinafter the League) challenging regulations of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. On May 1, 1978, the Board had
amended section 217.5 (c) of its Regulation Q to allow automatic fund trans-
fer (AFT) service "32 to allow the depositor to use moneys from his savings
account to cover overdrafts or maintain a certain balance in that depositor's
checking account." ' There were several reasons for the challenge to the
authorization of the AFT services by the League. First, it was alleged that
these regulations, if allowed to take effect, would violate the statutory
428 The Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1979, Hearings on H.R. 3864 Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1979) (Statement
of Irvine H. Sprague). [Hereinafter referred to as Hearings on H.R. 3864].
429 [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 843. Automatic Transfer Services [hereinafter ATS]
permit withdrawals to be made automatically from an interest bearing savings account into
a demand deposit account pursuant to a written agreement by the depositor, and allows the
depositor to make payments by checks or drafts even if the amount necessary to cover that
instrument is not available directly from the checking account. Hearings on H.R. 3864,
supra note 428, at 84 (Statement of Irvine H. Sprague).
480 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
630, 92 Stat. 3641 (Nov. 10, 1978).
481463 F. Supp. 342 (D.C.D.C., 1978).
48243 Fed. Reg. 20,002 (1978) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(2) (1980)). This is
substantially the equivalent to the ATS.
4 33 The FDIC, which regulates all federally insured commercial banks that are not members
of the Federal Reserve System, adopted a similar rule on May 5, 1978, at 43 Fed. Reg.
20,223 (1978) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 329.5(c)(2) (1980)). Both were scheduled to take
effect on November 1, 1978. 463 F. Supp. at 344.
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provisions against the payment of interest on demand deposits. 3 , Since
the funds needed to cover a check could remain in the interest bearing
savings account until needed to cover a check, this would allow the de-
positor to maintain a zero balance on the checking account with the funds
transferring over each time a check was written. This would cause the
AFT service to be, for all practical purposes, the equivalent of the NOW
account. The checking account would become a mere conduit between the
savings account and the payee named in the check. As such, these regula-
tions would violate the statutory prohibition of the withdrawal, by the
use of negotiable instruments, of the funds from a interest bearing savings
account."35 The League alleged that this would cause economic injury to
existing savings and loan associations. The District Court rejected the
League's argument, noting:
".. [Alutomatic fund transfer regulations do not violate the statu-
tory prohibition against the payment of interest on demand deposits
or against negotiable instruments drawn on savings deposits. This re-
sult is supported by the convenience and other benefits AFT services
will produce for bank customers and the role such services will play
in reducing the number of checks returned for insufficient funds." '36
The second case, American Bankers Association v. Connell,"3 ' con-
cerned the authorization of share draft programs. The Bankers Association
challenged the statutory authority of such programs to be offered under the
Federal Credit Union Act. ' The Court, however, allowed these programs
to continue, holding: "that share draft practices are among the incidental
powers of [Federal Credit Unions and] is not inconsistant with the legis-
lative history of the FCU Act or general Congressional scheme controlling
federal financial institutions. ' 39
The support to the AFT services and share draft programs by the
courts was short lived. On April 20, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed both decisions and refused to allow regulatory
434 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976), see also 463 F. Supp. at 345.
435 Then 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976), as enacted in Pub. L. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197. (since
amended by § 303 of the 1980 Act, supra note 3).
436 463 F. Supp. at 352.
4-3 477 F. Supp. 296 (D.C.D.C., 1978).
138 447 F. Supp. at 297-298, notes:
"A share draft is a demand draft which is drawn by a member on his credit union share
account and which is made payable to third parties. Each share draft is payable through
a particular commercial bank ...Share drafts are similar in appearance to checks..."
439 447 F. Supp. at 299. The "incidental powers" referred to by the Court are found in 12
U.S.C. § 1757(15) (1976), which grants federal credit unions the authority "to exercise such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business for which [federal credit
unions are] incorporated."
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agencies to authorize any such programs."0 That Court tempered its order
by the following language: "The effectiveness of this judgment, insofar as it
directs the subject regulations be vacated and set aside, is stayed until 1
January 1980, in the expectation that Congress will declare its will upon
these matters.""' This decision served to spur the Congress into action if
it wanted to save the services in question. The House of Representatives
immediately began work on a bill that would allow financial institutions
to offer interest bearing checking services. A bill of this type was originally
passed by the House in September, 1979.1"
In November, the Senate passed the measure and added a provision
to phase out interest rate ceilings and another to provide new lending powers
to savings institutions. The House, in turn, added provisions that dealt with
the Federal Reserve membership and reserve requirements. They extended
the court-set deadline of January 1 to March 31, 1980, when an immedi-
ate agreement could not be reached on all of the provisions. " ' Finally,
on March 5, 1980 all differences were ironed out. The bill was signed into
law by President Carter on March 31, 1980.
"At a White House signing ceremony, Carter called the legislation 'a
significant step in reducing inflation' and a 'major victory' for Savers. Treas-
ury Secretary G. William Miller described the bill as the 'most important
legislation dealing with banking and finance in nearly half a century.' "4"
A synopsis of the major provisions of Title III of the 1980 Act follows.
Section 302 allows withdrawals to be made automatically from a savings
deposit that consists only of funds in which the entire beneficial interest
is held by one or more individuals through payment to bank itself or through
transfer of credit to a demand deposit or other account pursuant to written
authorization by the depositor."4 5 Section 303 authorizes NOW accounts
but limits their use to individuals and non-profit organizations." Section
304 permits the use of remote service units "for the purpose of crediting
savings accounts, debiting such accounts, crediting payments on loans, and
the disposition of related financial transactions."" Share draft programs
are authorized for individuals and non-profit organizations through credit
w" United States League of Savings Associations v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 595 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir., 1979) (447 F. Supp. 296 and 463 F. Supp. 342,
vacated and set aside).
441 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEWS 839.
42 See 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 4.
443 Automatic Transfer Accounts, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233,
444 38 Cong. Q. 964 (weekly ed. April 12, 1980).
45 1980 Act, supra note 3, at § 302(a).
441 Id. at § 303.
447 Id. at § 304.
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unions by section 305.48 All prior sections became effective March 31,
1980 except section 303 authorizing NOW accounts which became ef-
fective on December 31, 1980.111 Section 308 of Title III increased the
federal deposit insurance limit from $40,000 to $100,000 in each insured
deposit institution."5' This increase was effective March 31, 1980, and
applied to insured national and state chartered commercial banks as well
as all the federally insured savings and loan associations and credit unions.
In addition, the amount of interest permitted to be charged by credit unions
on their loans was increased from twelve to fifteen percent. "5 '
B. Impact of NOW Accounts on the Consumer
Upon the passage of the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of
1980, the financial institutions wasted no time in bombarding the con-
sumer market with advertisements encouraging consumers to take ad-
vantage of their newly authorized offerings. These advertisements tell the
consumer that 5.25% interest is available on checking accounts and seem
to leave the consumer wondering who would possibly refuse the chance
to earn some "free money." As much as this interest bearing NOW account
may benefit many consumers, it is important to note that there may be
instances when a consumer could benefit most by retaining his traditional
savings and checking account.
Most banks offering NOW accounts require that a minimum balance
be kept in the account to avoid service fees. If the balance of the account
dips below this minimum, a monthly charge as well as a per check fee may
be charged. In fact,
"Many people if they maintain a low balance and write a lot of checks,
will find at the end of the year that they have lost money on NOW
accounts. After reading all this hype from the financial institutions
about what a bonanza NOW accounts are, they will feel cheated, be-
cause at the beginning of the year they weren't given the opportunity
to sit down and figure out how much the NOW account was going to
cost them."45
As a result of the possibility of this type of situation, most financial institu-
tions have made disclosures as to amount of interest offered as well as
minimum balances needed to be maintained and service fees to which the
NOW account may be subject. The consumer should consider all of these
448 Id. at § 305.
449 Id. at § 306.
450 Id. at § 308.
451 Title HI only authorized such an increase for periods not to exceed eighteen months, Id.
at § 310. The National Credit Union Administration exercised this power by increasing the
interest rate to 15 percent on March 31, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 22,888 (1980) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. §§ 701.21-1, 701.21-3, 701.21-6).
452 Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428, at 216 (Discussion Statement of Ellen Broad-
man).
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factors carefully in considering what the NOW account has to offer him
as an individual. Only by such close scrutiny by the banking public can
NOW accounts serve all to their best ability.
As a whole, the result of the passage of the 1980 Act should greatly
benefit the consumer. In addressing the House Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Chairman St. Germain
indeed emphasized the Congressional intent to benefit the consumer, giving
as the purpose of the bill in question "to provide the consumer access to
a simple interest bearing checking account." ' In addition, since NOW
accounts are optional, it would seem that the consumer has nothing to lose
since he may retain the traditional system of banking that he had always
had if he so desires. From the New England experience, however, it is
clear that the consumer has great enthusiasm for NOW accounts. "5"
The principal differences between a NOW account and the traditional
checking account may be described as follows:
"(1) NOW accounts are available to personal depositors, sole pro-
prietorships, and charitable public units, whereas demand ac-
counts are available to all individuals and organizations.
"(2) NOW accounts are technically savings deposit accounts, not
demand deposit accounts, and therefore,
"(3) interest may be paid on balances maintained in the NOW ac-
count, which is prohibited by statute from being paid on de-
mand accounts, and
"(4) drafts withdrawing funds from NOW accounts may be legally
delayed for thirty days, which is not the case for checks."'""
The advantages to the consumer are the ability to gain interest on demand
deposits, the ability to have all banking at one location or even in one
account, and a reduced chance of checks being returned for insufficient
funds.
The dangers of the NOW account have been expressed as well. Con-
gressman Wylie expressed the following fear:
453 Id., at 1.
4541d. at 60-61 (Statement of John G. Heimann). Mr. Heimann as Comptroller of the
Currency notes consumer enthusiasm, saying:
".. . at the close of 1978, just two months after the automatic fund transfer service
was initiated about 5,000 commercial banks held $3.3 billion in 420,000 accounts.
As of April 25, 1979, total automatic transfer account balances had increased to$6.4 billion. At the close of 1978, there were about 800,000 share draft accounts totaling$720 million in approximately 740 federal credit unions. In addition, there were an
estimated 400,000 share draft accounts in 600 state credit unions. About 200 Federally
chartered savings and loan associations have been approved by the [Federal Home Loan
Bank Board] to operate remote service units. These units have access to $2.6 billion
in savings deposits. During 1978, an estimated 2.25 million transactions occurred through
remote service units with a total of $172 million being transferred."
655 Id. at 84 (Statement of Irvine H. Sprague).
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"The cost of paying interest on NOW accounts, it seems to me, has
to be passed on to somebody and that somebody is the consumer. So
I cannot see how the NOW account would benefit the person who is
seeking the money for his house or seeking money for loans because
as I see it, if interest is paid on NOW accounts to obtain money for
lending purposes the cost will be passed on." ' 6
Finally, the fear has been expressed that the effect of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Act of 1980 as a whole will be to take
moneys away from savings and loan associations which are primary lenders
for housing purposes. With the addition of the possibility that these savings
and loan associations could invest their funds elsewhere, the possibility of
less funds available for housing with higher interest rates may become a
reality.457
C. Impact of NOW Account Legislation on the Banking Industry
The legislation permitting NOW accounts 5 8 serves to blur many of the
distinctions between national or commercial banks5 9 and savings and loan
associations or thrift institutions which were created primarily for the small
saver and to provide home financing. In fact, "all the distinctions between
commercial banks and thrifts will become increasingly muddied as a result
of the 1980 legislation. ' ' 0 This is true since savings and loan associations
may now offer the use of negotiable instruments as a means of withdrawal
from a savings account. The commercial bank may now offer interest on
those checking accounts converted to NOW accounts by customer au-
thorization. 0'
As a result of these developing similarities, a great deal of competition
between depository institutions should become apparent. This competition
will become even more intense about the middle of the decade when in-
terest rate ceilings are eliminated."' For example, "George M. Salem, ana-
458 Id. at 11. A similar concern was expressed in an article entitled "America's New Financial
Structure-Fewer but Bigger Institutions-Is the Small Bank an Endangered Species?" BusINESS
WEEK, November 17, 1980 at 140. That article notes:
"Once cheap consumer deposits are going to become more expensive and precious for
depository institutions to maintain as the bidding war for such deposits heats up. To
compensate, institutions have to price NOWs sufficiently high to avoid losing money
on the product. Most will require minimum balances and impose usage or per-check
charges."
457 BusINEss WEEK, November 17, 1980 at 141.
458 1980 Act, supra note 3, at § 303.
4
5 9 See generally 1980 Act, supra note 3, at § 302, 303.
40 BusINEss WEK, November 17, 1980 at 141-142.
461 These accounts are subject to a notice requirement and a bank may not be legally forced
to pay the instrument until a set period after the demand for payment is made. Although
savings and loans and commercial banks seldom, if ever, enforce this notice requirement,
it is still a possibility. Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428, at 77 (Statement of Irvine H.
Sprague).
"
2 Assuming the target dates set at § 205 of the 1980 Act are met - see text accompany-
ing fn. 304-314, supra.
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lyst at Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., notes... 'one of the largest com-
petitive battles in the history of banking is about to begin.' "4 As a part
of this competition, some large banks may be willing to initially treat NOW
accounts as loss leaders."" Smaller institutions may feel the pinch and be
forced to match the larger institution or watch their deposits drain away." 5
In addition, the large banking organizations may move into new areas in
search of new deposits and customers."" For all banking institutions in
general, "once cheap consumer deposits are going to become more expen-
sive and precious for depository institutions to maintain as the bidding war
for such deposits heats up." '467 The competition would seem to reflect the
desire to allow the market to dictate the type of accounts offered and their
prices.
4 6 8
This type of competition may stem from other effects of NOW ac-
counts on the banking system. NOW accounts are very attractive to typical
customers including those who now use checking accounts in a commercial
bank. The commercial bank may forsee the "likelihood of their customers be-
ing 'lured' to the savings banks by these attractive new services. On the other
hand, savings banks contend that they are not attempting to upset the com-
petitive balance, but are merely trying to provide their own customers with a
service they desire to have.""' 9 The commercial banks still have some custom-
er base that will be left untouched, that being corporate business, to whom the
NOW account is unavailable. 7 ' What will affect the customer's decision of
where to bank, however, is the availability of one stop banking'" as well
as the availability of newly authorized remote service units, many of which
allow twenty-four hour service.
The thrift industry should find several advantages as a result of the
new legislation. In these days when checking is a preferred method of doing
business, the NOW account gives the thrift institution a means to compete
with the commercial bank that was previously foreign to them. Some ad-
vantages to the thrifts include:
"(1) The NOW account provides thrifts with an ability to compete
more effectively in the short term savings and transactions ac-
count market.
"(2) Thrifts in New England have increased their deposits and
thereby can provide more funds for housing.
463 BusINEss WEEK, November 17, 1980 at 141.
484 Id.
415 Id., at 140.
4e d.
"
7 Id. See also text accompanying fn. 449, supra.
468 Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428 at 44-45.
4e9 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 471, 489 (Feb. 1973).
470 Id., see also 1980 Act, supra note 3, § 303.
471 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 490 (Feb. 1973).
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"(3) Future industry growth will likely become increasingly de-
pendent upon such innovations as increasing competition and
innovation in financial markets erode the effectiveness of de-
posit rate ceilings and differentials. Future viability of thrift
institutions may well depend upon an ability to provide the
consumer with a diversity of financial services."42
These advantages may indeed be counterbalanced by the inexperience of the
thrift institutions in dealing with this type of service and the expense in
developing the equipment and personnel necessary for handling the NOW
account. 3
Transitional problems will also be something that depository institu-
tions will have to deal with as they arise. These will most probably include
the following:
"First, servicing transactions accounts requires a substantial investment
in equipment and a large number of employees. This would require a
major adjustment on the part of thrift institutions that decided to com-
pete for transactions balances . . . Second, both commercial banks
and thrift institutions have relatively little experience in pricing trans-
actions services. [Such as remote service units and automatic funds
transfer services.] ... Third, allowing thrift institutions to offer transac-
tions services will add a substantial number of suppliers of these services
all at once. However, demand for transactions services is likely to
change only gradually. Thrifts, as new entrants, are likely to follow
strategies aimed at building market share, while commercial banks
will follow strategies aimed at holding on to existing demand de-
posits. 474
How the depository institutions handle these problems remains to be
seen in the near future. This as well as the results of the competition be-
tween the banks will shape the course of American banking institutions
as the effects of the market shape their course.
D. Effect of the 1980 Legislation on Credit Unions
Section 305 of the Consumer Account Equity Act of 1980 permits
every insured credit union to "permit owners of such share draft accounts
to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferrable instruments or other
orders for the purpose of making transfers to third parties." '75 Again, this
type of service is available only to individuals and to non-profit organiza-
tions. 76 These share draft accounts offer members of credit unions the op-
472 Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428, at 118-119 (Statement of Robert H. McKinney).
473 Guidelines for setting up the processes dealing with the collection and settlement of in-
struments drawn on such institutions have been set out by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board to help deal with this problem. 45 Fed. Reg. 64,161 (1980).
'74 Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428, at 63-63 (Statement of John G. Heimann).
45 1980 Act, supra note 3, § 305(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1785(f)(1)).
46 1d. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1785(f)(2)).
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portunity to earn interest on a savings type account and have access to
these accounts through the use of draft instruments that are functionally
the equivalent of checks."
This type of share draft program was necessary and vital to the con-
tinued operation and growth of all credit unions in the United States. Since
the passage of the Federal Credit Union Act in 1934, credit unions have
enjoyed substantial growth and popularity as a result of advantages they
have had over other financial institutions:
"These have included the convenience of credit union location and
operation. Often, the credit union was the only financial institution lo-
cated near a workplace that had operating hours dovetailing the con-
sumers' working schedule. The ability to deduct share deposits and
loan payments directly from an employee's paycheck has in the past been
a significant-and in some cases unique-advantage credit unions
have enjoyed over other financial institutions."'""
With the dawn of modern banking conveniences such as the remote service
unit, that often allows twenty-four hour availability of a bank to the consumer,
these advantages are not so unique as they once were. In order to keep
up with other financial institutions and consumer demands, the authorized
share draft programs should greatly increase the attractiveness of the credit
union to the consumer.
Credit unions are also expanding their abilities to serve their members
by beginning a new remote service unit program that has recently been
approved by the National Credit Union Administration. ' These units are
being set up under the authority conferred to the Administration under
the Federal Credit Union Act" ° which gives credit unions incidental powers
to help them carry out their business efficiently. Included in the authoriza-
tion of these programs are guidelines to setting up and operating these units.
In summary, the 1980 Act greatly increases the ability of credit unions
to serve their members. Although adjustments may be necessary in adapting
their business to meet new membership needs, these changes brought about
by the Act will increase credit union services and make them an even
more competitive force in the financial market.
E. Relationship Between NOW Account Legislation and Article III of the
Uniform Commercial Code
The withdrawal instruments authorized under the Consumer Checking
Account Equity Act of 1980 is a negotiable instrument, having met all the re-
477 U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (a), which defines a draft as a negotiable instrument that is an order.
478 Hearings on H.R. 3864, supra note 428, at 239 (Statement of Roy Hollihan).
47945 Fed. Reg. 32,290 (May 16, 1980).
480 12 U.S.C. 175 (15) (1976).
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quirements of such as set out in the Uniform Commercial Code." ' The with-
drawal instrument must be signed by the maker who would be the depositor,
and it is an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money which is pay-
able on demand to order or bearer. As such, it is subject to the provisions
of Article III of the U.C.C. which deals with commercial paper.
It is fairly clear that the NOW instrument will be treated the same
as any check or draft under the Code. '82 The difficulty in the treatment of
the NOW instrument comes into play, however, when the notice of with-
drawal period is taken into consideration. 83 Since interest is charged
on the funds in the NOW account, the moneys therein are subject to the
same notice period of withdrawal as are all time deposit accounts.
In appearance, the NOW instrument is identical to a check. The holder
may believe it to be a check and expect it to be treated as such. Upon taking
it to the drawee bank for payment, the holder may be surprised to find
that the institution exercising its right to a notice period during which
neither the holder nor the drawer may legally force the institution to pay
the instrument. Since, on its face, the NOW instrument appears to be pay-
able on demand," " mere acceptance may not be enough to satisfy a holder
looking for immediate payment. The Uniform Commercial Code section
3-507" 5 allows an instrument to be treated as dishonored when due payment
is not made. When informed that the instrument will not be paid on demand,
as the face of the instrument indicates, it would seem as though the holder
could choose, to treat the instrument as dishonored "8' and proceed against
either the drawer or a previous indorser on their contract on the instru-
481 U.C.C. § 3-104(1) defines a negotiable instrument as follows:
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within [Article IIl] must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as
authorized by this Article; and
(d) be payable to order or bearer."
492 For a discussion on the character of the NOW instrument as a check or draft, see 30
BUSINESS LAWYER 151, 157-158 (Nov., 1974).
483 Kaplan, supra note 423, at 452.
4 8
4U.C.C. § 3-108 states "Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight
or on presentment and those in which no time for payment is stated."
485 U.C.C. § 3-507(1) (a) reads as follows:
"(1) An instrument is dishonored when (a) a necessary or optional presentment is
duly made and due acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be obtained within the
prescribed time or in the case of bank collections the instrument is seasonably returned
by the midnight deadline .
496 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 471, 493-496 (Feb. 1973).
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ment. " t The payee may also have a remedy against the drawer on the under-
lying obligation. ' "
If banks would begin to enforce their right to notice prior to with-
drawal, the effect on the owner of a NOW account could be castrophic.
If the holder chose to treat the instrument as dishonored at that point, the
account owner could find his credit rating taking a rapid dive. He would
have no right to seek redress against the bank for his loss, however. They
would be acting entirely within their rights under the law and most probably
the agreement signed with the account owner upon opening said account.
Perhaps an alternative would be to change the face of the NOW instrument
to make it clear to any holder that it is subject to a certain notice period.
The words "payable on sight & 30" for example, would make it clear to
the holder that a certain waiting period may be exercised prior to negotia-
bility of the NOW instrument." 9 This legend on the instrument may have
drawbacks, as well. The banking public, including merchants, are accus-
tomed to demand instruments. They may not be willing to start accepting
instruments in payment for goods or services if directly made aware of and
threatened with such a waiting period. However, this has not been made
a problem yet, at least in New England. Seemingly, once NOW accounts
were established, they were treated by both banks and customers as any
other order instruments. A thorough search has found no litigation on this
point as of yet. It would probably be expecting too much to hope that none
would be brought now that NOW accounts are authorized nationwide.
There is also another aspect of NOW instruments that is fairly unique:
"Mention should also be made of the 'payable-through' devices which
is currently in use in connection with the clearing of [some] NOW
instruments. Where a thrift institution issues the NOW and where the
institution itself does not make use of the Federal Reserve check-col-
lection mechanism, the NOW will be an instrument 'payable through'
a commercial bank. This simply means that NOW instrument will be
routed through a commercial bank having access to the Fed-
eral Reserve clearing facilities. Section 3-120 of the Code pro-
vides that a payable instrument designates the payable-through
487 U.C.C. § 3-413(2) sets out the drawer contract as follows: "The drawer engages
that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he willpay the amount of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up. The drawer
may disclaim this liability by drawing without recourse." U.C.C. § 3-414(1) sets out
the indorser's contract.
"Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as 'without recourse')
every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and
protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement
to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up even though the indorser
who takes it up was not obligated to do so."
488 U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b) allows the payee to proceed on the underlying obligation until the
instrument is discharged.
9s9 This would still satisfy the "definite time" requirement of U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (c).
Winter, 198 1]
69
et al.: The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
AKRON LAW REVIEW
bank 'as a collecting bank to make the presentment but does not of
itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument.' The payable-through
bank's role is merely that of a collecting bank, and it must receive the
drawee's authorization to pay the NOW.""9"
Conclusion
Although NOW accounts have been in existence in New England for
quite some time, the bulk of cases in this area have dealt with the ability of
depository institutions to offer NOW accounts. Now that Congress has
authorized them as within the power of these institutions, this type of liti-
gation will cease to exist. Litigation is now more likely to revolve around
issues of the proper implementation and operation of NOW accounts, as
well as the problems mentioned above regarding the U.C.C. interpretation
of these accounts.
TITLE IV: POWERS OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS AND
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Introduction
The Act included provisions which expanded the asset investment
flexibility of Federal savings and loan associations. Changes were made in
the regulations affecting insurance reserves, liquidity requirements, and
ownership. Associations were authorized to issue credit cards. The Con-
gressional intent in granting the additional powers was to "enable thrifts
to become one-stop family financial centers making them more competitive
and giving them the earnings they need to pay market rates to depositors. ' 9 '
A. Changes in Investment Authority
Investment authority for Federal savings and loan associations is cate-
gorized by the percentage of assets which the S & L can invest or loan in a
given class of transaction. Classifications are related to the security of the
loan or investment as well as public policy motivations which parallel tax
expenditure policies. There are no limitations on the percentage of assets
which may be applied to account secured loans, home mortgage loans, U.S.
government securities and certain other specified secure investments." 2
Certain changes were required in this section due to the NOW account
legislation and the impact of inflation on the cost of housing.
In addition to loans made on the security of savings accounts, loans
49 Kaplan, supra note 423 at 453-454.
M1 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979). See also 1980 House Reg. Q Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 60-61 for a discussion of the family finance center concept projections
by Mr. Jay Janis, Chairman of the FHLBB, on the future role of thrift institutions.
492 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c) (1980).
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"specifically related" to NOW accounts are now allowed. 9 3 An overdraft
protection instant loan associated with a NOW account might be inter-
preted as specifically related even though it would not be secured by an
account balance. Overdraft protection loans might also be considered to
be consumer loans and therefore subject collectively to the 20% limita-
tion. 9 " However, regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board in response to the Act provide that "If a loan that may be made under
this section is also authorized to be made under another section, which may
have different percentage-of-assets and other limitations or requirements,
an association shall have the option of choosing under which applicable
section the loan shall be made." '95 The regulations specifically exclude
"loans in the nature of overdraft protection" from the definition of con-
sumer loans. 9' Overdraft protection loans are now included in the broader
classification of "consumer credit.4 97
Loans on residential real property were limited under prior law to
first lien mortgages. A maximum of $75,000 for each residence qualified for
the unlimited percentage of assets category. ' The new law removes the
first lien only restriction when the amount of unpaid prior mortgages is
added to the loan amount for calculation purposes. Now, under this un-
limited category, the loan amount, including prior mortgages, may not
exceed 66-2/3% of the appraised value of unimproved real estate; 75%
for real estate improved by buildings to be constructed or being construc-
ted or improved by offsite street, water, sewers, or utilities; 90% for real
estate improved by one or more buildings. 9' The $75,000 limitation is no
longer applicable"9' to the purchase of loans secured by liens on improved
real estate which are insured under the National Housing Act5°' or the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944.102
The provision for loans made for the purpose of "mobile home"
493 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)(A) (1980). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 66,781 (1980) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. § 563.43) (Regulations on NOW Accounts: Authorization for Federal
Associations to Issue Accounts and Extend Overdraft Privileges to Owners).
494 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2) (1980).
49545 Fed. Reg. 76,104, at 76,109 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.7-10(b)).
496 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 541.25).
4 7 Id. at 76,110 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 561.38).
498 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979). The limit was applicable to single family
dwellings in the contiguous United States.
499 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1980). The FHLBB may permit a loan to value ratio
greater than 90% for certain types of guaranteed loans or low income housing. See also
45 Fed. Reg. 76,095 (1980) (revision of Fed. S. & L. real estate lending regulations.) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-7).
5 00 Compare 12 U.S.C. §. 1464(c)(1)(I) (Supp. I 1979) with 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)
(I) (1980).
501 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
502 38 U.S.C. § 1810 (1976).
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financing was amended to apply to "manufactured home" financing." 3
This was probably to fulfill the intention that loans would be used for "resi-
dential financing- not something on wheels that is going to be moved from
time to time." 5"
An additional unlimited investment subparagraph was added which
permits investments in any open-end management investment company
under certain conditions. 0 5
Investment authority on certain classes of less secure loans is limited
to 20% of the assets of the association for each class. One class is com-
prised of first lien loans on improved commercial real estate." The second
class for participation loans was removed and replaced by a class comprised
of consumer loans and other securities. Under this class, an association
"may make secured or unsecured loans for personal, family, or household
purposes, and may invest in, sell, or hold commercial paper and corporate
debt securities, as defined and approved by the [FHLBB]."5 ° This expanded
autlibrity, combined with the previously available power to make house
improvement loans, °8 will enable the S & L's to compete with Credit Unions
for consumer related loans. The 20% allowance on these consumer loans
is twice the 10% recommended by the Carter task force and provided in
the initial legislation. 09 The power conferred on S & L's to offer consumer
loans give them a number of specific advantages:
"First, a number of studies indicate that, for S&L's with a large
enough volume of consumer lending business, the net yield available
from a portfolio of short-term consumer loans could be somewhat
higher over the long-run than the average mortgage portfolio yield.
Second, a Portfolio of short-term consumer loans promises to in-
crease the liquidity of S&L's because of the high turnover of such
consumer loans and, hence, ease somewhat the liquidity crisis that
S&L's experience when savings flows fall off. Third, and most impor-
tantly consumer loan powers would produce a synergistic effect. The
ability to offer a full package of family financial services, including
503 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(J) (Supp. I 1979) with 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)(J)
(1980).
504 1980 House Reg. Q Hearings, supra note 2, at 993 (statement of Congressman Doug
Barnard, Jr. of Ga.) See also statement of Will Ehrle, President of the Texas Manufactured
Housing Association, 1980 House Reg. Q Hearings, supra note 2, at 952-84, 994.
505 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)(Q) (1980).
506 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (1980). The provision which included the excess residential
real estate loan over $75,000 within this category was removed.
507 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(2)(B)(1980). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 76,104 (1980) (Regulations
for Federal S&L's and Mutual Savings Banks; Investment in Consumer Loans, Commercial
Paper and Corporate Debt. Securities.) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.
Parts 541 and 545).
508 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(1)(J) (1980).
509 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1979).
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consumer loans, should both attract new savings business to associ-
ations and help retain existing savings business. 51°
A third category of loans and investments are limited to 5% of as-
sociation assets for each class. 1' Substantial changes were made in this
category by the Act. Classes for land acquisition and development and hous-
ing facilities for the aging were removed.51' The provision for education
loans was retained." ' The provision for construction loans was modified
but is presently ambiguous and requires some technical correction. "'
In the fourth category, (Other Loans and Investments), the limita-
tions vary with each class specified. In the subparagraph on service cor-
porations, the 1% limitation was changed to 3%, "except that not less than
one-half of the investment permitted under this subparagraph which ex-
ceeds one per centum of assets shall be used primarily for community, inner-
city, and community development purposes." 1 '
State and local government obligations which constitute prudent in-
vestments are authorized if:
"(i) the proceeds of such obligations are to be used for rehabilitation,
financing, or the construction of residential real estate, and
(ii) the aggregate amount of all investments under this subparagraph
shall not exceed the amount of the association's general reserves, sur-
plus, and undivided profits." 1'
Prior to the Act, these investments could only be made if the general re-
serves, surplus, and undivided profits exceeded 5% of withdrawable ac-
counts, and the investments were limited by the amount of the association's
general reserves, surplus, and undivided profits." 7 Now, the 5% standard
510 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27-28 (statement of Jay Janis, Chairman
of the FHLBB). The recommendation for secured and unsecured consumer lending was in-
corporated into the Act.
511 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(3) (1980).
512 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(3)(A) (1980). (Supp. III. 1979) with 12 U.S.C.A. §
1464(c)(3) (1980).
513 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(3) (A) (1980).
514 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(3)(D) (1980). e.g., in the opinion of the author, the last sentence
of the subparagraph should be changed to read "Investments under this subparagraph shall
not be included in any percentage of assets or other percentage referred to in this sub-
section." comparable to clause (iii) of § 1464(c)(4)(C). Moreover, the terms of the sub-
paragraph itself limit the investment to "not exceeding the greater of (A) the sum of its
surplus, undivided profits, and reserves or (B) 5 per centum of the assets of the associ-
ation . . ." The overriding 5% limitation of paragraph (3) would seem to make the above
quoted phrase unnecessary.
515 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (1980). Service corporations as used in this subparagraph
are those in which the entire capital stock is available for purchase only by S&L's of a
particular state and by Federal S&L's having their home office in that state.
516 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(4)(D) (1980).
511 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(4)(D) (Supp. III 1979).
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has been changed to the variable 3 to 6% insurance reserve determined
by the FHLBB.5 18
Paragraph (5) was deleted and not replaced. 19 The definition of "resi-
dential real property" or "residential real estate" was modified to include
"property to be improved by construction of such structures;". °
The changes in investment authority provided by the Act will enable
aggressive thrift institutions to maintain existing accounts and competitively
acquire new ones. In particular, the ability to offer secured and unsecured
consumer loans will go far towards making neighborhood thrift institutions
a one-stop "family financial center" for many depositors.
B. Credit Cards
A single sentence was added to the Code which could have a signi-
ficant impact on the competitive balance between thrift institutions and
banks. "(4) An association is authorized, subject to such regulations as the
Board may prescribe, to issue credit cards, extend credit in connection
therewith, and otherwise engage in or participate in credit card operations." ''
This power is especially significant because, due to high market rates, banks
have been experimenting with annual service charges to compensate for
the customer's free use of money when balances are paid promptly. 2' The
S&L approach has been to charge interest from the date of purchase ir-
respective of the date of payment, with the line of credit secured by savings
and time accounts of the credit card holder.52 Now S&L's may offer credit
card plans wherein credit is extended beyond the amounts on deposit by
the saver. Credit extended in connection with credit cards is included in
the new definition of "consumer credit," ' but specifically excluded from
the new definition of "consumer loans"."52 The supplementary information
published with the final regulations by the FHLBB states:
The definition of "consumer loan" was amended to clearly indi-
cate that credit extended in connection with credit cards and loans in
51812 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(4)(D) (1980).
519 12 U.S.CA. § 1464(c)(5) (Supp. III 1979). Paragraph (5) stated "Any associations
which is converted from State-chartered institution may continue to make loans in the ter-
itory in which it made loans whilo operating under State charter."
520 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(6)(A) (1980). This change was made necessary by changes in
§ 1464(c)(1)(B) which removed the $75,000 residential loan limitation.
521 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(b)(4) (1980). See also Fed. Reg. 46,338 (1980). (final rules on
credit cards, etc.) (to be codifiedi at 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-3).
522 If planned major purchases are made at the start of a billing period, the bill will not
arrive for about four weeks and typically an additional three weeks will be allowed for pay-
ment. If the balance is paid promptly, this results in seven weeks of free use of the money,
and the process can be repeated monthly.
5 2
3 See 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 29, 75 (Statement of Jay Janis, Chair-
man of FHLBB, and follow-up question and answer.).
524 45 Fed. Reg. 76,104, at 76,110 (1980). (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 561.38).
525 Id. at 76,109. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.7-10).
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the nature of overdraft protection are not "consumer loans" and are
not to be counted within the 20 percent-of-assets limitation, even
though they are forms of "consumer credit" and must be included in
the loan classification system.5 2 6
This fast shuffle in the FHLBB regulations would appear to leave credit
extended in connection with credit cards, unsecured by account balances,
in a sort of limbo as far as percentage-of-assets limitations are concerned.
FHLBB regulations also liberalized the procedures for bill paying services
and traveler's convenience withdrawals.527
C. Trust Powers
The Act allowed thrift institutions to apply for the power to act as
trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or in any other fiduciary capacity
exercised by state-chartered corporate fiduciaries under local laws.528 This
new authority could fill a gap left by the unwillingness of commercial banks
to promote small trust accounts for middle-income depositors. "This is
because of what they perceive to be the unprofitability of this business.
Given the increasing financial complexities of our economy, there is an
enhanced need for financial and counselling programs and trustee services
for middle-income families." '29 "Fiduciary capacity" might include the
ability to offer tax preparation services although this is not specifically dealt
with in the Code or in proposed regulations. 3
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
State stock S&L type institutions which existed prior to March 31,
1976 may convert to Federal stock charter."'
Pursuant to the Act,"' the FHLBB authorized investments in mutual
funds to count toward the liquidity requirements where the investment
portfolio of the fund was comprised of eligible assets.5 The liquidity re-
-6 Id. at 76,108.
527 45 Fed. Reg. 46,338, at 46,339 (1980). (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.4(b)).
528 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(n) (1980). See also Fed. Reg. 82,162 (1980). (final regulations on
Trust Power Authorization). (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 550.2).
529 1980 House Reg. Q. Hearings, supra note 2, at 29 (statement of Jay Janis, Chairman of
the FHLBB).
530 See 45 Fed. Reg. 82,162 at 82,164 for a definition of the term "fiduciary" (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 550.1(c)).
531 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(i) (1980). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 57,114 (1980). (final regulations
on conversions from state stock to Federal stock charter.) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
552.2-1).
532 12 U.S.C.A. § 1425a(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1980).
53345 Fed. Reg. 57,113 (1980). (Mutual Fund Investment Counting Toward Liquidity -
Final Regulation). (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 523.10). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 76,104, at
76,108 (Supplementary information on Investment in Open-end Investment Companies). (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.9-4(a)).
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quirement can now be satisfied also by balances maintained in a Federal
Reserve bank.5
3 4
Provisions were made for the sale of mutual capital certificates, con-
stituting part of the general reserves and net worth of the issuing associ-
ation. 5 The provision was included to enable mutual associations to in-
crease the supply of funds to housing by the sale of the certificates.
TITLE V: STATE USURY LAWS
Title V of the Monetary Control and Deregulation Act of 1980"'e
deals with state usury laws. Usury laws were developed to prevent lenders
from charging exorbitant or unconscionable rates of interest on the moneys
they lend. They protect the consumer by placing a ceiling on the amount
of interest that may be charged on loans. With the economic situation
existing in the United States today, however, many states found their usury
laws causing them more harm than good.
The purpose of Title V has been stated as being "to provide competi-
tive equality among all financial institutions with respect to state usury
limits."5 7 The situation leading to the undesirable effects of usury laws is
a result of the dual banking system in the United States. State chartered
banks had to follow the usury limits imposed upon them by state law or
constitution. Federally chartered institutions, on the other hand, could
charge one percent over the discount rate on commercial paper irrespective
of state law.5"8 When the discount rate increases, the federally chartered
banks could adjust their interest rates accordingly. Many state chartered
banks, however, found themselves unable to lend money since the maximum
interest rate they could charge was less than the discount rate. When the
discount rate equals or exceeds statutory usury limits, the rate at which
state banks could borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank by discounting
their commercial paper approached the amount of interest they could charge
on the loans they make. The result was disastrous because "a bank cannot
reasonably borrow money at a price equal to or higher than the rate it can
lend." 9 Since state banks could not lend money, they were
"being forced to turn down favorite customers seeking loans, and, if
such banks act in good conscience, to send such customers to their
53412 U.S.C.A. § 1524a(b)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1980).
5 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(b)(5)(A) (1980). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 82,154 (1980). (final regu-
lations on Mutual Capital Certificates). (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § :563.7-4).
530 1980 Act, supra note 3.
537 Usury Lending Limits: Hearings on S. 1988 before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Statement of Chairman William
Proxmire). [Hereinafter referred to as Hearings on S. 19881.
538 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
339 Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 537, at 21 (Statement of John G. Heimann).
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national bank competitors, where funds may be available at the higher
rate of interest allowed by Federal law.""'
The federally chartered banks were not enough to pick up the slack
entirely, however. When market rates moved above usury ceilings, low in-
come and high risk borrowers had great difficulty obtaining loans from
commercial banks or other financial institutions subject to these ceilings. "1
An example of the impact of such a situation occurred in the state of
Arkansas. That situation was described by Bill Clinton, that state's gov-
ernor, as follows:
"The interaction of Arkansas usury provision with the tight money
conditions presently prevailing affects Arkansas economy in several
ways. Capital flows from our State to seek higher returns elsewhere.
Lenders are unable to obtain money at competitive rates, and are
forced to curtail their lending activity. Marginal borrowers, such as
young people and the poor, are the first to be hit with restrictive lend-
ing policies. Housing starts and other commercial activity virtually
ceases. And, as the availability of credit is restricted, a lack of money
ripples through the economy of Arkansas, often forcing the State
to lead the Nation into periods of economic hardship. '54 2
Arkansas is not alone in experiencing such effects from usury limits. Many
other states have a usury ceiling which is equal to or below the discount
rates." '
"For example, one study shows that Tennessee's economy grew at a
faster rate than the national economy except when market interest rates
rose above the State usury ceilings. At that point, Tennessee's economy
slowed substantially. The same study calculated that between 1974
and 1976, the annual loss in production averaged $150 million, the
annual loss of jobs averaged $80 million, and the annual loss of assets
in financial intermediaries averaged $1.25 billion. '44
As a result of these types of situations across the country, Title V was
passed.14 1 This was done in hopes that it would help remedy these types of
occurrences in the following way.
540 Id. at 6. (Statement of B.J. Lambert, Jr.).
54 Id. at 20. (Statement of John G. Heimann).
542 Id. at 3. (Statement of Bill Clinton). Arkansas banks were subject to a 10% usury limit
at that time. This limit was constitutionally mandated.
53 Id. at 39-40. (Statement of Irvine H. Sprague). Mr. Sprague gives the following states as
those having or having potential for the forementioned problems: Arkansas, Mississippi,
Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, New York, New Jersey, Nebraska, Iowa,
South Carolina, North Carolina, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Vermont, Ohio, West
Virginia, New Mexico, Texas, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Maryland.
44 Id. at 20. (Statement of John G. Heimann).
55 Id. at 38. (Statement of Irvine H. Sprague). This legislation was seen by many as an
emergency measure. Although the states themselves could remedy the condition of their
economics by adjusting their usury laws, in many states this could be done only after a
barmful delay. In Arkansas, for example, the usury Uim't wa Vositmtional in nature making
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"To compete effectively, depository institutions must be able to pay
market rates for funds and obtain market rates on loans. Elimination
of usury laws, coupled with diversification of thrift institution powers,
will improve the earnings flexibility of thrifts and will enable thrifts,
as well as other types of lenders, to be more responsive to the needs
of their customers."' "
In essence the provisions of Title V permanently preempt state laws
in several areas. First, it preempts state usury law as to the interest rate
ceilings on first mortgage loans made by depository institutions, mortgage
banks, and other lenders approved by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. "7 Second, it imposes a ceiling of five percent over the
discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank on all business and agricultural
loans above $25,000."' Third, it allows all federally insured depository
institutions and Federal Credit Unions to charge one percent over the dis-
count rate set by the Federal Reserve Bank, irrespective of state ceilings. "9
This is the same limit previously imposed on national banks under federal
law.55 Finally, the states are given three years to override these usury laws
and explicitly impose those of their own."'
Throughout the hearings, concern was expressed over whether the
passage of the preemption of state usury laws would be interfering with
the rights of the states. This legislation was given the support of many
only because the financial situation was so pressing. In addition, many states
had constitutional provisions which set the usury limits and would therefore
be time-consuming and difficult to change. In order to compensate for
spilling over into the powers of the states, the clause was included to allow
the states to override Title V. Because the economic situation in many of
the states was or had potential to become unstable, many of the witnesses
testifying before Congressional committees expressed a need for some type
of assurance that the state usury preemption would not be held invalid by
the courts." 2 As a result of this, a clause was included allowing the states
to override the usury limits imposed by this Act in an attempt to pattern
Title V after Public Law 93-501 which had been held valid in Stephens
the earliest date by which it could be changed under state law January 1981. To let the
Arkansas economy continue on its course until that time would greatly amplify the ill effects
already present in that state where immediate action was necessary.
546 Id. at 21.
547 1980 Act, supra note 3, § 501(a)(1)(A) (to be noted after 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7).
48Id. at § 511(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 86a).
549ld. §§ 522-523. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g).
550 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
551 1980 Act, supra note 3, § 501(b)(2).
552 State Usury Ceilings: The Hearings on H.R. 2515 before the Sub-Committee on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking
Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (April 3, 1979).
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Security Bank v. Eppivic Corporation.5 3 In that case plaintiff, Stephens
Security Bank was seeking recovery on a note executed to it by defendant,
Eppivic Corporation. Defendant asserted that the note was invalid as usuri-
ous under Arkansas law. Plaintiff maintained that Federal law5" ap-
plied which made the note valid. The Court accepted plaintiff's argument
and held the federal legislation valid at the same time. Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the national and monetary
banking system. The Federal government also has a legitimate interest in
regulating state banks whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. 5 That court read the clause allowing the states
to override the limited federal preemption of agricultural loans as being
reflective of congressional policy of permitting a state to determine its
usury ceiling. 556 In light of the great deal of authority the federal court at-
tributed to Congress with regard to setting usury ceilings for banks in
which there is a legitimate federal interest, it is questionable whether the
absence of such clause allowing states to override the Federal Legislation
would have caused the statute to become invalid. However, in an effort to
allow states to continue to exercise their rights in this area, the clause was
considered best included, in order to further insure the statute's limited
effect and validity under the constitution.
The constitutionality of this Title was the subject of a recent case before
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc.55 7 In
that case, an appeal was taken from a summary judgment in favor of Cooper
Communnities, Inc. They held a note and mortgage executed by a pair of con-
sumers on a residential lot. The interest on this note was to be twelve percent
per annum which was well within the allowable range under Section 501 (a)
(1) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980. Appellants claimed, however, that the note was usurious and void
under Article 19, Section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution. This section
places a ten percent per annum limit on such notes.55
Appellees alleged that the note was not usurious on the grounds that
Section 501(b)(2)"5° states that Title V overrides state usury laws ab-
553411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976); affd 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir., 1977).
55 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (1976).
555411 F. Supp. 61 at 66.
556 Id. at 65.
557 271 Ark. 503, 49 Gen. L.W. 2469 (1980).
558 Article 19, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution reads as follows: "Usury - Legal rate -
All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten percent per annum shall be void, as to
principal and interest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law; but when
no rate of interest is agreed upon the rate shall be six per centum per annum."
559 Section 501(b)(2) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act.
of 1980 reads in part:
"[The provisions concerning the usury limits under Article VI shall not apply to any
loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance made in any state after the date (on or after April-
1, 1980), and certifies what the voters of such state have voted in favor of any provisions,
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sent a state legislature holding to the contrary. Appellees argued that since
the state of Arkansas had not taken affirmative action to override the fed-
eral usury limits set by this article, federal law, not the Arkansas Con-
stitutional Provision, applied to the note in question.
The Arkansas court first held that "federal law must be authorized by
the United States Constitution before it preempts a state constitution provis-
ion."" ° Since there is no specific constitutional provision dealing with usury
laws, appellee relied on the commerce clause 6' of the United States Constitu-
tion to uphold the legitimacy of federal usury preemption. The court rejected
this argument saying:
We find nothing in any legislation involved here that pertains to the
regulation of interstate commerce. The option of a state to exempt
transactions within that State from pertinent provisions of the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, is a total contradiction
of any suggestion that the act is an exercise of the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce.5 6
2
To which the dissent replied:
Congress will be as surprised as I to learn that there is 'nothing in
any of the legislation involved here that pertains to the regulation of
interstate commerce'; for regulation of money between the states seems
clearly within its scope. The United States Supreme Court has many
times noted the broad scope of Congress to regulate economic affairs
which impact upon the several states." 3
This decision was handed down in December. After a change in the
makeup of the court in January, a petition for rehearing was granted. On
February 23, the court reversed itself and held that Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to enact Title V.511 As Arkansas was one of
the states expected to resist the federal preemption of usury law, this decis-
ion will probably be very influential. Now the interesting question is whether
the Arkansas legislature will take advantage of the power granted them to
override this provision pursuant to section 501(b) (2) of the Act.
constitutional or otherwise, which states explicitly and by its terms that such State does not
want the provisions [of the usury limit subsection] to apply with respect to loans, mortgages
credit sales, and advances made in such State."
5- 271 Ark. 503, 506.
"' U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
552 271 Ark. 503, 506.
,63 Id. at 507.
564 This decision was handed down too late for a cite to be available; the information in
the text came from a telephone conversation with the Clerk of the Arkansas Supreme Court
(March 11, 1981).
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TITLE VI: TRUTH-IN-LENDING SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM ACT
The Truth-in-Lending Act in its original form was enacted in 1968.565
This proved to be a major piece of legislation which protected consumers
by regulating the disclosure of the terms of credit transactions.' The Act
generally required creditors to disclose all material terms a consumer should
be aware of, especially the cost of credit stated as an annual percentage
rate. " " Through the use of the annual percentage rate, consumers were in-
formed as to the cost of interest rates in a uniform manner. Such uniformity
enabled consumers to compare and choose the lowest interest rates with the
most favorable terms.568 According to a Federal Reserve Board study, consum-
er awareness of the true cost of interest rates increased from fifteen percent
in 1969 to nearly fifty-five percent in 1977.69 In addition, the uniform
manner of stating interest rates emphasized the disparity in the cost of
borrowing from various types of lending institutions." "
Despite the Act's success in making consumers aware of the rami-
fications and cost of credit terms, Congress debated the merits of simplifying
the Act of 1968. For two years (1978-1979) the Senate tried to amend the
Act but the proposed changes had been attacked by the House Banking
Consumer Affairs Subcommittee Chairman Annunzio (D-Ill.) and con-
sumer advocates." Representative Annunzio refused to allow his subcom-
mittee to consider the Senate amendments (Senate Bill 108)572 to the 1968
Law.7 In retaliation, the Senate subsequently attached Senate Bill 108
to the House banking bill 4968 later enacted as the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.1" By attaching the Senate
Bill to the House Bill, Annunzio's subcommittee was circumvented because
the Truth-in-Lending Amendments were sent into conference along with the
banking measures."
The conferees, one of whom was Representative Annunzio, could not
r
5
6The Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current
version in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 1600 et. seq. (1976)).6 6 Id., at § 1601(a).
5
67 Id., at § 1606.
565 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODB CONG. &
AD. NEws 849, 850.
N9 Id.
570 Id.
,1 38 Cong. Q. 992 (weekly rept. ed., April 12, 1980).
572 Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act: Hearings on S.108 and S.37 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1979).
[hereinafter Truth-in-Lending Hearing].
573 38 Cong. Q. 992 (weekly rept. ed., April 12, 1980).
574 S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979) reprinted in [1980] U.S. CoNo.
& AD. NEWS, 835, 849.
55 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 80, (1980), reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 896, 908. (hereinafter HousE CoNF. REP. 96-842).
576 38 Cong. Q. 992 (weekly rep. ed., April 12, 1980).
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reach an agreement before the end of the first session of Congress in 1979.5""
On March 27, 1980, the House over Representative Annunzio's ob-
jections and accepted the conference report's suggestions."" The Senate
accepted the report March 28, 1980. 57
A. The Need for Simplification
Senator Proxmire supported the simplification of the Truth-in-Lending
Act by sponsoring the Senate Bill 108 which consisted of numerous amend-
ments to the Act.517 Despite the Act's success, Senator Proxmire stated why
simplification would be necessary:
[Tihe consumer is not getting the clear simple information he
needs to shop for credit. The average disclosure statement is too long
and too technical. Second, the Federal Reserve Board's regulations
have become so complex and voluminous many creditors, particularly
small lenders, just cannot keep pace with the steady flow of new in-
terpretations and rulings. Finally, the regulatory agencies have not
adequately enforced the Act over the past decade. 8
As the answer to the problem, Senator Proxmire supported the Senate Bill
108. "1 He contends that the consumer should receive a concise disclosure
statement which is written in terms that are understandable to the average
consumer. To clarify the criteria of simplification, the Federal Reserve would
issue model forms of acceptable disclosure statements.58 The distribution
of model forms serve a second purpose. Creditors who have been unable
to comply with the complex and frequently changing provisions of the Act
prior to simplification, would now have explicit guidelines. Besides simpli-
fication, the Senate Bill proposed to enforce reprisals against creditors
who had overcharged consumers on interest rates. 8"
Another avid supporter of Senate Bill 108 was Senator Garn. In a
Senate hearing,5 " he stated that the Federal Court case load has increased
forty percent because of the prosecution of Truth-in-Lending violations
which are "hypertechnical [and] supercritical violations."""5 In support of
his statement, Senator Gain points to a Louisiana disclosure form which
was thirty-six inches long."' This statement comprehensively disclosed all
577 1980 Act, supra note 3.
578 Id.
57 Truth-in-Lending Hearing, supra note 572, at 1 (statement of Sen, Proxmire).
580 Id. at 1-2.
581 Id. at 2.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 Id. (statement of Sen. Garn).
5" Id.
586Id. at 3.
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the terms of the transaction but if the length of the statement deters a con-
sumer from reading it, the Act has been emasculated.
Senator Garn also attacked the ambiguous language of the Truth-in-
Lending Act. He states:
I observed in one of those markup sessions [a session wherein
staff attorneys determine how to interpret phrases of the Act] that if we,
who were supposed to be experts including Senators and Staff members
and people from the Federal Reserve and consumer groups, could
not agree on what we were passing or what we meant by what we were
passing, then how in the world could the average unsophisticated
buyer really understand the disclosure and know what he was getting
in his loans and be able to shop for the best deal?7 "
Thus, Senator Garn contended that simplification was needed because the
legalese and complex terms were defeating the purpose of disclosure.
A strong interest group which lobbied for the passage of Senate Bill
108 was the American Bankers Association (hereinafter the ABA). "' The
ABA agreed that the voluminous information required in disclosure state-
ments overburdened the creditor and only inundated the consumer with
incomprehensible information.'89 To support their statement, the ABA
cited a 1977 Consumer Credit survey by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System which indicated that most consumers do not ade-
quately examine the disclosure statement because it is too voluminous and
complex. 590
Similarly, the United States League of Savings Association, (here-
inafter the League) acquiesced with the propositions of the above senators
and the ABA. The main divergence had been the League's recommenda-
tions concerning civil penalties, civil liability, and the recession rights of
consumers."
Senate Bill 108 was not embraced by all concerned interest groups.
The Consumer Union, a consumer advocate group represented by Attorney
Boardman, contended that simplification was necessary but that the Senate
bill eliminated key disclosure statements." 2
The deletions which the Consumer Union contested were that: (1). The
components of the amount financed are no longer itemized, 83 (2). Lenders
"1 Id.
588 Id. at 83 (statement of David Smith Jr., American Bankers Association).
"0 Id.
590 Id.
591 Id. at 81-83.
592 Id. at 12-14 (statement of Ellen Broadman, Attorney, Consumers Union).
508 Id.
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no longer must disclose how they will calculate payment penalties,' " and
(3). Creditors are no longer civilly liable if they do not disclose the total
sale price and later charges.595 These consumer advocates maintain that
the deletions would impair a consumer's ability to determine if the charges
included in the loan were proper and whether the interest rate was ac-
curate. 5 These contentions have not been answered by the passage of the
bill in its final form.
B. Creating the Answer to Simplification
The Senate Report which accompanies Senate Bill 108 states that the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs focused on
four general areas:
(1) providing the consumer with concise, understandable informa-
tion;
(2) simplifying the requirements for compliance so creditors will not
be faced with increasingly complex and frequently changing ad-
ministrative interpretations;
(3) limiting the creditors civil liability for statutory violations to
material disclosures; and
(4) increasing the level of administrative enforcement of the Truth-
in-Lending Act.597
These four areas are discussed below under the Senate Report headings of:
Simplifying disclosures, making compliance easier, limiting civil liability,
and strengthening administrative restitution enforcement.
1. Simplifying disclosures
The Senate committee adopted the Federal Reserve Board's recom-
mendation to simplify the disclosure statement. 98 Simplification was to be
achieved by substitution of totals for the itemization of certain figures."5 9
Although less information would be disclosed to the consumer, the infor-
mation provided would concisely disclose all important details of the credit
transaction.00 Also, descriptive phrases would be attached to numerical
disclosures in order to clarify how these numbers impact upon the credit
transaction."' For example, previously a numerical amount had only a
name attached, such as "finance charge." Under the Committee proposal
594 id.
595 Id.
596ld.
5 S. REP. No. 96-73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) reprinted in [1980] U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEws, 878, 879.
0s/d., [1980] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 880.
599 ld.
600 Id.
M41 Id.
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the numerical amount and the name will include a descriptive phrase such as;
"Finance charge is the amount the credit will cost the consumer annually
or as a total amount."
2. Limiting Civil Liability
The creditor would be civilly liable for statutory violations in the
event that the nondisclosure or mistake in stating terms would impair the
consumer's ability to understand the material terms or costs of the credit
transaction.'0 2 For example, in a closed-end transaction, the creditor would
only be civilly liable for not disclosing the amount financed, the finance
charge, the total amount of the payments, the annual percentage rate, the
number, the amount and due dates of the payments, any security interest
therein taken, and the consumer's rights of recission if applicable."°3 Also,
the creditor would be civilly liable for a failure to disclose certain terms
pertaining to an open-end transaction (also known as a revolving charge.)
However, there would be no liability for a failure to state the sequence of
disclosures or the identification of purchases and payments."°"
The committee also proposes that the creditor would not be sub-
jected to multiple class actions for the same violation." The creditor's
maximum liability would be $500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net
worth, whichever is less. 0 '
3. Making Compliance Easier
These provisions were recommended by the Committee in order to
eliminate the profuse litigation concerning purely technical violations." 7
The Committee tried to structure a bill which would not only protect the
consumer, but the creditor who in good faith has tried to comply with the
complex and ambiguous terms of the Act. An important provision is that
the Federal Reserve Board will promulgate model forms and clauses for
common transactions. 8 Thus, a creditor can be assured of complying
with the act by using a proper form. In addition, minor errors in disclosure
will be tolerated. 0 ' A creditor would be permitted an error within one-
eighth percent of the actual annual percentage rate.
4. Strengthening Administrative Restitation Enforcement
One of the major concerns of the Committee was the lack of enforce-
6
'o 
2 d. at 7, [1980] U.S. Cops CONO. & AD. NEws 883.
osd.
604 Id.
"0 Id.
606 Id.
607 Id. at 6, [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 882.
608 Id. at 7, [1980] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 883.
r09 Id.
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ment of the Truth-in-Lending Act by the federal banking agencies. "1 '
Therefore, the bill proposes that if the creditor incorrectly discloses the
annual percentage rate or the finance charge, he would owe the consumer
a refund."1 The refund would be the difference between the actual and
the disclosed rate or finance charge. Thus, mandatory refunds would be
an effective tool with which to enforce the provisions of the Act.
Another amendment to the Act which would strengthen its clout would
be a study concerning the viability of publishing a "shopper's guide to
credit." '12 This guide would aid consumers in comparison shopping for
credit because it would list the annual percentage rate charged by all credi-
tors in their area.
The House conferees accepted the above Senate amendments but
insisted on six changes."' One of the six changes which was hotly con-
tested was whether a borrower would receive an itemization of the amount
financed. The Senate bill removed this requirement, while the House amend-
ment required this disclosure but only upon the request of the borrower. "
The House conferees won on this point. 1 '
On another disputed point, the House conferees lost. The House amend-
ment would have required full restitution to be made in cases where the
error adversely impacts upon the creditor. 16 However, the Senate bill pro-
vision of partial restitution prevailed. 1
C. The Major Provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform
Act
Title VI, as passed by Congress has made major amendments and
additions to the Truth-in-Lending Act. These provisions are set out below
under sub-headings. Since the changes are voluminous, only the most salient
provisions will be discussed.
1. General requirements of disclosure
This section is intended to simplify the Act's general disclosure re-
quirements. In the event of multiple borrowers in a transaction not involving
the right of recission, a creditor need make disclosures only to the primary
borrower.618 If more than one creditor is involved, the one to whom the
610 Id. at 8, [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 884.
62, Id.
612 Id.
613 HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 575, at 80.
614 Id.
61538 Cong. Q. 992 (weekly rep. ed., April 12, 1980).
616 Id.
617 Id.
618 1980 Act, supra note 3, at Title VI, § 611 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(A)).
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obligation is payable to on its face is the creditor who has the duty to dis-
close the required information.61
The Federal Reserve Board has the discretion to decide whether tol-
erances for numerical disclosures, other than the annual percentage rate,
are necessary. Therefore, a creditor who makes a mistake in quoting the
monthly payment will not be in violation of this Act if the Board determines
that the mistake did not substantially infringe upon the consumer's rights. 2
2. Form of disclosure
The information required by this Title, such as the terms "annual per-
centage rate" and "finance charge" are to be disclosed more conspicuously
than the other information.62'
3. Recission
This portion of Title VI contains several amendments regarding a
consumer's right of recission. Foremost, when a consumer uses his home
as collateral for a loan, the consumer is entitled to rescind this transaction
within three business days after receiving notice of his right to do so. This
grace period was enacted to give the consumer time to consider the serious
consequences of encumbering the title to his home. Also, this Title expands
the protection to persons whose principal residence is a mobile home or
trailer. In addition, the creditor must inform the consumer of the right to
rescind as well as provide the consumer with forms to be used in exercising
such right. 2
This section also benefits the creditor. Title VI extends from ten to
twenty days the period during which a creditor must refund a consumer's
money and terminate a security interest following receipt of a notice of re-
cission. This gives the creditor an opportunity to determine whether the
right of recission is available to the consumer and whether it was properly
exercised. 23
The Act also provides an important provision designed to protect
a consumer's right to sue for recission while an enforcement agency is in-
vestigating a creditor for violation of this Act. This ensures that the maxi-
mum three year period (from the date of the transaction or sale of the
property, whichever occurs first) for rescinding a transaction (not with-
standing the fact that the creditor did not deliver forms to request recission)
does not expire before a consumer's rights are adjudicated by a regulatory
agency.624
019 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(B)).
620 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1535(D)).
C21 Id. at § 612 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(A)).
622 d.
623 Id. at § 612 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(B)).
624 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(F)).
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In addition, the Act explicitly states that a consumer who exercises
his right to rescind may be awarded relief for other violations not relating
to the right to rescind.625
Finally, the right of recission does not apply to residential mortgage
transactions 6 transactions which refinance any unpaid accrued finance
charges of an existing loan by the same creditor secured by the same prop-
erty," ' transactions wherein the State or its agencies are creditors," or
advances under a preexisting open-end credit plan which includes a security
agreement and which was limited by a previous credit plan. " '
4. Exempted Transactions
This provision exempts agricultural credit from the Act's coverage."
While this eliminates a substantial portion of credit transactions from the
Act's protection, Congress felt the agricultural credit is essentially commer-
cial and therefore the protections provided by this Act are unnecessary.
5. Model Forms
The Federal Reserve Board is required to issue model forms which
will protect the creditor from liability because any creditor who uses an
appropriate form will be deemed to be in compliance with the Act.6 ' This
aids small businesses who are unable to procure legal advice in drafting
forms and ensures that consumers are receiving the required information.
6. Accuracy and Dissemination of the Annual Percentage Rate.
In order to reduce the amount of litigation over technical violations
of the act, Title VI provides an acceptable range for errors in a disclosure
statement concerning the annual percentage rate (the interest charges).
For purposes of this Act, the annual percentage rate will be accurate if the
rate disclosed was within one eighth of one percent above or below the
actual rate."'2 However, the Federal Reserve Board may allow a greater
tolerance in order to simplify compliance where irregular payments are
involved."'
Besides ensuring accuracy, the Federal Reserve Board has a duty to
disseminate the annual percentage rate." 4 The Board will publish, on a
demonstration basis, the annual percentage rate for common types of loans
625 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(G)).
626 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(E)).
627 id.
628 Id.
629 Id.
630 Id. at § 603(a), (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h)).
631 Id. at § 605(c), (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1604).
632 Id. at § 607(c), (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1606(c)).
683 ld.
6 4 id. at § 618(a), (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1646).
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charged by creditors in selected metropolitan areas. These publications will
act as a guide to credit in that a consumer will be better able to comparison
shop for the lowest interest rates.
7. Components of the Finance Charge
The term "finance charge" was not adequately defined in the prior act.
Therefore, this title eliminates the confusion over the components of a
"finance charge" by stating that it includes only those charges not made in
a comparable cash transaction.635
8. Civil Liability
This section is intended to restrict the scope of creditor civil liability
for statutory penalties to only those disclosures which are of significant
importance. A creditor may not be held liable if the creditor shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional but
resulted from a bona fide error such as a clerical, calculation or computer
error. 3 6 A creditor has no liability under this section, if within sixty days
after discovering an error, he reimburses the consumer the amount charged
in excess of that disclosed. 637
Also, a creditor is not liable for merely technical violations. Liability
attaches only if the nondisclosure is material."3 ' Material disclosures are
defined by the Act to mean required disclosures such as the annual percentage
rate, the method of determining the finance charge and the balance upon
which a finance charge will be imposed, the amount to be financed, the
amount of the finance charge, the total of payments, the number and amounts
of payments, and the due dates or periods of payments. 3 ' However, a
creditor is not liable for failing to itemize the amount financed when the
disclosure is requested by the borrower " '
9. Restitution
Restitution will lie when the creditor understates the annual percentage
rate of finance charges. If the disclosure error resulted from a practice of
violations, gross negligence, or was intended to mislead the consumer, the
enforcing agency must order that the consumer pay no more than the
finance charge or the annual percentage rate actually disclosed.6 ' Notwith-
standing the preceding sentence, except where the creditor has intentionally mis-
led the consumer, no adjustment will be ordered unless the nondisclosures or
635 Id. at § 606 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1604).
630 Id. at § 615 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635).
637 Id.
638 Id.
63 Id. at § 612 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635).
640 Id. at § 615 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635).
641Id. at § 608 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1607(e)(2)).
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the inaccurate disclosures would have a "significantly adverse impact upon
the safety or soundness of the creditor." ' However, an agency may only
require partial adjustments in compensating a consumer when a creditor's
solvency would be threatened.
10. Open-End Credit Disclosure
This provision amends the prior definition of open-end credit plan in
order to curb the abusive use of this plan. Merchants have been structuring
a one time credit extension into a revolving charge plan (open-end credit)
because the disclosure requirements are less demanding."' Thus, the con-
sumer does not receive the essential cost disclosures such as the finance
charge and the total of payments if the plan is defined as open-end credit.
This revision curbs such practices by requiring that creditors must reason-
ably contemplate repeated transactions with the consumer in the future
before declaring a plan an open-end credit. As a consequence, infrequently
purchased goods such as home improvements or automobiles will be classi-
fied as closed-end transactions.
Another goal of this section is to simplify the required disclosures for
open-end and to aid small creditors in complying with the Act's billing re-
quirements. 6"' The Act eliminates the need to state what type of security
interest the consumer has acquired. 4 In addition, this section relaxes the
requirement that all creditors must provide a brief identification of all goods
purchased on their monthly statements. A creditor with fewer than 15,000
accounts is exempt if the identification was previously furnished and the
creditor treats any inquiry for documentation as if he violated the Fair
Credit Billing Act. 6' This exception applies to small creditors who may
not have access to automatic billing equipment which would be needed
to inscribe such information on his monthly statements. Granted, a consumer
would receive less billing information but this would be offset by the re-
quirements that the consumer incur no finance charge during the period
of inquiry.
11. Closed-End Credit Disclosures
This section pertains to closed-end credit transactions such as home
improvement or auto loans. The intent of Congress in enacting this section
is to simplify the disclosure requirements of closed-end credit transactions.
Such simplification would be achieved by eliminating itemization of the
finance charge and the amount financed as well as a description of the type
of security interest taken unless the consumer requests an itemization of
Id.
"s4Id. at § 613 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(2)),.
6" Id.
645 Id.
6" Id.
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the amount financed."4 7 Less disclosure is tolerated in order to provide a
disclosure statement without incomprehensible jargon. A clear, concise
statement would be a more useful comparison shopping tool.
To further aid the consumer in understanding the disclosure statement,
key terms such as "amount financed" and "finance charge" will be defined
in the disclosure statement. 4 8
Finally, to increase consumer awareness in closed-end credit trans-
actions the creditor of real property must disclose the total finance charge
and the total of payments in all transactions." '4
D. Conclusion
While there is a considerable amount of "simplification" in the new
law, not all groups affected agree that the act will solve the problems which
arose from the 1968 Act and its subsequent amendments. This title seems
to have been accepted, even though the House Subcommittee Chairman
Annunzio and consumer advocates ardently opposed eliminating the break-
down of what a loan covers because of the strong pressure to pass the other
provisions of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980. Therefore, the provisions as enacted did not change the
Act as originally proposed by consumer advocates.
TITLE VII: AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL BANKING LAWS
Title VIP50 of the Act contains substantive as well as housekeeping
provisions affecting banks. The 6% ceiling on the annual dividend rate
payable on preferred stock of banks, was removed 51 but preferred stockhold-
ers retain their immunity from liability for assessments to restore impairments
of capital. (Under certain conditions, common stockholders of some banks
may be assessed to pay in additional capital to correct a capital deficiency)."'2
Relief was given to banks holding real property in violation of existing
provisions."' Historically, banks have been prohibited from owning real
estate ". . . to keep the capital of the banks flowing in the daily channels of
commerce; to deter them from embarking in hazardous real-estate specu-
lations; and to prevent the accumulation of large masses of such property
6'7Id. at § 614 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)).
e48 Id.
e,9 Id.
650 1980 Act, supra note 3.
651 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 51b, 51b-I (West Supp. 1980).
652 12 U.S.C. § 55 (1976). This provision is applicable to national banks, state member
banks, or banks applying for membership in the Federal Reserve System per 12 U.S.C. §
516-1 (1976).
653 12 U.S.C.A. § 29 (West Supp. 1980). See also 1980 House Reg. Q Hearings, supra note
2, at 822-23 (statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency). See related
testimony at 863.
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in their hands, to be held, as it were, in mortmain.'6I Banks may now
apply for a five year extension of the previously allowed five year holding
period if they can show that a good faith effort was made to dispose of
the property within the five year period and that a rushed disposal would
be detrimental.
The Comptroller of the Currency was given authority to deny a
bank the power to accept or retain trust accounts in cases where the trust
power was unexercised for five consecutive years or where the power was un-
soundly or unlawfully exercised."5 Trust companies were classified as banks,
extending the restrictions on the ability of holding companies to own assets
in institutions of different states.65 The Comptroller was also given authority
to declare a legal holiday for national banking associations in the event
of "natural calamity, riot, insurrection, war or other emergency condi-
tions . . .,111
Previously, bank examiners under the Comptroller were under a duty
to examine banks at least three times every two years."5 Under the new law,
the examiners shall examine every national bank "as often as the Comptroller
of the Currency shall deem necessary." 5 9 The desirability of this provision
is questionable because of the potential for abuse. Examiners may cut back
on needed examinations when the budget is tight; conversely, they may
pursue continuous examinations as a method of harassment. The ability to
to selectively harass the banks in this way might effectively result in fed-
eral control over an individual bank's investment decisions or policies.
Under the Act, examiners may also inspect the foreign operations of state
banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System."0 Other mis-
cellaneous provisions dealt with bank ownership interests including holding
companies.
One significant provision dealt with the termination of the National
Bank Closed Receivership Fund. A depositor or creditor of a national bank
which was closed on or before Jan. 22, 1934 must apply to collect a liquidat-
ing dividend by Oct. 7, 1981.61 This termination could result in a windfall
to the Office of the Comptroller.
654 National Bank v. Mathews, 98 U.S. 621 at 626 (1878). By holding real-estate indefinitely,
the bank could defer paying tax on the appreciated value.
655 12 U.S.C.A. § 92(a) (West Supp. 1980).
658 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d) (West 1980). See also 1980 House Reg. Q Hearings, supra note
2, at 805, 824-25 (statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency). See gen-
erally discussion at 875-76 concerning interstate trust operations.
657 12 U.S.C.A. § 95(b) (1) (West Supp. 1980). "other emergency conditions" might include
a run on the banks such a that which occurred in the depression era.
658 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
659 12 U.S.C.A. § 481 (West Supp. 1980).
660 Id.
661 Within twelve months of the last notice published by the Comptroller in the Federal
Register. Thy last notice appeared in 45 Fed. Reg. 66,540 (1980).
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TITLE VIII: REGULATORY SIMPLIFICATION
The Financial Regulation Simplification Act"8' of 1980 is a revolu-
tionary piece of legislation. The Federal financial regulatory agencies (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and National Credit Union Adminis-
tration Board) before promulgating regulations must determine that these
regulations are needed."83
In order to promulgate new regulations, the regulators must meet
certain criteria. First there must be an opportunity for the public and in-
terested parties to comment on the proposed regulation. In order to help
the public and interested parties comment intelligently the proposed regu-
lations must be written in clear and simple language.'," This is a second
intriguing idea in a single act. Just imagine, not only must the regulation
be needed, but also understandable. What heresy! The final directive of
this Act is to avoid conflicts, inconsistencies and duplications." 5 The regu-
lators are directed to follow these provisions to the maximum extent possible.
There are exceptions to the requirements of the Act."' Two of these
exceptions involve changing regulations that are already in existence; two
others involve emergency situations.8 ' When reformulation of a proposal
occurs that has already been issued for public comment it is unnecessary
to reissue a regulation."' This is also true when a change in a regulation
eliminates a loophole or reduces burdens on regulated parties where delays
are unnecessary if they would cause harm.8 9 Just what kind of harm is
not stated.
There is also a provision that suspends the need for following the pro-
cedures of this Act.8" The first of these is when an emergency situation
makes it impractical or unnecessary. Such circumstances could exist when
only technical or clarifying amendments are needed. Another emergency
situation that circumvents the need to follow the Act is when a regulation
is subject to a short statutory deadline.""'
62 1980 Act, supra note 3, at Title VIII.
663 Id. at § 802 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C, § 3521).
66 Id.
M Id. at § 803 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3522).
"08 H.R. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 84, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 897, 912.
"T Id.
8 Id.
MO Id.
670 Id.
71 Id.
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Before a regulation is promulgated the Federal financial regulatory
agencies are required to take certain facts into consideration. The regulators
are directed to consider the alternatives to the regulation under consider-
ation." 2 The costs and burdens are to be considered on both the proposed
regulation and the alternatives. The regulators are directed to keep costs
and burdens to a minimum in promulgating regulations." 3 This Act should
have a positive effect on the public and regulated institutions in letting
them know where they stand.
TITLE IX: FOREIGN CONTROL OF UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The purpose of this Title was to place a moratorium of foreign ac-
quisitions of depository institutions in the United States." '7 This moratorium
was to be effective until July 1, 1980 when a previously begun General
Accounting Office study of the situation was to be completed." '
The intent of Title IX was not to discriminate or cause prejudice
against the attempted foreign acquisitions. 6 The purpose of Title IX was
to give the Administration, the Federal Reserve and Congress an oppor-
tunity to review and study the situation. "
Title IX lists a number of exemptions to its provisions. The first
exemption is any acquisition under $100 million." '7 Corporate reorganiza-
tions and ownership interests under foreign control that are being trans-
ferred are exempt. " 9 The exemption extended to applications filed on or
before March 5, 1980." 9 These applications were however made subject
to standards that were in existance at the time. 81 The last exemption was
for takeover of subsidiaries of a bank holding company under orders to
divest by December 31, 1980." ' This Title was not meant to affect the
case one way or the other but just to give an opportunity for study of the
present situation." "
6T2 Id.
673 Id.
674 Id.
075 Id. The G.A.O. study concluded that the moratorium should continue until overall banking
policy is established. G.A.O. REPORT No. GGD-80-66 (Aug. 26, 1980).
676 Id. at 85, [1980] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWs at 913.
6 7T Id.
6 7 8 Id. at 84; 912.
679 Id.
60 Id. at 85; 913.
681 Id.
682 Id.
as$ Id.
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